Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

50. Telegram 45515 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria¹ ²

Washington, March 27, 1970

SUBJ:

• Safeguards Committee

REF:

• Moscow 1465

IAEA/DISTO

1. UK Embassy Washington has made available to Department text of Soviet statement reported reftel. Text (unnecessary words omitted) as follows:

2. “Entry into force on 5 March 1970 of NPT places new and serious problems before its participants. This concerns in first instance nuclear powers, with whom treaty is deposited and who bear special responsibility for putting it into practice. Before these powers stands task of taking all possible measures which will guarantee reliable control by IAEA and its establishment within period laid down by Treaty.

3. “From this stems necessity of achieving greatest possible mutual understanding with regard to those steps, which are being taken by each side in IAEA in spirit of striving for such mutual understanding; and in view of great role which IAEA play in accordance with NPT, in first instance in field of control, it desirable to communicate certain considerations about best way to guarantee that negotiations about special agreements between non-nuclear powers and the agency should begin within 180 days from date of Treaty’s entry into force, i.e. no later than 5 September this year; and that agreements themselves about guarantees should enter into force for present participants in Treaty no later than March, 1972, and, if all possible, earlier. Therefore, it is necessary to take urgent measures in Agency so that it can execute obligations entrusted to it.

4. “In view of urgency of this task and considering responsibility of depositary powers with regard to non-proliferation treaty, we cannot help but feel concern in connection with approach of British side to problem of preparing IAEA for fulfillment of functions of control over implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty.

5. “It is known to British side that Agency’s Secretariat has already drawn up, taking into full account statutes of IAEA, and system of guarantees, draft model agreement on control with non-nuclear powers. On basis of this draft, Finland has already expressed willingness to conclude agreement on control.

6. “Instead of making efforts to conclude quickly work of IAEA on draft model agreement, British delegation at last session of governing body in February this year, introduced proposal, point of which is to occupy consideration of states with complicated and lengthy enquiry on quote desirable content unquote of agreement about guarantees between IAEA and non-nuclear states. But it already quite clearly indicated in Treaty, as to what content of such agreements should be—they must conform to statutes and to guarantee system of agency. Question also arises—might not procedure, which is being proposed by British delegation, be used by certain states in order to attempt to revise very guarantee system of Agency, to weaken in same manner international control in accordance with Non-Proliferation Treaty and to delay for unspecified time establishment of such control? Such course of events would in no way promote resolution of tasks, lying before IAEA in connection with Non-Proliferation Treaty. IAEA has wherewithal to fulfill tasks in field of control in accordance with Treaty, on basis of existing guarantee system and of experience in its use.

7 “We are convinced that, as has been the case up to now, joint and agreed actions of the nuclear and depositary powers could play great role in concluding work on draft model treaty. We express hope that cooperation between Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States will be continued on all questions linked to Non-Proliferation Treaty.” End Text.

8. Foregoing text made available FYI only and should not be discussed with other delegations except UK and Soviets at their initiative. End.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Moscow, London, and USMission Geneva. Drafted and approved by Trevithick (SCI/AE); and cleared in IO/OES, EUR/SOV, EUR/BMI, and ACDA.
2. The telegram transmitted the text of the Soviet statement concerning the NPT’s entry into force on March 5 and the creation of the Safeguards Committee. This statement is reported in Document 49.