13. Editorial Note
On February 22, 1969, West German Chancellor Kiesinger met Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin in Bonn to discuss a proposal on the Bundesversammlung from Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party. In a letter to West German Foreign Minister Brandt (as SPD Chairman) the previous day, Ulbricht had suggested that his government would “react positively,” specifically offering Easter passes for West Berliners, if the Bundesversammlung was moved to another city. (Memorandum from Lesh to Kissinger, February 22; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 681, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. I) Although he thought the offer was insufficient, Kiesinger told Tsarapkin that a “substantial and worthwhile concession” might be enough to change his mind. (Telegram 2547 from Bonn, February 24; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6)
At his urgent request, Tsarapkin visited Kiesinger in Stuttgart the next day to deliver a message confirming that a decision to move the Bundesversammlung not only would diminish tensions but also might improve relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany. When Kiesinger reiterated that the proposal did not suffice, Tsarapkin replied that “an improvement in Soviet-German relations, not wall passes, was the key element.” (Ibid.) Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin later gave Secretary of State Rogers an oral statement presenting the Soviet version of events described above. (Memorandum of conversation, March 17; ibid., POL GER W) For records of the meetings between Kiesinger and Tsarapkin, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pages 252–263.
On February 23 President Nixon began his European trip amid reports that the West German Government was reconsidering its decision to hold the Bundesversammlung in Berlin. Before he arrived in Bonn, the Embassy warned that the issue might dominate Nixon’s meetings with Kiesinger, possibly associating him with “responsibility for the final decision, whatever it may be.” In the Embassy’s view, Kiesinger had allowed a “protracted, damaging display of German indecision,” fearing that the controversy might adversely affect his popularity with either German public opinion or the U.S. Government as it considered the feasibility of negotiations with the Soviet Union. By offering “small concessions paid in actuality by the East Germans,” the Soviets could now claim credit for avoiding a crisis over Berlin, thereby “reestablishing a détente atmosphere which wipes out much of the damage from the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.” Since “important American interests” were at stake, the United States could press the West Germans to: 1) reaffirm the decision to hold the Bundesversammlung [Page 33] in Berlin; 2) negotiate a more equitable settlement, i.e., beyond a limited agreement on Easter passes; or 3) make the best of a bad situation. The Embassy suggested that there were “strong arguments” for the first course of action: “If we are going to have difficulties with the Soviets on Berlin, it may be that the present overall situation contains effective limitations on what the Soviets can do in countermeasures around March 5. These may not be so strongly present at a later stage to keep down the level of the dispute and bring the issue to a favorable outcome.” (Telegram 2548 from Bonn, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W) In its reply, the Department repeated that West Germany should decide where to hold the Bundesversammlung; the United States would then support the decision. (Telegram 29542 to Bonn, February 25; ibid.)
On February 25 Assistant to the President Kissinger received an urgent appeal from Fritz Kraemer, his former mentor and currently a senior adviser in the Pentagon. In a memorandum forwarded to Kissinger in London, Kraemer argued that acceptance of the East German offer would have “tragic consequences.” Although some thought the proposed deal indicated a Soviet desire to avoid confrontation, Kraemer believed that the “shoe is on other foot.” He wrote:
“West Germans—especially Social Democrats Wehner, Brandt, Schuetz, but also Chancellor Kiesinger and other non-Social Democrats—have been wavering, ambiguous and publicly agonizing over issue of holding Federal Assembly in Berlin from outset. It is they, rather than Moscow-Pankow, who grasp at straws to be taken off the hook. To renounce established custom of electing Federal President in Berlin in return for Easter Passes would constitute, in harsh world of realities, retreat from a long held permanent position in exchange for purely temporary, transitory advantage. Regardless of how such actual retreat would be justified and prettified by official Western propaganda, friend and foe would conclude that, once again, West has given in to naked Communist threats when moment of truth arrived.”
Kiesinger had reportedly deferred a final decision pending consultation with the President; Kraemer insisted that Nixon should use this opportunity to intervene since Washington, not Bonn, was ultimately responsible for the security of Berlin. “Under circumstances,” he explained, “US President in own self-interest cannot simply let uncertain and advice-seeking Chancellor follow line of least resistance and yield out of weakness. Bonn, on contrary, needs to be assured of US feeling that, at this late date, change of venue of Federal Assembly site would be fateful mistake of gravest consequences.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 448, President’s Trip Files, Wires Sent to Dr. K While on Presidential Trip—23 Feb thru 2 March 69)