Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

107. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, January 19, 1967.

For your clearance.

This cable replies to Win Brown’s reluctance to ask Park now to commit another Korean combat division to Vietnam in 1967.

It asks Brown’s views on the suggestion that he get Park’s tentative commitment now, before the Korean elections, to deploy another division later this year.

BKS

Attachment²

Washington undated.

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Exclusive for Ambassador and info General Bonesteel—eyes only—from Bundy and McNaughton.

Refs: A. Seoul’s 2756. B. Seoul’s 2760. C. State 88135.³

1. We recognize and accept cogency of arguments you advance in refs A and B. We are aware of public statements by President Pak and MND Kim that no more ROK troops will be sent to Viet-Nam. Also aware of Pak’s December 17 press conference statement that military aspect of Viet-Nam war has passed crest and that there no longer any doubt who will win.⁴ We recognize political difficulties with which Pak would be faced if we asked him to publicly commit more troops prior to June elections. We also understand dangers of seeking private commitment from Pak now to be made public following elections.

2. Nevertheless, our primary objective for additional ROK contributions to Viet-Nam is to secure more combat troops. We are concerned that too rapid negotiation or acceptance of Korean officers of non-military or para-military additional participation in Viet-Nam may lead ROKG to believe our desires can be satisfied by such programs. On other hand, we have noted your comment para 5 ref B that such additional involvement might contribute to psychological climate making possible additional military contribution after elections.⁵ While we see merit in some of the ROKG proposals, our final positions regarding U.S. financial support for them will depend importantly upon President Park’s attitude toward despatching an additional division to Viet-Nam later in 1967. That division is what we really want.

3. Problem is complicated by fact that U.S. deployments to Viet-Nam may level off after mid-1967. Public discussion following ROK elections of despatch of additional ROK troops might thus coincide with publicity regarding stabilization of U.S. effort in Viet-Nam.

4. It occurs to us that one approach to solving this dilemma would be for you to have frank informal chat with Pak. In course of conversation you might make following points:

a. As President Johnson, Premier Ky, and General Westmoreland have indicated, more Free World forces are necessary in Viet-Nam to bring struggle to early favorable conclusion;

b. Accordingly, President Johnson has decided to increase U.S. forces there during CY 67 to level 35 percent above that existing at time of Manila Conference. This for President Pak’s private information and no one else. This will result in participation in Viet-Nam of about 25 percent of all U.S. ground forces by end CY 1967 and we would be hard pressed to further increase ground forces, in view commitments elsewhere, including Korea. About .27 percent of U.S. population will be involved in Viet-Nam by end 1967. An equivalent Korean contribution in Viet-Nam would be in excess of 70,000.

c. Additional troops will be needed for various purposes. One requirement will be for troops to man a physical barrier in SVN south of the DMZ, for which plans now being developed. Size and character of additional manpower requirements for this barrier will depend on decisions yet to be made on the form the barrier will take. U.S. and GVN forces will both be employed in this undertaking but Korean anti-infiltration training and experience could be particularly valuable in this type of assignment. This is one possible area for employment of additional Korean troops;

d. USG welcomes ROKG proposals to send non-military or para-military forces to participate in SVN pacification program. We hope agreement can be reached on arrangements both useful in SVN and beneficial to ROK. However, we regard such participation as additive to, rather than as substitute for more combat troops;

e. The USG would be prepared to support additional troops in whatever form was most desirable from ROKG viewpoint;

f. We hope ROKG could provide as soon as possible after ROK elections an additional division, perhaps composed of volunteer veterans;

g. USG knows that Pak is confronted by elections and that this makes it difficult for him to make any commitment now. However, in order that we may make our fiscal, manpower and other plans for 1967 we are at this time asking if President Pak would be prepared to make a tentative commitment for the despatch of another division to Viet-Nam later in 1967.

5. Request your comment on approach suggested para 4 above or any alternative suggestions you may have for expediting ROKG decision to send another division to Viet-Nam.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Top Secret. According to an attached memorandum from Donald Ropa of the NSC Staff to Smith, January 19, both he and Walter Jenkins of the NSC Staff did not object to the proposed telegram.
2. Top Secret; Exdis. The telegram as sent was not found, but it was apparently transmitted to Seoul.
3. Document 101; footnote 6, Document 101; and Document 100, respectively.
4. A summary of Pak’s comments was transmitted in telegram 3258 from Seoul, December 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 KOR S)
5. In paragraph 5 of telegram 2760 from Seoul, November 22, 1966, Brown wrote that with regard to expanded Korean involvement in Vietnam “the only path which appears likely to be successful is the non-military one. It is now beyond the realm of possibility that this added involvement could, after election, contribute to a psychological climate in which it might be possible to get further troop contributions.”