Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

102. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, November 29, 1966, 0830Z.

2881. Refs: Seoul’s 2687,² 2856,³ 2857;⁴ USUN 2348,⁵ 2591;⁶ Seoul’s A201, dtd November 17.⁷ Korea Debate in UN.

1. Evidence to date appears to indicate NK regime and its supporters are conducting better organized and apparently more vigorous assault on US–ROK position in Korean unification debate than in previous years. On basis reports of NK and other Communist propaganda output we suspect there may be a new tactic employed by NK and Soviet Bloc this year, namely, to seek to eliminate UN presence in Korea (UNC and UNCURK) or, at minimum, during course of debate so impugn integrity of these UN agencies that next year Soviet effort in UNGA may have more sympathizers.

2. The Department is fully aware of actions taken by NK and Soviets, both within and outside the UN framework, to enhance the prospects for defeating US/ROK position on Korean item and is in better position to evaluate prospects of Soviet success if the debate follows traditional pattern. However, if the Soviets have estimated they cannot win confrontation with us on basic reunification issue, they may decide on gaining only limited goal this year. One way to tilt the scales in their favor is by attacking integrity of UN presence in Korea, particularly if they can demonstrate abuses and actions by UN instrumentalities that UN members would disapprove or at a minimum frown upon.

3. It seems to us that an approach of this type by Soviets would focus on the following three areas:

A. Military Armistice Agreement Violations.

(1) Radio Pyongyang and other Communist propaganda outlets have placed growing emphasis on allegations of US–ROK violations along DMZ. As Department aware, we have indications that there probably have been a small number of forays across the MDL by ROK armed forces. The NK regime probably has photographic and physical evidence to prove that such attacks by ROK forces occurred. (In a number of NK raids into the ROK area, they have stripped ROK and US bodies of personal belongings and pocket litter. This type of item, which is difficult to fabricate, would make dramatic evidence to support NK charges.) Soviets or other Bloc country could introduce charges of Armistice Agreement violations by UNC forces during Korean item debate and then produce evidence provided by NK to prove charges. Since ROK forces are under UNC operational control, the Soviets could then make case in the UNGA that UN forces themselves are violating the armistice agreement which they pledged to uphold and urge withdrawal UN presence.

(2) In meeting these charges, we could, of course, point to the NK violations, particularly the spate of incidents along the DMZ in late October and early November. In this connection, it is necessary for us to bear in mind that we cannot prove with any evidence, nor for that matter do we have intelligence information, that military personnel of the North Korean armed forces conducted those raids. The best we can argue is that such incidents were either the consequences of crossings by North Korean intelligence agents or infiltrations conducted by NK armed personnel, probably from the Reconnaissance Bureau. It may be a fine point but it is important to be aware that Reconnaissance Bureau personnel are civilians, though uniformed, and not NK armed forces personnel. Some elements of the Reconnaissance Bureau, however, are under the operational control of the NK field command. In brief, we have no evidence or intelligence information to charge that the NK regime breached the Military Armistice agreement by undertaking actions into ROK territory with military personnel of the NK armed forces.

(3) The distinction between the NK violations of the DMZ and the ROKG violations may be a fine one but we believe that those members of the UN who are unenthusiastic or are fence sitters on the Korean items may be less outraged by violations of the DMZ made by espionage and civilian reconnaissance agents than they would be by an out-and-out violation of the agreement by purely military personnel from regular military formations.

B. Abuse of UN Authority.

Reports from a number of posts indicate that the NK regime and other Communist nations have seized upon the fact that a ROK unit landed in Vietnam, carrying a UN flag. We expect that the Soviets and others will be looking for other evidence of such unauthorized use of the UN name, its flag or other symbol as ammunition to argue against the UN presence in Korea. The Soviets may well seize upon VUNC as another example of an unauthorized activity conducted in the UN name.

C. UNC: Operational Control of ROK Forces.

(1) The Soviets could also seize upon UNC operational control of ROK forces for exploitation. They could point out that the UNC, a UN instrumentality, has operational control over the armed forces of a non-UN nation, an action going beyond the authority of the UN resolution. Though this practice has existed since the Korean War. We are unaware of any action by the UN, per se, to authorize it.

(2) We should also be aware that the UN resolution called only for a “Unified Command” and the phrase “United Nations Command” does not appear in any UN resolutions. “UNC” appears to have been adopted at the beginning of the Korean War as a name for the “Unified Command” solely as a unilateral action by the US and, though unchallenged over the years, is, nevertheless, without UN sanction.

3. In this era of UN peace-keeping forces in various parts of the world, the UNC is an anomaly in terms of its relationships to the UN. Admittedly the Korean arrangement is unique in that the UN placed the Unified Command “under the United States,” requested the US to appoint a commander and requested the US to make reports to the Security Council, all in recognition that major hostilities were underway. Now that hostilities have been over for thirteen years, the Soviets could argue that the pattern established for other UN peace-keeping forces in their relationships with the UN should be followed or UNC should be stripped of its UN cloak.

4. It can be argued that much of the foregoing is based on “hairsplitting” and highly legalistic contentions. Nevertheless, if the Soviets wish to obfuscate the basic issue during the Korean unification debate, they could, by adopting any or all of the approaches outlined above, hit us in areas where we are vulnerable and would be on the defensive. Given the sense of ennui on the Korean item that USUN reports is present among some UN members and the lack of interest in this item on the part of many new UN members, this new approach by the Soviets could attract new and undesired type of interest, particularly since the US would be cast in the wrongdoer’s role. In a forum such as the UNGA, arguments based on highly legalistic interpretations often find more favor than those based on moral justification.

5. We recognize that the foregoing is speculative but it is within the realm of possibility. Because it is potentially, and could be sufficiently, damaging, we believe that thought should be given to the tactics we and the ROKG should use in reply. It also raises the question as to whether we should initiate actions, at the UNGA, such as charging the Communists with violations of the DMZ in order to preempt the possibility of their charging us with violations.

6. Department and USUN in better position to determine whether any action should be taken. We have not discussed any of the foregoing with the Foreign Minister since the Ministry does not appear to be aware of the ROK forays across the MDL. If the above speculation appears reasonable, the Department may wish to discuss matter on a personal and private basis with ROK Foreign Minister to insure that he is aware of dangers and to assure his advice on tactics.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–14 KOR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to USUN and Moscow.
2. Telegram 2687 from Seoul, November 17, reported on the increasingly violent incursions within and across the DMZ by North Koreans; see footnote 3, Document 99.
3. Telegram 2856 from Seoul, November 28, discussed problems associated with use of radio broadcasts by the Voice of the UN Command (VUNC) as a means of psychological warfare. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, RAD 6)
4. See footnote 4, Document 99.
5. In telegram 2348 from USUN, November 15, Goldberg expressed his concerns about the UNC being used to broadcast U.S.-sponsored messages to North Korea and Communist China. He urged that such broadcasts “no longer be made in name of UN Command.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, RAD 6)
6. In telegram 2591 from USUN, November 23, Goldberg reported on information he received from an intelligence source “that USSR is concerned about military maneuvers by US and ROK forces currently underway in South Korea.” The source revealed that “Hanoi and Peking have been putting pressure on Eastern Europeans to ‘open second front’ to relieve pressure in Vietnam. Similar request went to North Korea.” The Soviets feared that Chinese influence within the North Korean Army could provoke continued actions along the DMZ. (Ibid., POL 32–4 KOR/UN)
7. See footnote 3, Document 99.