Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

51. Telegram 1930 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State¹ ²

Vienna, April 10, 1970, 1529Z

Subject:

• Safeguards Committee: Special Meeting of Board of Governors April 1 and 2

IAEA/DISTO

Summary: The following is Mission’s analysis of results of special Board meeting of April 1 and 2 which resulted in establishment of Safeguards Committee to prepare Agency for its NPT safeguards role. End summary.

1. In its meetings on April 1 and 2 Board of Governors took an important step in preparing the Agency for its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT. The resolution adopted provided for a committee on which all member states could be represented and set forth a timetable of reports and meetings designed to insure that an initial report of the committee containing advice to the Board on NPT safeguards agreements will be in the hands of the Board prior to August 25, within the 180 day period at the expiration of which negotiations between the Agency and initial states parties to the NPT begin.

2. As a result intensive consultation prior to and during the Board we were able to get the support of the Soviets for the text of our resolution (with two reservations). The Soviet reservations related to mention of U.S.–U.K. to offer submit their peaceful program to NPT safeguards and to fact that only views of member states being solicited and not those of GDR. We met with Soviets on two occasions prior Board meeting once bilaterally and once together with U.K. and kept in close touch with them during meetings. The Soviets manifested a more accommodating attitude toward our resolution and at close of meeting Amb Arkadiev came over to shake hands with members of U.S. delegation, evidently pleased with meeting’s outcome.

3. Soviets were not alone in objecting to paragraphs in preamble. Most of pre-February Board discussion between U.K. and EURATOM countries and others related to contents of preamble. Until the end Trivedi (India) maintained that he could support operative paragraphs of our resolution but most of preamble caused him problems. If the preamble had been simpler we may have had considerably less difficulty with resolution.

4. We were able head off attempt by Spain abetted by India to distort the focus of the study and have the Committee study ways to update and revise the Agency’s safeguards system. In order to head off the Indian “compromise” which would have assigned to the Committee both the tasks of recommending the content of NPT agreements and that of revising the system, the U.S., U.K. and Italy drafted a consensus statement to the effect that when its NPT task was completed the Committee should consider the implications which the arrangements arrived at for parties to the treaty might have for the Agency’s other safeguarding activities.

5. The Spanish draft resolution calling for the revision of the safeguards system was received with enthusiasm by members such as Brazil and Argentina which wish to minimize IAEA involvement in NPT and sympathetically by many other members of the Board e.g. Japan, Australia, S. Africa and even Italy despite its co-sponsorship of our resolution. Many delegations shared Chairman Baxter’s view that the two resolutions were not incompatible and that the adoption of the U.S.–U.K.-Italian text would not necessarily preclude the Board from adopting the Spanish text. Ambassador Smyth, Kratzer and other members of U.S. delegation along with U.K. and Italian dels had extensive discussion with Professor Otero attempt persuade him not press his resolution and convince him that some of his concerns could be met by Committee established under our resolution. Prof. Otero would not accept the compromise proposal we offered whereby the Chairman would read the consensus statement referred to in paragraph 3 above. The Spanish preferred to support resolution of Trivedi (India) who attempted “marry” our text with Spanish text. Trivedi’s text was gaining some support until Smyth indicated it not acceptable. In light of consensus to be read by Chairman and our willingness delete three references to NPT in preambular paragraphs Trivedi agreed not press his resolution to a vote.

6. U.S. del found Jackson (U.K.) much more flexible in his approach than his colleagues from London who arrived in Vienna with preconceived notion that timetable Jackson and Mission had negotiated with Soviets was unrealistic. Mission at times had feeling that London contingent of U.K. del more inflexible than Ducci (Italy) who was somewhat restrained by his co-sponsorship of U.S.–U.K. resolution.

7. It clear from statements at February and April Board meeting and the sympathy expressed for Spanish resolution that many participants in Committee will press for wide ranging discussion of nature of safeguards to be applied under NPT and for some revisions in Agency safeguards system.

Lewis

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to AEC, USMission Geneva, USUN, USMission EC Brussels, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rome.
2. The telegram analyzed the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to establish a safeguards committee to prepare the agency for its NPT safeguards role. Specifically, the telegram examined the Soviet objection to certain paragraphs in the preamble, attempts to alter the focus of the committee, and the introduction of a resolution from Spain revising the Safeguards system. Given the wide ranging support for the Spanish resolution, the conclusion predicted continued discussion concerning possible revisions to the Safeguard system.