31. Memorandum of Conversation

In the first of five U.S.-German NPT discussions, ACDA Deputy Director Farley commented on each of the FRG talking points provided to him. Ambassador Roth also raised the issues concerning the use of nuclear energy and assurances of nondiscriminatory safeguards. He intended to use the results of these discussions to determine priorities for future discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. Drafted on November 3 by Malin (ACDA/IR).

32. Memorandum of Conversation

In their second meeting, U.S. and German officials continued their discussions of the NPT, focusing more specifically on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, safeguards, and the German Government Statement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 12 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room.

33. Memorandum of Conversation

In this third session of U.S. and German NPT discussions, officials continued their discussion of the German talking points, focusing their energies most specifically on Points 7 through 14.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR) on November 18. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room.

34. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) and the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control (Roth)

In this fourth session of U.S.-German NPT discussions, Hillenbrand and Roth discussed the status of the NPT talks, the Brandt government, and U.S. military force reductions in Germany.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Barkley (EUR/GER). The meeting took place in Hillenbrand’s office.

35. Note Prepared by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley)

Disarmament Division Chief Roth confidentially told Farley that Chancellor Brandt planned to have a one-day Bundestag debate on NPT in November. Following that discussion, the FRG would sign the treaty.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–0096, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, April–October 1969. No classification marking. The note is unsigned.

36. Memorandum of Conversation

In this fifth and final session of the U.S.-German NPT discussions, participants continued to ferret out problematic phrases and vague statements in the U.S. position and the FRG Statement. Both sides expressed approval with the overall accomplishments of the sessions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting took place in the ACDA conference room.

37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith’s October 30 conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on NPT and expressed concern about holding a joint U.S.-Soviet NPT deposit ceremony with, as Dobrynin put it, “full publicity.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 70, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicated Kissinger saw it on November 10. Also attached but not published is Part I of the Smith-Dobrynin conversation.

38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt discussed the FRG request for a U.S. statement on NATO and security guarantees. The FRG wanted confirmation that, should the NPT outlast NATO, the U.S. nuclear guarantee would continue to pose as a deterrent to nuclear attack. While he noted he had “no real objection” to confirming U.S. support of the German requests, Sonnenfeldt called the U.S. statement “painful in the extreme.” As the procedure applied an outdated rhetoric to the NPT and made unavoidable connections between the NPT and SALT, which would force the U.S. to make unfortunate concessions on both should SALT encounter difficulties.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: “Can’t we get control of [these?] matters? How about showing Hillenbrand SALT instructions with Colorado language?” The attachments are not published.

39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Rogers asked Nixon to authorize release of a statement in connection with the signing of the NPT by the FRG. Rogers noted that recent talks between U.S. and FRG representatives revealed two requisite provisions before the FRG would adhere to the NPT, the continuation of NATO and U.S. commitment to European security. Rogers assured the President that the drafted statement would confirm U.S. support while not further extending U.S. international commitments.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Kissinger approved the statement for the President on November 12. (Draft memorandum to the President, undated; ibid.)

40. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt notified Kissinger that the Soviets had indicated they planned to ratify the NPT on November 24. Given the perceived lack of Soviet interest in a signing ceremony, Sonnenfeldt recommended against a U.S. signing ceremony.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential. Sent “urgent” for information/action. A notation at the top of the page indicated Kissinger saw it and that action had been completed.

41. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon

Nixon and Kissinger tentatively decided not to have an NPT signing ceremony.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Records, 1969–76, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–28 April 1969. No classification marking.

42. Telegram 200453 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts

The Department instructed posts in those countries that had not yet signed or ratified the NPT to encourage their host governments to do so. The telegram encouraged all officials to cite the recent U.S., USSR, Swiss, and FRG signature of the NPT as indication of NPT legitimacy and as reason to reexamine their own ratification status. It closed with further strategic advice for encouraging ratification in European capitals and former British dependencies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) on November 28; cleared by ACDA/D, EUR, NEA, L, PM, AF, ARA, EA, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Rogers. Repeated for information to USNATO, USEC Brussels, USUN, U.S. Mission Geneva, and Helsinki.

43. Memorandum of Conversation

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Under Secretary of State Richardson discussed efforts to persuade enough countries to ratify the NPT to allow the treaty to come into force. By December, twenty four nations had indicated their intention to deposit their ratification by January, 1970. Should this occur, the two men tentatively agreed to hold a joint U.S.-Soviet ceremony for the deposit of instruments of ratification in early February.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. VI. Confidential. Drafted by Bowden (EUR/SOV); concurred in by Leonard (ACDA); and approved on December 31 by Abramowitz. The meeting was held in Richardson’s office. The memorandum of conversation is Part I of V.

44. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson

Smith expressed concern over getting key non-nuclear governments to sign the NPT before it came into force. He attached a draft telegram to posts in most of the principal non-signatory states and proclaimed it as a “low-key way” to circumvent the U.S. policy against “arm twisting” reluctant governments into signing the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Secret; Exdis. The attachments are not published. The telegram at Tab A was approved and sent on February 11 as telegram 211405 to multiple posts. (Ibid.)

45. Telegram 864 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State

The telegram provided an update on the IAEA negotiations over establishing a committee to implement the NPT’s safeguards provisions. It includes text outlining a set of eight responsibilities mandated by the NPT; encouraged all member states to engage in discussions concerning those tasks with the Director General; and ensured the prompt dissemination of those viewpoints to all member states for consideration. It closed with a discussion of the use of specific terms in facilitating the terms of the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to AEC, Bonn, USEC Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.

46. Editorial Note

47. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)

Seaborg briefly summarized his meeting on NPT with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and attached the talking points of the discussion. These talking points emphasized cooperation, IAEA organization, and the identification of IAEA objectives. These goals included safeguarding NPT negotiations, the maintenance of an effective and credible system, encouraging acceptance in reluctant nations, and the creation of a resolution for a focused forum of discussion with specific time limits.

Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 21, pp. 524, and 532–538. No classification marking.

48. Telegram 40032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

The telegram reported on Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg’s March 18 meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Seaborg recounted the FRG’s decision to sign the NPT. Dobrynin concurred with Seaborg’s assessment, cautioning that the difficulties would arise when “ironing out the differences in texts.” Both participants expressed their desire to prompt the adoption of the resolution at the April Board meeting.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to London and Vienna. Drafted and approved on March 18 by Allen (IO); and cleared by Kratzer (AEC). Trevithick (SCI) was informed.

49. Telegram 1465 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

The telegram reported that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev had handed the UK a statement criticizing its proposal for forming an IAEA safeguards committee.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to London and Vienna.

50. Telegram 45515 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria

The telegram transmitted the text of the Soviet statement concerning the NPT’s entry into force on March 5 and the creation of the Safeguards Committee. This statement is reported in Document 49.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Moscow, London, and USMission Geneva. Drafted and approved by Trevithick (SCI/AE); and cleared in IO/OES, EUR/SOV, EUR/BMI, and ACDA.

51. Telegram 1930 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State

The telegram analyzed the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to establish a safeguards committee to prepare the agency for its NPT safeguards role. Specifically, the telegram examined the Soviet objection to certain paragraphs in the preamble, attempts to alter the focus of the committee, and the introduction of a resolution from Spain revising the Safeguards system. Given the wide ranging support for the Spanish resolution, the conclusion predicted continued discussion concerning possible revisions to the Safeguard system.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to AEC, USMission Geneva, USUN, USMission EC Brussels, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rome.

52. Document Adopted by the Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency

This document entitled “The Structure and Contents of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Under the Nonproliferation Treaty,” outlined the objectives and applications of the agreement, including policies on cooperation, implementation, accountability, and finance.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 218–244.

53. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

The memorandum addressed concerns among Euratom countries that the U.S. might terminate its supply of enriched uranium and the Soviet threat to “make a public issue” should the U.S. continue to distribute the substance. Given that Euratom nations had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, Pollack and Hillenbrand supported the continued supply of uranium over Soviet objections and outlined a potential rationalization to use with the Soviets to assuage their concerns.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) December 1970–December 1971. Drafted by Loftness (SCI/AE) on December 3. Confidential. Drafted on December 3, by Loftness (SCI/AE) and concurred in by SCI/AE, ACDA, EUR/RPE, EUR/G, L/SCI. IO/SCT. Johnson initialed “Approve” on page 5 on December 7 but added a handwritten note stating, “on assumption AEC concurs & H does not perceive any Congressional problem.” The attachments are not published.

54. Telegram 32227 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna

The telegram informed the Mission that the Department, the ACDA, and the AEC had approved of continued U.S. supply of enriched uranium to Euratom countries. It then included a three part statement outlining the official statement to use should the Soviets question the decision either in a formal discussion or in an informal format.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent priority to the Mission to the European Community in Brussels and repeated priority to Moscow. Drafted on February 23 by Haendler and Dodd (EUR/RPE); cleared in SCI, ACDA, EUR, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Springsteen (EUR).

55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Farley recommended that Kissinger urge the Japanese to adhere to the NPT during his upcoming trip to that nation. Farley wanted to address recent reports cited in the Japanese press indicating that the U.S. had lost interest in Japanese adherence to the agreement. To correct this, he highlighted the following considerations for Kissinger to stress in his discussions: 1) U.S. interest in maintaining control over the number of nations with nuclear capabilities; 2) U.S. interest in the overall success of the agreement; and 3) U.S. interest in maintaining the momentum generated by U.S. Soviet cooperation in arms control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972 (2 of 3). Confidential.

56. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt reviewed the issue of delivery of U.S. nuclear material to Euratom after March 1, 1972. Concerned this could become an “irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations,” Sonnenfeldt recommended the approval of a statement to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin detailing the reasons for the continued delivery.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 719, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. 22. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Walsh. Haig initialed “OK” next to “Approve” on page three. An adjacent note in an unidentified hand states: “Livingston notified State by phone 5/25. To be followed by written confirmation by Mrs. Davis.” All Tabs are not published.

57. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Johnson requested that Kissinger stress the U.S. Government’s interest in Japan’s ratification of the NPT on his upcoming trip. He cited the recent Japanese press reports portraying the U.S. as lacking in its commitment to preventing Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. These reports had also caused concern amongst Soviet officials in the IAEA. Johnson concluded by emphasizing the importance of putting “these fears to rest once and for all” and noting the reverberating effects the Japanese ratification would have on other “threshold” nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972. Secret.

58. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

The President and Kissinger discussed the NPT and the Department of State’s effort to get Kissinger to urge Japanese ratification of the treaty while visiting that nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 732–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume.

59. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt summarized negotiations between IAEA and Euratom on a safeguards agreement under the NPT. The attached telegram reported on a meeting between Department of State officials and a European Community delegation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol. II 1971–1972. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is Document 56. Initialed by Kissinger. Tab B was drafted in ACDA and EUR; cleared in AEC/DIS, AEC/NUMS, SCI/AE, ACD, and EUR/RPE; approved by Springsteen. It was repeated for information to Vienna, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and Tokyo.

60. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt forwarded a Department of State telegram containing the text of a verbal statement made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies in response to an April 10 verbal statement by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin complaining U.S. policy on nuclear fuel supplies to Euratom violated Article III of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXIII. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. At Tab A is Document 56. Tab B was drafted in EUR/SOV; approved in EUR, EUR/SOV, and L/SCI, and for information in SCI, ACDA, PK/AE, EUR/RPE, and AEC/DIP. It was repeated for information to USEC Brussels, USMission IAEA, USMission Geneva, USUN, USNATO, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, The Hague, London, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and AEC.