Office of the Historian

106. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 19, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Korean Relations, and Korean Internal Situation

PARTICIPANTS

  • Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
  • Hyun Chul Kim, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
  • Kun Pak, Director, Bureau of International Relations, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • The Secretary of State
  • William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
  • Benjamin A. Fleck, Country Director for Korea

The Korean Elections

1. In response to the Secretary’s question whether the outcome of the voting on the Korean item would affect the elections, the Foreign Minister replied that a defeat would have had a profound negative impact on the government’s position.2 In his opinion, neither Yu Chin-o nor Yun Po-son had much chance of defeating President Pak, but “an election is an election.” He believed that the main issues in the elections would be Korean participation in Viet-Nam and ROK-Japan relations. The Secretary asked whether the recent smuggling case would have an effect. Lee replied affirmatively, stating that the two primary factors in that case were President Pak’s determination to treat the culprits on a legal rather than a political basis and the widespread popular interest in effective government.

Bilateral Ministerial Meetings

2. The Foreign Minister proposed that his government and the United States initiate annual bilateral ministerial meetings similar to those held by the United States with Japan and Canada. Since the U.S. representatives visited Tokyo once a year for this purpose, there was no reason why they should not proceed to Seoul during the same trip. The existing lines of communication between the ROK Government and the United States Government were excellent; therefore, such meetings [Page 229] would bring no additional substantive benefits. They would, however, make a good public impression and would heighten the prestige of the ROK Government. The Secretary’s assent to this proposal would be a Christmas souvenir for the ROKG. The holding of the first such meeting prior to the Korean elections would be a helpful gesture by the United States which would give President Pak “a shining face” prior to the elections.

3. The Secretary replied that he hoped this proposal would not be made publicly. He wanted the Foreign Minister to know that he believes such meetings are not a very efficient way in which to transact business. The agenda has a tendency to become overcrowded and there is usually insufficient time to cover the agenda items properly. The Secretary said he would think about Lee’s proposal but he was convinced that individual talks with individual ministers were a highly preferable way of transacting business.3

U.S. Assistance to Pak’s Election Campaign

4. The Foreign Minister then asked that the United States Government make some public gesture which would be interpreted in Korea as support for President Pak in his campaign for reelection. The Secretary asked if public opinion in Korea regarding the United States would be helpful to the government in the elections. Lee replied that this would definitely be the case and that the Secretary had seen for himself during President Johnson’s recent visit to Korea the deep feeling for the United States which existed among the Korean populace. Ambassador Kim added that, in his opinion, the U.S. attitude toward President Pak and his administration will determine the results of the election. Later, as the Foreign Minister was leaving, he asked when the Secretary was planning to visit Seoul. The Secretary replied that he had no immediate plans for doing so inasmuch as he had just been there. The Foreign Minister urged the Secretary to consider the possibility of going to Seoul and publicly praising Pak’s leadership, prior to the election.4

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL KOR S–US. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck and approved in S on January 4. The memorandum is Part I of II.↩
  2. The U.S.-ROK-UNC resolutions on the Korean items were all upheld. Details of the resolutions and voting results are in Yearbook of the United Nations: 1966, pp. 138–146.↩
  3. In a summary of this conversation, Rusk noted: “We do not favor this proposal and believe it would be particularly inopportune and almost impossible to arrange prior to Korean elections.” (Telegram 105138 to Seoul, December 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,POL KOR S–US)↩
  4. The second part of this discussion focused on Vietnam, ASPAC, SEATO, and developments in China. (Memorandum of conversation, Part II of II, December 19; ibid.) The Foreign Minister discussed similar topics in a meeting with McNamara on December 19. (Memorandum of conversation, December 22; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Korea 091.112)↩