Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

226. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 15, 1967, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger
• Report on Their Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• Americans
  • President Johnson
  • The Secretary of State
  • Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
  • Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • George C. McGhee, American Ambassador to Germany
  • John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Robert R. Bowie, Counselor of the State Department
  • Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director, ACDA
  • Francis Bator, Deputy Special Assistant to the President
  • Edward Fried, Senior Member, NSC Staff
  • Alfred Puhan, Director, EUR/GER
  • Harry Obst, Interpreter
• Germans
  • Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger
  • Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
  • Heinrich Knappstein, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany
  • Karl-Guenther von Hase, State Secretary and Press Chief
  • Karl Theodor, Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Parliamentary State Secretary
  • Dr. Horst Osterheld, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
  • Dr. Johannes Prass, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
  • Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Foreign Office
  • Dr. Ulrich Sahm, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
  • Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
  • Mr. Claus Soenksen, Personal Aide to Foreign Minister Brandt
  • Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
  • Mr. Hartmut Schulze-Boysen, Counselor, German Embassy
  • Heinz Weber, Interpreter

After expressing regrets for having kept everyone waiting so long,² the President said that the Chancellor and he had had a good exchange of views. He said that they had talked about our mutual problems and touched on all the important issues which would be taken up in detail during the latter part of the visit. The President said that he had explained to the Chancellor his feeling that our common bond, our unity, our standing shoulder-to-shoulder is unchanged. The President explained that he and the Chancellor were in complete agreement that NATO must be kept sturdy to defend Germany and Europe. He said that complete understanding had been reached on this point.

The President said that on the non-proliferation treaty he had asked the Chancellor to review with the Secretary of State and other officials all details of that project. He said he had made it abundantly clear to the Chancellor, as he had to his predecessor, Mr. Erhard, that we would not take any decisions affecting the welfare of Germany without first having had the most candid consultations.

The President reported that on the question of the trilateral talks and troop strength, the Chancellor had told him it would not be necessary to reduce the German strength at all; in any event it would in his view not be more than a reduction of some 15,000. The President said he had made it clear we didn’t think there should be any reduction. He referred to gallant efforts on our part to avoid any reductions of U.S. troop strength. He stated that if the German people felt it was essential to make reductions in the German military establishment, it would cause us a serious problem here, a problem over which he might not be able to prevail. He said the decision of the FRG on this is one that would be made for both nations. He said we hoped it would not be necessary for us to make reductions. He said we will try to avoid them.

The President said that as far as the Chancellor and he were concerned, they had the same objectives: maintain our strength, work to lessen tensions, remain loyal and true to one another, and work for a united Germany and Europe.

The President said he and the Chancellor had exchanged views on de Gaulle. He mentioned that the Chancellor and he had talked about bridge building. He said he had given him our views on Viet-Nam and the Middle East. He told him how earnestly we were working to solve that problem. He said we were living in very serious times and were anxious to meet our problems without endangering our security.

The President returned, at the conclusion of his remarks, to the possibility of cutting troop strength. He reiterated the view that we should not reduce our troops, but he pointed to the $30 billion deficit we had and his need for getting a tax bill through the Congress. He said if we did not get such a tax bill, we would face serious problems. He might have to make cuts even where he didn’t want to.

Chancellor Kiesinger expressed full agreement with the President’s remarks. He said his colleague, Minister of Defense Schroeder, had done great damage with the report that German troop strength would be cut by 60,000. Kiesinger said there had been no such Cabinet decision; there had been merely cuts from projections for spending. The Chancellor said he had made it clear the Germans would increase their spending. He referred to the proposal for medium-term financing, a new kind of planning for the Germans, to give them some idea where they were going. He said he had learned that some of the planning in the Ministry of Defense had been highly unrealistic. He referred in this connection to a conversation he had had with General De Maziere, who had told former Defense Minister Von Hassel to come down to earth. Two weeks before Erhard’s fall, Von Hassel finally accepted the General’s recommendation.

The Chancellor said he was personally convinced that they could maintain their present troop strength but that if the decision was to cut, it would under no circumstances be more than between 15,000 and 19,000. He repeated, no final decision had been reached. He stated a final decision would be made only after consultations with us. He also assured the President that any of the four plans recommended for the absorption of the reduced projections would not weaken the German military establishment.

The Chancellor said he wanted to use this occasion to draw the President’s attention to his Government’s declaration of last December to the effect that the Germans would increase their spending for aid. He said the Germans had done so. He pointed to this sector of the German budg-et in which there had been no cut. He said German aid would increase in 1968 by 26%, in 1969 by 10% and in 1970 by 6%.

The Chancellor said he had told the President that according to a public poll taken in Germany this year, to the question, “Do you think close cooperation with the United States is necessary?”, the response had been 42% affirmative in January, 47% in February, 69% in May, and 71% in June.

The Chancellor said he wanted to say a word about de Gaulle. He said he had decided to provoke the General and probe his real feeling about the United States. Kiesinger said he had told the General that the Germans regarded NATO and an integrated military system as indispensable and that the Alliance had to be strengthened. He warned de Gaulle that remarks about the U.S. could damage Franco-German relations. Kiesinger said it was interesting that de Gaulle had stated publicly and even more strongly privately that French policy was not directed against the U.S.; that he wanted to preserve French friendship for the U.S.; that he wanted to preserve the Alliance until relations with the East were completely changed; and that he had no objections to the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe. Privately de Gaulle had told Kiesinger that the presence of U.S. troops was even desirable.

The Chancellor said up to a point the Germans could win some ground from de Gaulle. The General had been much more stubborn about U.K. entry into the Common Market, but the Germans continued to show their support for the British. At the same time they had told Harold Wilson they couldn’t act as a bulldozer.

The Chancellor said that he and de Gaulle agreed that they disagreed on most points. The Germans hope, according to Kiesinger, in the long run to accomplish one big task, to overcome the existing antagonism and to restore normal conditions in Europe. He said there was a natural destiny which linked France and Germany.

The Chancellor turned to German efforts in Eastern Europe. He mentioned Foreign Minister Brandt’s trip to Romania and the exchanging of trade missions with the Czechs. He said he had told the Czechs that the Munich Agreement was no longer valid; that the Germans no longer wanted to base their relations with Czechoslovakia on that treaty.

The Chancellor, in summing up, referred to reports in some U.S. papers alleging that a reduction of 60,000 men in the German Army had some connection with a new German policy, some new form of cooperation with France, or some new Rapallo. He said this was “sheer nonsense, sheer nonsense”. He said the Germans were determined to continue their close relations with the U.S., adapted to modern requirements. He said he knew that European security could not be assured without U.S. support. He said the Germans would do what they could to make their contribution to assuring that security.

The Chancellor asked the President to trust him and not to listen to rumor makers. He said with great emphasis: “As long as I am the Chief of the German Government, you can depend on us going along that way….; we will be honest; we will make sure of your friendship by being your friend.”

The President said it was very heartening to all around the table to hear the Chancellor’s remarks. He regarded this a good omen for this visit. He said what had distressed all of us were rumors and reports before decisions had been made. He said he had been very glad to have the Ambassador come to him and inform him of the facts. The President said none of us should take action without full consultations with NATO. He said he was the last to want to dismantle NATO. This is why we had to help the British and the Germans earlier to keep them from starting the unravelling process. The President said he didn’t want to mislead the Chancellor. He said he did not know whether he had the strength to keep Mansfield from forcing U.S. troop reductions if the Germans made reductions in their military establishment. The American people would not be able to understand why we should maintain our troop strength in Germany if the Germans themselves felt able to cut their own troops. The President concluded he hoped and prayed that no cuts would be made.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Kiesinger Visit. Secret. Drafted by Puhan. The meeting was held at the White House.
2. The President and Chancellor met privately at noon. A memorandum of conversation covering the initial meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 263.