Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, November 22, 1966, 0315Z.

2756. Eyes only SecState and SecDef from Ambassador. Ref: State 88135.² I have discussed reftel with General Bonesteel. We fully understand the importance of securing further forces to man the proposed activity in the SVN DMZ, and the time urgency involved.

We consider the following considerations to be relevant.

1. After President Johnson’s visit President Pak personally gave a firm assurance to the Korean people that no further Korean combat troops have been requested or are being considered for SVN.³

2. This assurance has been received with satisfaction by all political parties and by all sections of Korean opinion, which have been unanimous in expressing opposition to the despatch of further Korean combat troops to SVN.

3. The fact that the further contribution suggested reftel would consist of volunteers would not make their despatch acceptable. The Koreans will feel that troops that will be assigned to frontline duties and have to fight are combat troops, whether volunteers or conscripts. Many are already arguing that the volunteer rear area guard and logistic units now being considered will also have, in effect, a combat mission.

4. No preparations for recruitment, training and deployment of a volunteer division could be made without public knowledge.

5. A key point made by President Johnson in his discussions in Seoul was that he was not here, nor for that matter had he made his Asian trip, to ask our allies in Vietnam to increase their forces there. He stressed that he wanted them to understand Westmoreland’s problems—put themselves in his shoes—and think about what they could do to increase their effort in Vietnam. He went on to say that after elections in the U.S. and Korea we would have to work on this problem.

6. Pak, on his part, pointed out to President Johnson that he expected to be given a rough time before next year’s elections by his political opposition because Korea was the only Asian nation with a large troop commitment in Vietnam. In saying this Pak was reflecting the feeling of many Koreans that Korea has already made a disproportionate force contribution to the Vietnam effort. Pak, no doubt in a sincere desire to be forthcoming, did respond to President Johnson’s suggestion of calling up ROK reservists for combat duty in Vietnam as an aspect of easing the unemployment problem. Here again, however, the context of the discussion was that this was something to be discussed after elections.

7. You will recall that President Pak was visibly shaken by our request for a second division so soon after his agreement to send the first, mainly because of the political difficulties with which the despatch of the first division was confronting him. Pak is facing an election in May. To win it, particularly by a sufficient margin to establish him in firm control, may not be as easy as many like to think. The Korean people have accepted the fact that their government decided to send ROK forces to Vietnam and are proud of their record there. This should not mislead us into believing that ROK support of VN is a popular active cause in this country. Opposition leaders are already calling for some form of withdrawal of the ROK forces now in SVN. For Pak to agree now to send more combat troops, particularly in the face of his recent public assurances, would undoubtedly damage his election chances. It might even cost him the election.

8. Moreover, no one, not even Pak, knows what may happen between now and the election, either on the domestic scene, or in SVN, or along the DMZ.⁴ Pak does not know what pledges he may feel it necessary to make to his people in order to get re-elected. He cannot accurately predict the power position in which he will find himself after elections because he does not know the margin by which he will be re-elected, nor the degree of DRP support which he will have in the new Assembly. Thus he is in no position to make a pre-election commitment for further troop despatch which is worth anything even if he wanted to do so.

9. Therefore, for President Pak now to receive a request for more combat troops would, I am convinced, seem to him an embarrassing and unfriendly disregard for his political problems, which are well known to us.

10. Re para 7 reftel, the Koreans will not think it reasonable, but rather most unreasonable, that a country of Korea’s small size and limited resources should be asked to contribute to the South Vietnamese war as large a proportion of their population and armed forces as a great power like the U.S. This is especially true of a small country directly [across] the DMZ from a substantial and well-armed North Korean force and almost next door to vast ChiCom forces.

11. The Koreans feel that they have already made a disproportionately great contribution to the war in SVN. When they refer to the fact that their contribution in terms of percentage of population is approximately the same as that of the U.S., they are emphasizing how exceedingly great their contribution is, not how reasonable it is. They feel that any pressure for further combat troops should be applied to gain a more equal contribution by other Asian and Pacific countries which they consider equally affected by aggression in Vietnam and which do not have a long frontier with the Communist countries manned by opposing armies.

12. An unexpressed major premise of the argument in para 7 may well be that the present Korean forces in Korea are too large. Whatever we may think of this, the Koreans simply do not agree. On the contrary, both government and public feel that their present forces should be stronger than they now are in light of the increased risk they feel they have incurred by their contribution in SVN.

13. The arguments in para 7 would seem particularly outrageous to the Koreans if coupled with any indication that we would be reluctant to provide them with iron-clad assurances of continued long term support and pay generously for any further contribution out of our vastly superior resources. Even if the government wished to avoid this attitude they could not get away with it with their assembly, press and public opinion. You will recall that President Pak had to ask for an “economic plus” to get Assembly approval of the second division.

14. Very importantly, it appears to me that we are in danger of seeming to take the Koreans for granted and of trying to do it on the cheap. They will recall that, as I mentioned in my message from Hong Kong last February (Hong Kong 1489 to Department),⁵ we first asked for a small medical unit and got it. Then we asked for non-combat troops and got 2,000. Then we asked for a combat division and got that. Before the ink was dry on the agreement for the first combat division we asked for a second combat division and ultimately got that. Now we would be asking for another 16,500 combat men. The Koreans will wonder when and where this will end and why others are not pressed to do likewise.

15. If we wish continuance of the attitude of whole-hearted support we are now getting from the ROKG in SVN, we will be well advised to avoid any action which would make them feel that we are taking undue advantage of their willingness to cooperate, or are giving insufficient weight to their concern about the security problems which they feel they now face and which they are sure will persist for them even after a settlement in SVN.

16. Consequently, it is my conviction, in which General Bonesteel concurs, that the best way to preserve the chances of securing our objective of further combat troop contribution from Korea, is to wait to raise this question with Pak until after the election.

17. If we ask President Pak for more combat forces now we risk a flatly negative reply, coupled with a personal sense of being imposed upon which would mar the [garble—effect of?] President Johnson’s visit, especially on Pak personally, and endanger the sincere support we are now receiving from the Koreans in Vietnam.

18. Pak will probably be expecting such a request after election. He may be disposed to cooperate providing he can get what he would consider adequate remuneration and particularly long-term security assurances. His demands on these points will be large and will undoubtedly include genuine and speedy modernization of the ROK armed forces. We will have to be prepared to be very forthcoming.

19. After election Pak will be in a better position to respond affirmatively if he wants to do so. Even then a favorable response is by no means a certainty. What is much more certain is that if we make a request to him prematurely at a time when he is likely to consider it an imposition and when it would be politically impossible for him to accede, we would prejudice any changes which may exist of getting a further combat contribution from Korea later on.⁶

20. I have considered recommending that I be instructed to go to Pak, tell him of our new project and the forces needed to man it, and simply ask him, without pressure or formality, if he could help now, or later. In view, however, of the considerations described in this message, including the fact that Pak is really in no position to make a meaningful commitment even if wanted to, I decided that even such an approach would simply be embarrassing to all concerned, had nothing to gain for us and possibly much to lose.

21. General Bonesteel concurs in all respects.

Brown

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. IV, January 1967 to August 1967. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the Department of Defense. Attached to an undated memorandum from Jorden to Rostow in which Jorden expressed his complete agreement with Brown’s views and advocated against pushing “the Koreans too hard. None of our other friends has nearly as good a record. A good deal more would not be unreasonable for the Australians, New Zealanders, Filipinos, Thai, Malaysians—to say nothing of our ‘staunch’ European friends.”
2. Document 100.
3. On November 10 Pak announced during an informal press conference that the ROK would not provide additional combat troops to serve in Vietnam. (Telegram 2589 from Seoul, November 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S)
4. Brown had previously informed Washington that political problems surrounding the dispatch of more troops had been compounded by the increase in the number of incidents along the DMZ, a combination that significantly diminished any possibility that more Korean troops would serve in Vietnam. (Telegram 2613 from Seoul, November 14; ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
5. Document 79.
6. In telegram 2760 from Seoul, November 22, Brown pointed out that the ROKG, at the behest of the United States, had shifted its focus to providing noncombat assistance to Vietnam and that an expanded Korean role in Vietnam could only be nonmilitary in nature. Brown added that “it is now beyond the realm of possibility that this added involvement could, after election, contribute to a psychological climate in which it might be possible to get further troop contributions.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S)