Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, November 19, 1966, 6:56 p.m.

88135. Exclusive for Ambassador Brown Eyes Only. State/Defense message.

1. We are planning to build a physical barrier in South Vietnam south of DMZ. Current plans are for construction to commence in mid-February with a targeted completion date of late May. This is a highly classified and sensitive matter.

2. A nine infantry battalion division plus logistic element augmentation (about 16,500 men) will be required to man the hilly and rugged, intermittent western portion of this barrier.

3. We note that Pak told President that it would be easy to reactivate almost immediately a division of recent army veterans for combat use. We wish now to pursue with Pak this concept of an anti-infiltration Korean division, possibly made up of veterans. While Pak could be told about the barrier, our intention would be to say in wider circles only that the Korean division would be “to help prevent infiltration through the DMZ.”

4. We recognize that it might be necessary to put such a volunteer ROK division into a special category with greater pay and benefits than received at present by ROK troops, that such special treatment might create morale problems among already deployed third-nation troops, and that we would have to face a Korean attempt to increase the 600,000 troop ceiling.

5. Obtaining this anti-infiltration combat division is of utmost importance in view of limits on other manpower availabilities. It is obviously not the same as the civilian logistics service corps concept. That idea needs substantial refinement before a definitive comment on its merits can be made. And presumably would be dropped at least for the time being if 16,500 additional ROK combat troops supplied.

6. New ROK division ideally should be in SVN not later than 1 April 1967. While we recognize that upcoming elections in Korea might make impossible dispatch of regular ROK troops by that time, we wonder whether purely volunteer status of new division would make early recruitment and deployment possible. In any event, in order to program construction and US deployments it is highly desirable to secure commitment from Pak not later than 1 January 1967 that deployment could be made by 1 July 1967.

7. By mid-1967 about .25% of US population will be in SEA actively engaged in war in Vietnam; an equivalent Korean contribution would be about 72,500 men. Further, by mid-1967 over 20% of US ground forces will be in SVN; Korean equivalent would be over 100,000. We conclude that it is entirely reasonable to expect further Korean combat contribution to SVN and that it should not be necessary for US to pay too stiff economic or political price for this contribution.

8. Please give us your recommendations on how best to achieve objectives outlined above. In arriving at your position you may discuss this telegram with General Bonesteel only. Address response Eyes Only for SecState and SecDef.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Drafted by Steadman (DOD), cleared by General Brown (JCS), and by Shostal (S/S), and approved by Bundy.