Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

263. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 15, 1967, noon.

SUBJECT

• The President’s August 15 Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign
  • Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, Federal Republic of Germany
  • Mr. Heinz Weber, German Interpreter
• United States
  • The President
  • Mr. Harry Obst, Interpreter

After an exchange of pleasantries;

The President said that he was aware that the Chancellor had a budget problem and so did he. The last sixty days, in addition to the budget problem, had called for a number of critical decisions. Among them had been the railroad strike for which it had been necessary to pass legislation that was upsetting “the labor people”. The Middle East crisis had developed suddenly and it had been very difficult to obtain a cease fire but at least a temporary solution had now been found. Then Chairman Kosygin, without any forewarning, had decided to see him. He had not wanted to go to New York because of the presence of people at the United Nations from communist countries, Arab countries and Africa, and Mr. Kosygin had not wanted to come to Washington.

We then agreed to meet in Glassboro. He said the Chairman and he had discussed primarily the Viet-Nam problem. He believed that the Soviets would have liked to see the matter settled but it seemed they did not have sufficient “horse power” or influence to bring to bear on Hanoi.

They also had talked in some detail about the situation in Venezuela where some communist agitators had been captured. They had a “straight” talk on the matter and he found the attitude shown by Kosygin “quite satisfactory”.

They had talked about avoiding the establishment of an antiballistic system which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Kosygin had agreed to talk about this matter but no date was set.

He had suggested to Kosygin to table the NPT without Article III. He could not get an agreement on this at that time but this week it looked as if the Soviets were ready to proceed on this matter. The Soviets had informed us at 5:30 a.m. that they were ready to table the draft leaving Article III blank and leave the discussions on that Article to the future developments. He believed this would actually happen this week or next. He did not really know why they suddenly showed this willingness; maybe they looked for some positive result for their 50th anniversary; maybe they wanted to make up for their flop at the United Nations.

After the hectic Middle East discussion at the United Nations there had been a disturbance in the Congo. He had sent over three planes mainly with the thought in mind to have them ready in case it was necessary to evacuate Americans in that area and if this was not necessary to help the established government in their efforts to put down the rebellion. This was the first time the United States had intervened on behalf of a black government. For that reason he considered this an important move which, however, had brought about some consternation on the domestic scene.

This was followed by the race riots in Detroit and other cities. They had not been as bad as similar riots in India, Latin America and other parts of the world but had been very unusual for our country. President Roosevelt had had the same problem during his administration.

The President then turned to the budget situation. He explained in detail the components that added up to a total deficit of about $30 billion. In that context he mentioned General Westmoreland would need about 200,000 more men in Viet-Nam, as he thought that now was a good opportunity to “try to wind up this thing.” Sixty-five thousand of those will be supplied by South Viet-Nam, 45,000 by us and the rest by the Koreans and the other allies. However the United States would have to pay for almost all of them. He said he was trying to cover the deficit by borrowing about one-half of it, cutting the deficit part of the expenditures by one-fourth and raise the other one-fourth by means of a surtax. If he would have to go into the capital market to borrow all of it, it might drive interest rates up as high as 12 percent and cause a dangerous inflationary spiral. This was a time when cities and other public authorities were borrowing heavily for all sorts of projects which had put an additional strain on the capital market. He hoped he could avoid that situation. However, some votes in congressional committees had not come out in his favor.

His financial problems were compounded by the fact that his public opinion poll showed him at an all-time low of 39 per cent.

The Chancellor told the President not to be too concerned about the public opinion polls. Polls in his country about the popularity of the CDU Party generally showed a low about one year before any election, but they had always won the elections.

The President replied he found the Chancellor’s remarks very encouraging but he still preferred to see a more favorable poll. He did not think that he had made any major political mistakes, but there were groups inside his Party and others that had different views on matters like Viet-Nam and he has not been able so far to make them go along with his opinion.

The President emphasized that he would keep the Chancellor fully informed, as he had done in the past with Mr. Erhard, on all U.S. activities around the world that could significantly affect the world power structure. He could not repeat that often enough. He was willing to talk about the NPT in detail and listen to any suggestions that the Chancellor might have in the matter. With regard to the troop level he could promise the Chancellor that he would do anything in his power to hold the line if the Chancellor would do the same. He would not ask any favor of the Chancellor that he would not readily grant himself. After the visit of McCloy and his visit to Bonn he had allayed domestic fears on Germany. Then had come from Bonn the leak about troop cuts and it had led to a severe reaction in the Congress which had taken revenge by such actions as a substantial cut in his foreign aid request.

The Chancellor told the President that he tried to keep up with events in the United States. He was fully aware of the President’s domestic problems. He could not see where the President had made any major political mistakes that might account for his low rating in the polls. He believed that whenever a nation was plunged into a serious crisis people were quite ready to follow and support the Government’s policy in the beginning but after some time and after the real difficulty became apparent and people could not see the end or a satisfactory solution in sight people had a tendency to get nervous and discouraged. This is why he had been so angry by the remark by Defense Minister Schroeder that the FRG would have to cut their Armed Forces by 60,000 men. This simply was not true. It had never been considered by him or his government.

The Chancellor then explained that the proposed cuts were only in planned increased defense spending. In fact military spending would still go up by 1.1 per cent in 1968, by 7.5 per cent in 1969 and by 6 per cent in 1970. He then explained his attempt to introduce a “medium term” financial plan covering a five year period. He also explained that this year’s reduction in defense expenditure planning was not just a result of economic reasoning, but that the top military men had tried for a long time to achieve more “realistic planning” in the Defense Ministry. They felt that the planning of the MOD exceeded what they could hope to get allocated in the national budget. They finally had agreed on the modification of planning just two weeks before the fall of the Erhard Government. In his talks with Defense Minister Schroeder last week they had decided that if a cut in personnel (the Chancellor did not specify here whether military or civilian) had to be made it would not exceed 15,000. This decision would only be made later in the course of the year. He personally would hope there would not be need for any cuts at all.

The President replied he believed that force levels should be maintained if at all possible. Europe would need all the military forces at its command in order to remain secure during the uncertain period that lay ahead. He would do anything in his power to preserve the strength of the Alliance. He did not want to be the architect of the dismantling of the Alliance. He would hold the line if Kiesinger could hold the line, but if the Chancellor had to make a reduction he would be forced to make a proportionate reduction in the face of pressure from public opinion and from the Congress. They would have to stand arm in arm.

The President complimented the Chancellor on his skillful handling of the improvement of relationships with East European countries. He believed the Chancellor was moving in the right direction.

The President then repeated with great emphasis that all available forces were needed to guarantee the security of the Alliance and that every effort should be made to retain the present strength.

The Chancellor said it was his view and that of his government to strive to maintain the present strength of the armed forces. He also believed that this was important to the security of the Alliance. Keeping up the necessary strength was not in any way in conflict with the policy of detente and the pursuit of peace. However, one would have to be careful not to confront the two military apparatuses facing each other with additional political tension, as this could lead to an eventual explosion. While keeping the military balance on the same level one should instead try to decrease the tension and keep it as low as possible. News media and some people had made it appear as if the FRG policy was one of aiming at the reduction of force levels; this was far from the truth.

The President interjected that if the members of the House and the Senate were asked by how much they thought Kiesinger was trying to cut his armed forces, about 90 per cent of them would say by 60,000 men. The President then dwelt in some detail on the problems posed by inaccurate or slanted reporting in the news media as well as differences in language and national customs. He quoted as an example some misinterpreted statements of Prime Minister Ky that had appeared on television and in the press. He said that just one misunderstood word often could distort the picture significantly. In the light of this it was all the more important that the men at the top had complete trust and confidence in one another and that they would not do anything that would affect the position of the other without frank and full consultation. It should be the same kind of process as between two brothers running a business jointly. He believed this was the best way for the two men to work together. Did the Chancellor agree to that?

The Chancellor replied the President could be assured of that. He could also be assured that what he had just told him about defense matters was true and correct.

The Chancellor cited a public opinion poll taken in Germany which showed that the percentage of people there favoring closer cooperation between Germany and the United States had risen from 42 per cent in January of this year to 71 per cent in June of this year.

The Chancellor then spoke about the Franco-German relationship. He said it was almost a miracle that after centuries of warring and fighting with each other a Franco-German friendship had been established. He was trying to continue the course begun by Schumann and Adenauer.

During his recent talks with General De Gaulle in Bonn he had tried to provoke the General into a clear statement of his views on the United States. He had found them less harsh than expected on some counts. De Gaulle had said publicly during his visit and emphasized even more strongly in private that he believed that it was useful to maintain the present military strength and that the United States and France had been connected by a long and natural friendship. France wanted to preserve that friendship and wanted to preserve the Western Alliance at least until such time as the relationship with the Soviet Union had completely changed. De Gaulle also said publicly that he would not object to the physical presence of U.S. forces on German soil and had added privately that not only would he not object to them but he found their presence desirable. (The Chancellor said he hoped he was not committing any breach of confidence by relating this private remark to the President.)

In response to Kiesinger’s question why De Gaulle was using such harsh language about the United States the General had answered that this was not so much directed against the United States but was addressed to the French people to exhort them not to give up their French identity for a life of comfort in the Atlantic Community.

The Chancellor remarked that he would interpret the remark of De Gaulle “until the relationship to the Soviet Union had completely changed” to mean that he would not leave the Alliance in 1969, as it was not likely that a complete change could occur by that time.

On the question of British entry into the Common Market he had found De Gaulle to be “stubborn”. He did not believe that much of a change had taken place in his attitude on the matter but maybe in the long run public opinion and other pressures would bring him around to reconsider his position.

De Gaulle also had told him that he believed that the only danger from the Soviet Union was a military danger. He did not think that the communists in the countries west of the Soviet Union were any longer true allies of the Soviet Union. The Chancellor made clear that he did not share this view, and the President said he did not either.

The Chancellor stated that he thought the Soviet Union, though not talking much about China, was thinking about the problem of China all the time. The President agreed with this view.

The Chancellor repeated that he thought De Gaulle’s attitude during their last meeting had been more relaxed than during their meeting in January. He had seemed to acknowledge the existence of differences between the two men rather than to balk at them as he had done in the past. He had ended their conversation by telling the Chancellor a story about two men that had gone out to hunt for a treasure. After a long journey, hardship and disappointment they finally had to give up their attempts without finding the treasure. Instead, however, they had found a much more valuable treasure: friendship and understanding.

The President thanked the Chancellor for his comment on General De Gaulle. He said he was impressed by the progress and stabilization achieved in France under the General’s leadership. This stability had had a good influence on the rest of the world. He did not quite know why De Gaulle sometimes found it desirable to use such sharp language. Maybe by age he still felt more closely attached to another era, the era of Church-ill and Roosevelt, and maybe he remembered too much the attitudes of President Kennedy and Macmillan toward him. As far as the President was concerned he made a policy of consciously refraining from negative statements about De Gaulle. Whenever he was being hit by the General he was just turning the other cheek. In four years he had not said one bad thing about him. He (the President) was interested in seeing European unity maintained and he did not want to add to any seeds of dissension. He believed that if the chips were down De Gaulle would stand by the United States, as he had done during the Cuban crisis. This action the President had not forgotten.

The Chancellor, returning to the question of British application to enter the EEC, stated that some decision would have to be made within the EEC during this year with regard to Britain’s application. His Government had made clear to Mr. Wilson, and during the Rome meeting, that they favored the British proposal. He had suggested that the Chiefs of the six governments meet again toward the end of this year to discuss the matter. However, he could only go so far in pushing the British case. He could not act like “a bulldozer”. That would make the General only more stubborn.

The President said that he did not think De Gaulle knew how much respect the President had for the French people and how much confidence he had in General De Gaulle. He thought the Chancellor could be helpful to the United States as a sort of mediator in his talks with De Gaulle. The Chancellor replied he would be glad to try to mediate and harmonize wherever possible. He considered his last meeting with De Gaulle (about June 12) as the most important. With regard to the then just erupted conflict in the Middle East De Gaulle had expressed his concern about the possibility that Israel might not want to relinquish the conquered territory. The President interjected that he was concerned about the same matter.

The Chancellor said he believed De Gaulle was honest and serious when he told him during the meeting that his foremost concern was peace for France and peace for Europe. The German people had been confronted with a moral option at the beginning of the Middle East crisis. He (Kiesinger) was happy that they had opted almost unanimously for Israel. He thought this had proved again that the rumors and press stories about a resurgence of neo-nazism were false.

The President stated he was often confronted with the problem of having an image distorted by half a dozen newspaper people or other media, probably at times with the intent to further the interests of certain groups.

He said since their interests were one and the same they should never fight each other. If he and the Chancellor could stand together it would be an essential contribution to stabilizing the world situation. A closer United States-German cooperation would be in the best interests not only of the two countries but would be of benefit to all of Europe. He did not think that it had made any sense for Germans to fight Americans in two big wars as they both hailed from the same stock.

Returning to the Middle East crisis the President said that in his meeting with Foreign Minister Abba Eban on May 26² he had tried hard to discourage any aggressive move on the part of Israel and had tried to assure Mr. Eban that according to United States intelligence information the Arab buildup was of a defensive nature and did not point to an imminent Arab attack. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

The Chancellor thanked the President for informing him on this meeting and the position taken by the United States in the Middle East conflict. He said he had found this information extremely interesting.

The meeting then broke up about 2:00 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 475, CF 37. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and approved by the White House on October 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Kiesinger visited the United States August 13–19.
2. A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.