Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

14. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, February 26, 1969, 11:05 a.m.

DRAFT MEMO OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHANCELLOR KIESINGER AND PRESIDENT NIXON

Chancellor: (The Chancellor started by saying he did not have enough English practice; that he has visited the States in 1954 for the first time; that he has a daughter in Washington with two granddaughters.) After this introduction, he mentioned that the President was aware that there was now a “little war” between France and the United Kingdom on two topics. One, the talk that leaked from the conversation between General de Gaulle and the British Ambassador in Paris, Soames, and the other concerning the Western European Union (WEU).²

Nixon: We want to get your advice as to our best action. I feel that I should have communication lines open to the French and to de Gaulle. My views are in support of the European Alliance and I also believe that Britain belongs in Europe. On the other hand, I don’t think it is useful to possibly try to score points when there is no give in the French position. There are other areas where we should work together. It is vital for Germany to have ties with France, you are the key here. I assure you I want to have the closest consultations with your government. You are the heart of the alliance. We don’t want to do anything to weaken this—such as in Berlin—while you are tightrope walking between allegiance to and alliance with the United Kingdom and France. We are on the outside. We don’t want to get involved in internal battles. We want communications with all the parties. Our devotion bilaterally and multilaterally to your nation is firm. How can the United States best play its role?

Chancellor: The best thing would be to show your true interest in European affairs. Many people share the conviction that Europe must be united and become a stabilizing factor in world affairs. This is the main aim here, namely such a united Europe in some form, but this is our own affair. I am sorry that we have not so far succeeded, and it is not only de Gaulle’s fault. He has his own ideas about a united Europe which are not accepted by us. For example, he wanted special connections with us but we don’t have the same views about many things. We share the views of other Europeans on NATO and on relations with the United States. Even on the Near East conflict, our views are different. In talking with de Gaulle we were quite frank. de Gaulle once told me a story about the two treasure hunters who shared many dangers and hardships. However, they found no treasure—they only found friendship. de Gaulle wants Europe without U.S. partnership and with the exclusion of Britain. There are more differences between Germany and France than between any other Western government; yet we have a treaty with the French and we meet on the highest level twice a year. Precisely because our views differ, I feel we must meet. The General has now become disappointed. I tried to strengthen our ties, but I can’t change our views only to agree with the French. Up to now I have avoided a split. I have tried to build bridges—for example, in the last WEU dispute. On the whole our relationship with France is not as good as it used to be. If you constantly disagree on problems it becomes tiresome. We have asked the French why they are so anti-United States. Our relations with the United States have first rank in our own political aims. de Gaulle is a strong man with a feeling of a historic mission because France has declined as a nation. I am very firm in trying not to let us (Germany and France) drift apart. The miracle after the war was that our two people did not want to drift apart either, and yet I am often being blamed for not being able to make up my mind and make decisions in this relationship.

Nixon: You have got to stay on this tightrope. We understand and we don’t want to embarrass this delicate relationship. I will have a very good talk with de Gaulle so that he does not get the feeling that he is being isolated.³ We will have communications, but I also have no illusions.

Chancellor: It is always a pleasure to talk with de Gaulle. What he says we listen to.

Nixon: (Interjects) And he says it so well.

Chancellor: We are not sailing in the wake of France. It is disappointing to him that we don’t share all his views, but we will have to be patient over the next decade with France. de Gaulle should not get the feeling of isolation. I told Wilson that two years ago when he wanted to be harsh, but we cannot force de Gaulle to do anything. Our public opinion is very much for Britain’s participation in Europe and so is the opinion of our national leaders. There really is no barrier for the United Kingdom and we told Wilson last time that we cannot conceive of a united Europe without the United Kingdom or France. In the past few years new European institutions were talked about, forming a unit within WEU and excluding France, but no one can really think that this will work.

Nixon: That is a mistake. We must look at history’s sweep. Man changes and leaders change. France is a part of Europe just as the United Kingdom should be. We should not engage in vindictive rhetoric or react emotionally rashly. We should have a steady firm line. There is another analogy—our relationship with the Soviets. These are not belligerent, not provocative, but firm, direct and uncompromising on principles. I understand that in dealing with the Soviets, we are not dealing with a friend. de Gaulle is a friend. The Soviets may some day be a friend, but not now.

Chancellor: In talking with President Johnson on French problems and mentioning that we were often irritated, he also said that they are still our friends and we should never forget what de Gaulle did during the Cuban crisis.⁴ I feel that de Gaulle will do that in any crisis affecting the alliance.

Nixon: We must look at the long sweep of history, and isolating any one is a great mistake. That will be my policy—to make clear that I want the closest communications with your people. We have talked it over. We have established a “line of credit [communication?]”. The line of communication must be very clear and direct.

Chancellor: When the NPT issue was raised soon after I came into office, I was given a very hard time. I remember an article by Foster in which he said that if you want the treaty you have to risk an erosion in our alliance.⁵ I think that would be a terrible mistake.

Nixon: I couldn’t agree more. What I feel and reiterate because of our future relations—and as you know, I have suggested that the Congress ratify the treaty and eventually it will be passed—or on any problem you face, arms limitation or anything that we may talk about with the Soviets, the alliance is, as we say in the United States, the Blue Chip, the heart of the defense of Europe and of the free world. As far as the Soviets are concerned, all their actions are designed to break up that alliance. We shall not fall into that trap. We will talk but we won’t get trapped. Let us not weaken the alliance. We have to think about what they want and then look at our alliance and particularly at Germany. We know their aim and they are keenly aware that we “play the same game.” I think therefore they appreciate us more.

Chancellor: We must be firm but not hostile, open to discussion. We are prepared to maintain our rights but we and our people are realistic. The people are firm and will not waiver, but they are not emotional. They know very well whether our friends are with us or are not interested in us; but the people don’t want the impossible. The fact that you are going to Berlin is of the greatest value to us. The NPT situation is still difficult; there is division in my country and in my party, but we now should be discussing it on a higher level. There are the two UN resolutions that the Soviets want to utilize against us⁶ and there is the problem of control. We (Chancellor and President) should not deal with that now, but if that could be treated satisfactorily, also for public opinion, that would be a step in the right direction.

Nixon: Do you need some reassurances from the Soviet Union on those two UN resolutions?

Chancellor: Our public opinion would not understand why we signed the treaty if the Soviet Union claims the right of military intervention at their pleasure. On control, for example, we have a common work plan with the Dutch on a centrifuge. So the Soviet Union says we cannot do that after the treaty is signed. Therefore the control question has to be cleared up. I am sure we can satisfy the Offset question satisfactorily and would like to do it over the longer haul.

Nixon: There is need here to get our experts to talk to each other. We have a common objective—international monetary stability. We are not rigid, however, I know your government has some objections to our suggestion about compensation for our troops stationed here. We don’t want any embarrassing situations. I have talked to our financial people and we will have to work out a satisfactory arrangement.

Chancellor: That was a real problem in 1966 and led to Erhard’s resignation.

Nixon: I know there is a German financial group coming to the United States in March. They might talk about this problem with our financial people.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is marked “Uncleared—For Embassy Use Only.” The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In a March 10 letter forwarding the memorandum to Sonnenfeldt, Fessenden explained: “Attached are the draft records of the three meetings we discussed on the phone. The record of the private session between the President and the Chancellor was done by Hans Holzapfel, our interpreter. The other two were prepared by me. We prepared them during the night you were here, and I then gave them to Marty [Hillenbrand] the next morning on our way to Berlin.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut) An earlier draft, including handwritten corrections, is ibid., RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387, Box 484, CF 338, President Nixon’s Trip to Europe, 2/23–3/2/69, Chronology; Memcons— Vol. I of VIII) For a German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 273–278.
2. Reference is to the controversy surrounding two meetings in February between de Gaulle and Soames, in which the future of European integration and security, including British membership in the Common Market, was reportedly discussed. For discussion of the “Soames Affair,” see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 86–89.
3. Nixon was in Paris on February 28 and March 1 for meetings with de Gaulle. Documentation on the visit, including a memorandum of conversation on the latter date, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI. See also Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pp. 370–375; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 104–111.
4. Reference is to de Gaulle’s public support for President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Kiesinger met with Johnson several times during his visit to Washington, August 15–16, 1967. For memoranda of conversation, including discussion of de Gaulle, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XV, Documents 226 and 228; and ibid., vol. XIII, Document 263.
5. Reference is apparently to William C. Foster, “Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament,” Foreign Affairs, 43 (1964/65), pp. 587–601. Foster was Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Johnson.
6. Reference is to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter; see footnote 9, Document 7. Strauss and others insisted that West Germany should not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty until the Soviet Union renounced its “legal right” to intervene in internal German affairs under the articles. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 259.