105. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
SUBJECT
- U.S. Army Strength in Korea
Following up on our conversation with the Secretary in Tokyo on December 6,2 I enclose a self-explanatory table provided by General Bonesteel, showing authorized, assigned and on-board strength of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea as of the end of each month for the period December 31, 1965 through November 30, 1966.
You will note that as of November 30 the on-ground strength was 43,748, on an upward trend from a low of 38,711 on September 30, and with a projected on-ground strength of 49,000 for December 31, 1966.
If this figure can be reached and maintained, and especially if the quality mix in terms of specialties is such as to fill some of our more glaring present deficiencies, we should be in reasonably good shape. We have little hope of getting a good mix, however.3
[Page 227]You can see how disturbing the trend from March through September and even October was to all of us here.
I hope that the assumption in the last paragraph of the enclosed table is correct. We should keep close tabs on it both here and in Washington.
It was good to see you. All best wishes for Christmas and the New Year.
Very sincerely yours,
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S–US. Confidential.↩
- Rusk visited Tokyo December 5–7 to meet with senior Japanese officials.↩
- In a second letter to Bundy, December 13, continuing discussion of U.S. Army strength. Brown stated that “one of our main problems here was that even when we had enough bodies we did not have people with the right qualifications and experience. The result, therefore, is that the combat effectiveness of the forces is far less than would appear from their numerical strength.” Brown attached an in-depth study of the problem done by Bonesteel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S–US)↩