Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

537. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, November 19, 1966, 1010Z.

2015. Joint Embassy/USAID message.

1. In view present competition for limited US aid funds, Country Team believes it useful recall significance continuing bilateral economic assistance as principal instrument for assuring type of US presence needed to secure our over-all objectives in Afghanistan.

2. Such presence was found imperative when RGA was much less responsive to popular aspirations than it is now. Major political transformation of recent past renders it even more vital to our interests. In CT view, therefore, USG cannot afford lower its sights in Afghanistan re level of presence on grounds that present government is “safely” Western-oriented. CT does not view this simply as problem of giving aid and comfort to a friendly government somewhat frightened by prospects it has opened up through Western-type political liberalization. More important problem is to make sure our total program, at this juncture, does not fail express to growing sector of populace which politically alert that US has creative and dependable interest in their progress.

3. Central role of technical assistance in providing this assurance is obvious. However, benefits are gradual and long-term in nature. Advice alone is not enough to secure popular confidence. To assure continuation of presence adequate to accomplish our objectives, CT convinced US must keep up momentum in certain sensitive sectors where any open invitation to Soviets or ChiComs to take over in areas of past US efforts could tip balance and render our past investment ineffectual. This need not mean abdicating our incentives to self-help and other program criteria. It does mean we must move on an adequate number of projects which combine economic development potential and political benefits for US.

4. In this context, CT has following views on currently pending program issues:

A. Food and Agriculture

(I) Re Food for Peace, CT believes current US posture is in Afghanistan’s own best interests and should be carried through despite emotional shock being experienced by RGA. Essential positive element US posture is, of course, continuing readiness supply fertilizer, equipment and technical assistance to assist RGA’s intensified food production program.

(II) We must recognize, nevertheless, that in recent years Afghans have regarded PL–480 support (of type now being phased out) as primary form US assistance. Its transformation will inevitably shift public attention more acutely upon Helmand Valley development, where our present image is unsatisfactory, as well as upon economically stagnant area Kandahar which also traditionally associated with US aid effort.

B. Helmand Valley

For this reason, it fortunate we are now in position move ahead with Kandahar diesel-electric power project, and that we are on point of financing badly-needed new equipment for HACU.² This new movement will be all to the good. But we must recognize that Helmand-Kandahar agricultural development as we conceive it can show results only gradually. CT proposes continue restraining RGA ambitions for land development at uneconomic pace. This underscores urgency of proceeding with long-deferred Kajakai hydro project. CT convinced that, among various proposals for US action in Afghanistan, this is one where both economic and political factors clearly show it in our interest to carry out. In view foregoing circumstances, timing of final US commitment to project has become more critical than ever. Thus, CT has received with extreme concern, even dismay, indication (per Aidto 532)³ that AID/W considering further deferment Kajakai loan as well as possibility stopgap alternatives. Separate message on specifics reftel will follow soonest.

Although Helmand long thought of as US preserve, Soviet or ChiCom offers to build on our foundations are by no means out of question if we allow matters drift too much. We may question their economics, but Soviet-aided Nangarhar project and ChiCom-aided Parwan project show that both powers are prepared enter this type activity in Afghanistan and possibly expand it (viz. new ChiCom survey Farah Rud Valley, west of Helmand).

C. Civil Aviation

In this sector, takeover our predominant role by another power would be particularly harmful to US reputation, and takeover by Communists a signal defeat. Despite progress, we are not yet near point where Afghans can go it alone in civil aviation. CT believes Boeing jet project justified on economic grounds. If it should prove to be borderline case, however, CT wishes point out that rejection loan would deny US another case where economic and political factors fortuitously combined to constitute a real opportunity for US. Turndown would in fact mean we paid political price: population would eventually draw conclusion that, at critical time, US was unprepared share with Afghanistan its special genius in commercial jet transport.

Bush airline idea has potential for increasing national cohesion and encouraging responsiveness by RGA to population in remote areas. If friendly Western power such as Canada should prove willing finance foreign exchange costs such venture from outset, CT would regard this as in harmony US interests. If not, it will be only natural for RGA to look to US. Project is not yet sufficiently developed to pose specific programming issues. Our attitude, however, should be sympathetic if feasibility studies should show that Bush operations of specified scale could be conducted on economic basis or something close thereto (as has been done in some other LDC’s).

D. Ministry of Justice Proposal

CT will need further study before able give outline initial response to CA–1063⁴ re Title IX Foreign Assistance Act. However, should mention that CT has serious doubts about going ahead with project for reorganization Ministry Justice and overhaul legal code. RGA is not pursuing initiative with any enthusiasm. Present leadership Ministry Justice totally inadequate for realization benefits. Even if this changed, doubtful that request, if resumed, would be confined to just the kind of activity we would want to involve ourselves in. Risks are abundant in view intertwining Islamic law with present system. If anything went wrong with project, public much more likely find fault with our role than give US credit for involvement more constructive aspects.

E. Roads

For reasons already suggested (particularly section C above), we may want to concern ourselves in future with targets opportunity re road-building in north. There is no doubt about impact on rural populace of highways already built here by US and Soviets, or about increased mobility afforded to urban populations. Activity along roadsides testifies to how such roads can change lives of people and, in their minds, point the way to the future.

This longer-run US interest affects issue of increasing aid loan to permit widening roadbed Herat-Islam Qala road. CT believes decision to economize by building 5.5 meter road ([garble] meters including shoulders) was mistake which, if not rectified, will plague us in future. Since Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road is 7 meters wide (10 meters including shoulders) and IBRD-financed road from Nrshed to Afghan border will apparently have roadbed 9 meters wide, it seems inevitable that HIQ link with narrower roadbed will, in words one astute official US observer who recently visited here, turn out to be “monument to niggardliness.” Here is prime case where we have ability respond quickly at cost which seems reasonable in light our total stake in Afghanistan. Because cost of widening will increase with every day of construction, CT believes widening HIQ road most urgent of program issues confronting US in Afghanistan and urges immediate approval before AHC gets any further down road.

Blood

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) AFG. Confidential.
2. Helmand Authority Construction Unit.
3. Not found.
4. Reference is incorrect; CA-1063, December 3, concerned a different subject. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 1–1 LAOS)