Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, June 11, 1971, 1014Z.

1973. No Distribution Outside Department. For NEA/ARP Director Murphy and NEA/RA Director Schiff from Ambassador. Subj: PARA Paper on Saudi Arabia.

We forward herewith description of those elements which, pursuant to Ambassador’s recent consultations, it is our understanding Bureau would view as principal ones for inclusion in PARA paper on Saudi Arabia.² Thus policies and courses of action covered are only those which we believe would need top-level Bureau attention to assure their implementation and success.

1. (A) Military assistance programs for Saudi Arabia: Saudis desire maximum degree of US support and supervision in connection with development of Saudi Navy. My conversation with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense, June 9, revealed Saudi desire also for active USG role in assisting Saudis with acquisition of F–5 aircraft and in development of Saudi abilities to fly and maintain these planes.³ All of this will put new burdens on USMTM, Embassy and all Washington agencies involved, including particularly military services, although we can expect almost complete Saudi financial reimbursement for USG expenses incurred in these programs.

(B) Saudis regard with greatest seriousness long-standing ties of US–Saudi friendship, occasion for whose sincere and convincing reaffirmation was provided by King’s recent visit to Washington.⁴ They are well aware of nature and extent our military aid to Israel and to Jordan. They will be strongly inclined expect maximum performance in these two new spheres of Saudi–US military collaboration in a manner consistent with our traditional friendship and our help to other Middle Eastern friends of US.

(C) We believe US policy should be, insofar as possible, to encourage Saudi military and defense officials undertake maximum decision making responsibility to assume as rapidly as possible full burdens of command and planning for new programs. Nevertheless, Dept and DOD should be aware that it may be necessary to supply comprehensive planning as well as personnel (located both in Washington and Saudi Arabia) to assure success of what Saudis consider are vital elements for their defense. While it may appear to us USG is assuming disproportionate load, we should keep in mind Saudis are drawing heavily also for expertise they need on US private sector. For example, Raytheon–Hawk program has recently been renewed, Saudis continue depend on Lockheed for maintenance of C–130’s and are now developing with Lockheed project whereby Lockheed personnel will play integral role with Saudi Air Force in creating completely coordinated air defense system. In sum, though we can understand how there may be DOD and military service resistance to heavy degree US involvement in Navy and F–5 program, Saudi expectations for US assistance are high and must be met if we are to maintain military tie as binding aspect of US–Saudi relations.

2. Increased reimbursable US technical assistance for Saudi economic development: (A) We have had indications from Saudis in key positions, and it is our own conclusion as well, that USG role and image in Saudi Arabia would benefit by counter-balancing heavy preponderance our present activities in military sphere by greater help for Saudi economic development. US has performed well with US Geological Survey team and as agent for Jidda desalting plant. Moreover, we have responded helpfully to requests for special short-term assistance, such as for advisor in establishment of social insurance system, experts for design of airways control system, etc. Nevertheless, we convinced there will be expanded future opportunities for supply of technical assistance, reimbursable by Saudis, on long and short-term basis.

(B) Thus, we would propose to be alert and perhaps to some degree search out opportunities where we feel reimbursable US technical assistance might be most advantageously offered in terms our relations with Saudis. Embassy makes this suggestion with full awareness that current US policy is not to seek leading position with regard to programming and guidance of developing country economic plans. But we believe we should be somewhat more active here than we have in past in looking for opportunities to render technical aid in key areas of Saudi economic expansion. Obviously too we can hope in many instances for profitable commercial by-product as in case of present airways control study by FAA team from which we hope will emerge plan utilizing American specifications and guiding Saudis toward US suppliers. AID has expressed general sympathy for some expansion of reimbursed technical assistance but top-level Bureau support may be required to assure full and effective implementation.

3. Addition to Embassy staff of operations officer: Considerations supporting this recommendation are included in Embassy’s response to inspectors’ report.⁵ Latter noted large portion of officer time now being devoted to USG military and technical assistance programs in Saudi Arabia. Inspectors’ suggestion was that Embassy requires kind of “Aid Director,” but we suggest somewhat different alternative: addition capable FSO–3, “military-economic operations” officer to serve under direction of Political-Economic Counselor. There is steady growth in Embassy workload stemming from operational aid type programs: for example, just announced Saudi desire for help with F–5 aircraft program and request just received from FonMinistry for USG to run survey on need for sensor system to protect oil installation in Eastern Province. Embassy hopes that further Departmental review will result in decision add to our staff desired officer and secretary to assist him.

4. (A) Strengthening Saudi Arabia against hostile forces on Arabian Peninsula: Last couple of years have seen Communists develop foothold on Arabian Peninsula. These are strongest in PDRY where USSR and Chicoms are providing variety of assistance to Communist dominated govt. Communist trained guerrillas continue campaign in Dhofar against Muscat–Oman regime of Sultan Qabus. Saudis have moved to suppress PDRY threat through various forms of aid to anti-PDRY forces operating from bases now primarily located in Yemen Arab Republic. US should continue its present posture of aloofness and refrain from encouragement these Saudi endeavors. Fortunately Saudis seem disinclined so far to seek our assistance. Currently anti-PDRY campaign is sputtering along providing relatively little threat to Saudi security or that of YAR.

(B) More logical course, however, is one aimed at reinforcing development and defenses of two friendly neighboring states, YAR and Muscat–Oman. Thus, US aid to YAR is required as best means creating a stable, developing, friendly North Yemen as needed buffer between Saudi Arabia and dangerous PDRY.

(C) US aid to YAR can have additional utility as lever to persuade Saudis step up their own assistance to Yemen which so far rather meager. We should maintain continuing dialogue with Saudis with object encouraging their contributions to Yemen welfare and coordinating it with ours. Bureau may have maintain steady persuasive discussion with AID convince it of need for enlarging US assistance to YAR.

5. Saudi role vis-à-vis Gulf states and Muscat–Oman: Effective and helpful Saudi role vis-à-vis emerging political development of Gulf states and Muscat–Oman can have significant impact on security and stability this region and important Free World and US interests there. US should remain alert for opportunities endeavor persuade Saudis to pursue most fruitful courses of action.

6. (A) Role of Corps of Engineers: Long-range role of Corps in Saudi Arabia may well come up for consideration over next year or so. Pressures from COE for rapid scaling down of Corps presence seem abated somewhat as additional tasks in Mediterranean area have been found for MEDDIV Headquarters in Livorno, Italy, which hitherto had been becoming excessively dependent on Saudi Arabian district. Engineers must, of course, remain for two- to three-year period required assure successful completion SAMP program and Tabuk cantonment. Now pending is Saudi request for Corps assistance with construction naval facilities on Gulf and Red Sea coasts. Corps proposes use as much as possible cantonment designs developed for Tabuk and Khamis Mushayt.⁶ Believe we should respond positively to this request. There seems possibility of one or two small $3–4 million jobs on which Saudis may seek engineer assistance within next few months, and these too could properly be included in Corps operation.

(B) We should, however, begin to project the phaseout of COE from Saudi Arabia over next several years. Best means of assuring this is commence work with Saudis now enlarge and strengthen training program whereby promising Saudi officers learn COE functions so that Saudi Armed Forces can assume many of these in foreseeable future. Corps should accordingly be given every encouragement strengthen its programs for training Saudi officers to assume COE functions.

7. (A) Improvement of USMTM: Embassy recommends increased attention to means for heightening effectiveness of USMTM. Principal problem is one-year tenure of 145-man training mission, all of whom, with exception dozen top officers who serve for two years, find their advisory impact sharply limited by present policy of assigning mission personnel for only one year. Hitherto US services have found it difficult recruit officers for two-year assignments partly because of lack of facilities for families in Saudi Arabia and partly also, as far as we can discover from informal soundings, because officers find USMTM assignment unattractive in terms of career progress. With development of American schools, improved housing and shopping facilities, Saudi Arabia, particularly as to billets in Jidda and Riyadh, has become a more attractive assignment. Perhaps following Vietnam withdrawal ratio of officers to billets may shift so that Saudi Arabia will appear a more attractive career opportunity. Embassy is conscious also that endeavors will have to be made persuade SAG provide housing for larger number accompanied US military personnel, which Saudis have been reluctant hitherto to provide. As first step, however, there should be Washington policy decision that USMTM personnel assignments will be for two years and will permit families to accompany insofar as practicable.

Thacher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret; Limdis.
2. The Policy Analysis and Recommended Action Paper was not found.
3. Thacher met with Sultan on June 9 and presented him with a letter that had been worked out among the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Northrop during Thacher’s consultation meetings in Washington. Sultan indicated his desire for a government-to-government transaction. (Telegram 1955 from Jidda, June 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 SAUD)
4. See Document 151.
5. Not further identified.
6. Khamis Mushayt is the site of King Khalid Air Base, in southwestern Saudi Arabia.