Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

158. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 18, 1972.

Saudi Arabian Role as a Factor in U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf

In response to your request for a review, prior to the Moscow Summit, of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf and the more active role which the Saudis are playing, the following is a summary.

Situation in the Area. The Communist states and their radical Arab followers have had limited success in expanding their influence along the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula. Both the Soviet Union and the Chinese have close relations with the ruling radical National Front regime in Southern Yemen giving them a foothold in the Peninsula.² Chinese diplomats and road builders remain quietly active in the neighboring Yemen Arab Republic but Soviet influence there has waned in the past two years with the renewal of Yemen’s ties to several Western and moderate Arab states and with the growth of tension between the two Yemens. Soviet involvement in the Gulf which so far has been held to naval visits to Iraq and Iran and to a diplomatic presence in Kuwait, has had little success outside of Iraq. Even the UAE may be dragging its feet despite Shaykh Zayid’s February 1972 agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow. The PRC, which for years has made a determined effort to establish a commercial presence in the Gulf, has had even less success than the Soviet Union in establishing itself there politically. The Chinese support the Dhofari insurgency in Oman but Sultan Qaboos’ pacification program (with British help) in former guerrilla strongholds in Dhofar seems to be taking hold.

More Active Saudi Role. Over the past 18 months, the Saudis have slowly begun to move away from their isolationism of the Sixties. The wider political latitude given Faisal following the death of Nasser, awareness of the Kingdom’s growing financial reserves, concern over the Communist-supported Dhofar rebellion coupled with Soviet and PRC support for the radical Southern Yemen regime, Saudi realization of the security implications in the Gulf with the departure of the British, and the continued Saudi-US dialogue on Peninsular matters have all been contributing factors. As a result, the Saudis have undertaken a more active role in regional affairs:

In Yemen, they helped bring Royalist and Republican leaders together in the spring of 1970, thus contributing to the end of the eight-year old civil war; recognized the Yemen Arab Republic Government in July 1970; and have extended since recognition $18 million in loans (which will probably not be repaid) with a further loan of $12 million expected soon. The Saudis have also provided aid in kind such as scholarships, educational supplies, food, trucks, and two DC–6 aircraft (for the Yemen Airlines); obligated $9 million for project aid (schools, mosques, hospitals, and construction of roads from the Saudi border to the Yemen towns of Hodeidah and Sa’ada); and supplied arms to the Yemeni armed forces. They have been slow, however, to establish a diplomatic presence in Sanaa commensurate with their interests and responsibilities. Happily, an Ambassador has now been nominated. The Saudis also plan to establish a project aid office in Sanaa, but finding qualified Saudis to staff it may prove difficult.

Southern Yemen (PDRY–Aden) has never been recognized by the Saudis who regard the Communist-dominated National Front regime as a threat to themselves and the rest of the Peninsula. Saudi hostility deepened following the November 1969 border incursion at Sharaura by South Yemeni regular forces. Even before that event, however, the Saudis had been financing and arming insurgent tribesmen in the south. These efforts have continued but with a noticeable lack of success. Saudi leaders now seem to be rethinking their approach to the problem of Southern Yemen. It is unlikely, however, that they will abandon entirely their goal of overthrowing the Aden regime.

With Oman there has been a dramatic improvement in relations following the December 1971 visit of Sultan Qaboos to Riyadh when King Faisal agreed to establish diplomatic relations. The Saudis are considering how they can strengthen Qaboos in containing Dhofar insurgents supported by the Chinese and South Yemenis. A three-man Saudi military delegation visited Muscat in May, returning with requests for over $60 million to purchase military equipment. Favorable Saudi action on at least a portion of this request is expected. Qaboos has also requested financial aid for several development projects that have been initiated and for civic action programs in the liberated areas.

In Qatar, the Saudis have supported Shaykh Khalifa, who, last February, took control away from his normally absent and dilettante cousin, Shaykh Ahmad, by deploying National Guard units near the Qatar–UAE border.³

In the United Arab Emirates, the Saudis have been slow in bringing their influence to bear. Some Saudi aid has been given in recent years to some of the poorer Trucial States (i.e., the construction of a 121-mile highway between Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah) and there is a Saudi Government office in Dubai. The Saudis, however, were too late to head off the collapse of efforts to form a nine-member federation. While Faisal strongly preferred this federation, he accepted the decision of Bahrain and Qatar last summer to become independent. Faisal has not, however, formally recognized the recently established seven-member United Arab Emirates because of his unresolved boundary dispute with Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Saudi-Abu Dhabi relations were further soured when Zayid disregarded Saudi advice against agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviets.

U.S. Efforts to Encourage Saudis. Because of Saudi Arabia’s geographical location, its economic strength, and its relative political stability, USG efforts have emphasized Saudi cooperation with the Iranians on the security of the Gulf, financial aid to Yemen and Oman, and a resolution of the Abu Dhabi border dispute. We have neither supported nor directly opposed Saudi initiatives in Southern Yemen. We have pointed out that we believe the best answer to South Yemeni threats is to build up the economic and political strength of the North Yemeni regime rather than subsidize Yemeni tribes of doubtful loyalty to conduct hit-and-run campaigns in the South. As you know, the President sent a letter last September to King Faisal⁴ in response to his appeal that we help Yemen and we have set forth several projects which might be drawn up by U.S.G. technicians or contractors but implemented with Saudi funding. Unfortunately, the Yemen Government’s decision to defer reestablishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. has inhibited further progress in this direction. However, the Saudis are moving ahead by themselves on some of these projects, engaging an American contractor to do the basic design work for two highways south from the Yemen-Saudi border.

We are currently reviewing in the context of the Saudi PARA⁵ how we can urge the Saudis to do more in the Peninsula. Their willingness to do more may be accelerated by their assessment of the implications of the recent Soviet-Iraq friendship treaty and growing concern over Iraqi subversive efforts in the lower Gulf. Given Saudi military deficiencies and dependence on foreign (especially U.S.) advisory and contract support, we do not want to encourage them to play the role of “policeman” in the Peninsula. What we believe is feasible is:

a) to allow Saudi transfers of unsophisticated surplus U.S.-made military equipment to Yemen;

b) to offer to the Saudis for their consideration technical appraisals by U.S. experts of potential projects worked out by the Yemeni or Omani governments;

c) to offer U.S. advisors on a reimbursable basis to help the Saudis establish a project aid office in Yemen;

d) to encourage the Saudis to provide more scholarships to their schools to students from Peninsular countries;

e) to urge stronger Saudi diplomatic representation in the lower Gulf; and

f) to stimulate King Faisal to establish relations with the UAE, possibly by putting the Abu Dhabi boundary issue on ice for the time being.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and Dickman and concurred in by Atherton.
2. Additional information on Soviet interest in the Gulf is in Intelligence Memorandum, “Moscow and the Persian Gulf,” May 12 (ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, President’s Trip Files, Briefing Book, Visit of Nixon to Iran, May 1972), and in Research Study RESS–15, “Moscow Moves in the Persian Gulf,” February 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E) Chinese involvement in the Dhofar rebellion is analyzed in Intelligence Memorandum, “The Mountain and the Plain: The Rebellion in Oman,” May 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–T00832A, Box 8)
3. See Document 113.
4. Document 185.
5. See Document 152.