Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

225. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 15, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with German Foreign Minister Brandt

PARTICIPANTS

• German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
• German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
• The Secretary of State
• United States Ambassador George C. McGhee

1. U.S.-Soviet Relations—The Secretary asked Brandt whether there was suspicion in Germany, arising out of U.S. contacts with the Soviets, that we would reach agreement with the Soviets at the expense of German interests. Brandt replied that, although there are recurring intimations of this nature in the press, there is no substantial body of informed opinion in Germany that has such a concern. The Secretary pointed out the poor state of relations existing between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which is not conducive to reaching new agreements. It is the Soviets who have failed to ratify the Consular Convention between us, even though it has now been approved by the U.S. Senate. His impression is that the Soviets are dominated by the fear of China—by the prospect of an unfriendly nation of a billion people possessing nuclear weapons on their border. Indeed, in his judgment it is the position of China with respect to the Vietnamese war, which prevents the U.S. and Russians from bringing about an end to the war. The Secretary felt that we and the Soviets could reach an agreement to end the war without difficulty. The Secretary referred in this connection to certain evidence that both the Soviet people and the satellites are getting tired of the sacrifices they are making throughout the world, i.e., in Vietnam, the Middle East and in the under-developed world.

2. German-Soviet Relations—Brandt reported that although the official Soviet attitude toward Germany, and the Soviet press, remained harsh and critical, he had received certain suggestions in recent months that the Soviets might be seeking an improvement. He considered that certain signals had been passed to German officials in Moscow and Geneva which could be so interpreted. He has discussed this matter with Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin in Bonn, however, there has been as yet no change in Soviet policy. He would continue his efforts, since Germany desired an improvement in relations with the Soviets.

3. German Policy Toward Eastern Europe

a. Romania—Brandt commented very favorably on his recent visit to Bucharest.² He had been warmly received, having had some nineteen hours of conversation with high officials including six with the Prime Minister. He had found the Romanians willing to act quite independently of the Soviets. They seemed anxious to give practical effect to their recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany, both in the cultural and economic fields. They proposed cooperative economic enterprises in third countries—citing Morocco as a possibility. No details as to such arrangements, however, had been worked out. In discussions with the Romanians on how to proceed with negotiations on East-West security matters, Brandt had found, however, a sharp difference in view with the Romanians. Whereas Germany preferred that any negotiations be between the Blocs, i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians preferred that they be bilateral—looking toward the removal of the Blocs. Manescu said jokingly that “they did not propose to let the Germans put the Russians in control of them again.”

b. Czechoslovakia—Brandt was also optimistic about the exchange of Trade Missions³ recently negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia by his personal representative, Ambassador Bahr. Although this had not been extended to official diplomatic or consular relations, the Czechs understood that the German Trade Mission would look out for the interest of Germans in Czechoslovakia generally.

c. Bulgaria—According to Brandt, Germany could also have diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, if it were willing to cancel certain Bulgarian indebtedness to Germany. In response to a query by the Secretary, Brandt advised that these arose from recent commercial transactions.

d. Eastern Germany—With respect to their relations with the GDR, Brandt commented on the harsh and unyielding attitude displayed by Ulbricht to the recent proposals made by the FRG, looking to the establishment of contacts in various technical areas.

4. UK-European Security Proposal—The Secretary made reference to a recent proposal made by the UK to the effect that the Four Powers, i.e., United Kingdom, United States, France and Germany, should together consider possible moves in the field of European Security. Brandt commented that British Foreign Minister George Brown had asked him to speak to Secretary Rusk about this proposal. As far as he could see, however, the proposal was largely procedural in nature. He was not clear as to what the mechanism created would deal with. His own concept was that the Germans might first feel out the East Germans, to see what possibilities existed, after which these could be taken up by the Four Powers. The Secretary commented that it was easy for us to accept the British proposal as a procedural step, however, he too is not clear as to what they really have in mind.

5. Greece, Turkey and Canada—In discussing NATO problems, Brandt referred to a rumor that he had heard to the effect that Greece and Turkey were considering withdrawing from NATO, and associating with some regional group—in Greece’s case with Tito. The Secretary pointed out that Turkey’s interest lay more with Iran and Pakistan, and that this association might prove profitable in dealing with the Arabs. In the course of the ensuing discussions, skepticism was expressed by both the Secretary and Brandt that Greece and Turkey would in fact take such a step. The Secretary explained the recent apparent inconsistencies in Canadian policy, in terms of Prime Minister Pearson’s having been awarded the Pulitzer Peace Prize. Ever since that award, the Canadians have been looking for opportunities to be peacemakers. Difficulties arise in negotiations involving the Canadians, since no matter what the position of the U.S., they tend to take contrary or different views in order to demonstrate their independence of us.

6. UK Entry in the Common Market—Brandt referred to the strong public opinion in Germany supporting British entry into the Common Market. If de Gaulle persisted in blocking British entry, a serious problem would arise before the end of the year in German-French relations.

7. de Gaulle —The Secretary referred to de Gaulle’s recent visit to Canada and indicated our concern as to the implications of de Gaulle’s unusual behavior.⁴ Did this mean that de Gaulle had become senile and was losing his grip? Brandt said that his impression from recent conversations on his visit to Bonn was that he was not, and he cited several examples of de Gaulle’s mental acuity and firm grasp of the situation. In his judgment we would have to put up with de Gaulle for another two to three years.

8. France and NATO—Secretary Rusk referred to recent evidence that we had heard that France was considering withdrawing from NATO in 1969. He suggested to Brandt the desirability of our discussing this with our NATO allies in order to prepare them for such an eventuality, otherwise, French withdrawal might have a serious effect on the NATO. Brandt discounted the possibility of French withdrawal. He pointed out the assurances de Gaulle had given him during his recent visit to Bonn. Brandt did not react to the suggestions of concerted action. Ambassador Knappstein pointed out the desirability of not taking any action since it might encourage the French withdrawal.

9. German Reunification—The Secretary said he wanted to make it clear to Brandt that we would be glad at any time to consider or support any reasonable move looking toward German reunification. The difficulties that he had had in this respect with Schroeder during his period of Foreign Minister was only that he had insisted that the Western Four be in agreement as to how we proceed and that the Soviets accept a Western proposal to negotiate. In the absence of such prior agreement there was the danger that the U.S. would find itself alone as it did in 1961 and 1962.

10. Soviet Troop Withdrawal—The Secretary advised Brandt that we see no evidence of Soviet willingness to engage in reciprocal troop withdrawals in central Europe. This is probably because the Soviets fear criticism that they had acted against the interests of the bloc, by making it possible for the U.S. to release troops for Vietnam. In fact, however, we have ample troops in Vietnam and in any event would not use troops so released. In recent years the U.S. has taken a different attitude on the question of troop withdrawals from that which we held earlier. Initially we were concerned with the obvious disparity between U.S. withdrawals to America and Soviet withdrawals to the Soviet Union, however, changing circumstances in Eastern Europe perhaps have reduced the disparity.

11. Political Consultation Among the Six—In responding to what had been decided at the recent Summit meeting in Rome concerning political consultation among the Six, Brandt said that the agreement had been only to consider the feasibility of such discussions—not to conduct such discussions themselves. He was very skeptical about the ability to have discussions about the security threat to Europe as provided for under the Treaty of Rome.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. Secret. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on October 31. Brandt accompanied Chancellor Kiesinger on his August 13–19 visit to Washington. For text of public statements issued during and at the conclusion of the visit, see Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1967, pp. 325–330. McGhee commented on the visit in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 228–229.
2. August 4–8. For text of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Brandt visit, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 218–220.
3. For text of the August 3 German statement on these discussions, see ibid., p. 217.
4. de Gaulle visited Canada July 23–26. During a speech at Montreal City Hall on July 25, he repeated the rallying cry of French-Canadian separatists, “Vive Quebec libre.”