Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Jidda, May 22, 1972, 1450Z.

1637. Subj: Issues for Meetings with Prince Sultan: Political.

1. Prince Sultan’s visit to US promises to be most important symbolic happening of 1972 for Saudi–US relations,² particularly when seen against events of banner 1971 which brought Vice President, Secretary Rogers and USIS Director Shakespeare to Saudi Arabia while King and Minister Interior Prince Fah’d traveled to US. Recent months have seen important new programs in cooperative US–Saudi endeavors for strengthening Saudi defenses. Highly appropriate, therefore, that Minister of Defense Sultan, third most influential figure in SAG, should be guest of Secretary Laird this year.³

2. Charged with both Kingdom’s defense and commercial aviation affairs, Sultan has had uninterrupted tenure for almost ten years. Given his seniority in family, his vigor and devotion to country’s interests, he promises to be an important voice in SAG policy for number years to come. He acknowledges fully dominant role of King Faisal, but has great influence with King and other key figures, particularly Minister of Finance with whom he generally wins set-tos over money. His views carry weight not only on defense matters but regarding all major aspects Saudi foreign relations as well. He and his older brother Prince Fah’d are strongly pro-American.

3. US objectives with regard to visit may perhaps be seen as threefold.

A. Sultan’s presence will provide tangible proof for world to see of closeness US–Saudi ties at time when many other Arab states unwilling tolerate even diplomatic relations. Sultan will become stronger than ever voice at highest Saudi levels supporting friendship and dependence on US.

B. Discussions with Sultan both political and military will provide useful dialogue with alert, highly articulate Saudi spokesman so that in political sphere we can expect useful review each other’s viewpoints. Specific suggestions on political topics below.

C. We should seize opportunity to have highest levels US defense establishment stress to Sultan our concern certain operational aspects our cooperative military endeavors. Comments this regard via separate message.⁴

4. It would seem helpful keep in mind also Saudi objectives with regard to visit. While Sultan himself is pleased and flattered by invitation, it clear as well he taking business-like approach, intending discuss specific military topics and desirous seeing certain types equipment and installations (comments on schedule also by separate message).⁵ More important is fact King has agreed to the visit as another important opportunity get across to top USG leadership deep, continuing concerns of Arab govts with Middle East situation and Saudi Arabian security. (Visit has been billed publicly here as mission for the Arab cause.)

5. Sultan will be bearing letter from King to President. Sultan has several times indicated to Amb his warm hope presidential appointment can be arranged at any time during his ten days stay. Amb has, each time, reminded His Highness firmly of very exceptional burdens President will be facing upon his return from Moscow in addition to regular heavy demands on his time. King Faisal has not directly requested meeting for Sultan with President, but implication is strong that he very much hopes for it.⁶ We aware fully difficulties finding space on President’s schedule, yet our best assessment of situation impels us conclude inability of Sultan to see President would be very considerable disappointment to King.

6. As Defense Minister focusing on military and subversive threats to Saudi territory, Sultan personally, we believe, more concerned with Arabian Peninsula affairs than Arab-Israel. However, on King’s instructions, he will probably give priority in his comments to latter topic and his oral presentation may follow line of letter he bears to President (contents as yet unknown). Central appeal will be for vigorous US action compel Israel give up Arab territory, particularly Jerusalem. It will be interesting observe whether Sultan reflects any shift in customary cautious Saudi posture with which Dept well acquainted. Believe (and sincerely hope) Sultan will abjure reiteration King’s Zionist-Communist demon-conspiracy preoccupations. We certain his comments will reflect Faisal’s high personal regard and confidence in President, motif we have had played back to us through number of sources over past year.

7. Second most important subject Sultan will broach is that of overall security Arabian Peninsula. Here Saudis continue be deeply preoccupied with long-range aggressive and subversive potential PDRY. Attacks launched on YAR, on Saudis’ own territory and Oman are matters greatest concern as is Saudi apprehension Communist elements in PDRY will soon make their disruptive influence felt among weak Gulf states.

8. As regards YAR, Prince Sultan recognizes need for economic growth and social improvement, but he has been much more preoccupied with military means containing PDRY threat. He pressed this point vigorously in recent conversations with Ambassador and may well propose in Washington adoption by US of policy replacing USSR as YAR’s principal military supplier, using Saudi Arabia perhaps as channel. While we would endorse concept SAG transferring its own excess military equipment to YAR, seems desirable Saudis continue be encouraged focus their attention on stepped-up economic aid. Given fervid Saudi anti-Communist convictions they tend understandably maximize long-range dangerous potential of PDRY. Embassy does not suggest we should argue this point with Sultan, but he might benefit from up-to-date US intelligence assessment current strengths, weaknesses, intentions PDRY regime. Sultan might be informed we applaud Saudi decision aid YAR economically and hope aid programs may be expedited.

9. Re Oman, we should express warm appreciation recent signs Saudi intention to intensify assistance, military and perhaps economic, for Oman Sultan’s beleaguered regime. Saudi assistance to Oman helps protect Strait of Hormuz which commands world’s petroleum lifeline as it passes from Gulf. British have carried heavy and helpful load, and Saudi aid to Omanis can have important impact in accelerating present process eliminating Dhofari rebels. We certain Omanis welcome this, and Saudi cooperation this regard is clear mark statesmanlike approach towards problems of Peninsula defense.

10. With regard UAE and other Gulf states, we should seek Sultan’s views on their political future emphasizing our conviction tremendous scope in region for exercise constructive Saudi influence. Latter was pivotal force deterring Gulf states from establishment relations with USSR and Saudi action this case proof its capacity successfully block Baathis, Communist or any other destablizing groups from exploiting situation.

11. We would hope such action could rank high in Saudi priorities and might encourage re-examination possible settlement troublesome boundary dispute with Abu Dhabi.⁷ We have no specific suggestions as to means or terms of settlement and are aware important and generous concessions King Faisal has already made. We note Saudi Arabia has conceded important Buraimi Oasis region and Abu Dhabi has agreed give Saudis access to sea above Sab Khat Matti. Thus, two major steps toward settlement have been taken. Is there not some means by which remaining and less significant differences might be resolved?

12. Believe Saudis should be thanked and encouraged with regard their consistent and very generous support for Jordan, and likewise, Prince Sultan should be brought up-to-date on continuation our own heavy support there. Subject is obviously delicate one, but Dept might wish sound out Prince on Saudi attitude toward Jordan’s military assistance for Gulf states. He should be reminded also our conviction Saudi-Iranian cooperation vital to Gulf security and stability with question raised perhaps whether exchanges at ministerial level might not be considered in near future.

13. King Faisal will, we think, be looking forward with particular eagerness to information Sultan will bring from Washington re Moscow summit meeting. He will be specially interested, of course, in any results touching on Middle East as well as impact on overall US and free world relations with Soviet bloc.

Thacher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. It was repeated to CNO, CSA, CSAF, UNCINCEUR, and CHUSMTM Dhahran.
2. On his copy of the telegram, Saunders wrote: “he should see Pres.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia)
3. The Defense Department had a strong interest in Sultan’s visit, believing it would be an “important gesture in our effort to check the decline of U.S.–Arab relations and would give the lie to allegations that the U.S. has been ‘dragging its feet’ on programs of great importance to Saudi military planners.” (Letter from Nutter to Laird, March 8; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–0125, Box 16, Saudi Arabia)
4. In telegram 1641 from Jidda, May 27, Thacher discussed the lack of trained Saudi manpower, which he regarded as “the most serious single issue facing Saudi defense establishment.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)
5. Telegram 1642 from Jidda, May 24. (Ibid.)
6. On his copy, Saunders noted: “We will have to check on action item this week.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia)
7. On his copy, Saunders noted: “hmmmm. King probably shaking old maid finger at Sultan telling him not to talk about it!” (Ibid.)