538. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Background for Maiwandwal Visit Tuesday, March 28 at 12:00 noon2

Our main reason for inviting the Afghan Prime Minister is to reassure him that we’re still behind him in his delicate balancing act between the West and the USSR. So far Afghanistan has kept the Western door wide open, even though we’ve put in less than half the Soviet level of aid. The Afghan King, in a private talk with President Kennedy in 1963,3 opened his heart on his fear of going completely under Soviet domination. Maiwandwal probably doesn’t know this, but it’s typical of most Afghan leaders’ real sympathies. We want to encourage them.

But staying out of Soviet clutches is an uphill fight. Economically, Afghanistan is increasingly linked with the Soviet economy, and the USSR provides all its military equipment. But we have a near-monopoly of assistance to its whole educational system. PanAm has built its airline and is minority co-owner. Most of the Cabinet is clearly pro-Western. Maiwandwal himself is an old friend and knows the U.S. well, but he has to avoid further criticism that he’s in our pocket.

The main thing he wants from his visit is a sense that we’re not backing away. He and his colleagues are leery of our increasingly tight approach to aid. (FY 67 $34 million, FY 68 $18 million.) We can’t make a long-term commitment to his new Five Year Plan, though it’s a good one worked up with Bob Nathan. But we are ready to go ahead with [Page 1070] several projects (described in Secretary Rusk’s memo).4 We believe these plus your normal warm hospitality will do the job.

I recommend you read Secretary Rusk’s memo and the scope paper (General Tabs A and C attached).5 The economic charts (background Tab B) prepared especially for you suggest the main contours—low overwhelmingly agricultural GNP, exports growing but going mainly to the USSR, elementary industry growing slowly—the very first steps of development. Above all, you will be interested in the description of Afghanistan’s new experiment with parliamentary government which Maiwandwal is trying to make work (background Tab A). Maiwandwal is running into familiar problems of student unrest, party building, how to make an archaic bureaucracy function rapidly. His bio is at Bio Sketches Tab A, and we’ll have talking points for you Monday night.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 3/28/67. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “rec’d 3/25/67 1:50 p.”
  2. Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal visited the United States March 25–April 9. While in Washington March 28–30, he met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials. For the exchange of greetings, exchange of toasts, and joint statement issued on March 28, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1967, pp. 627–632. A summary of Secretary Rusk’s conversation with Maiwandwal is in telegram 165557 to Kabul, March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 AFG) Briefing papers and other material relating to Maiwandwal’s visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 587, V.26 and V.27.
  3. For a record of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, Document 327.
  4. In a March 24 memorandum Rusk recommended that the President indicate to Maiwandwal U.S. support for Afghanistan’s economic development program, and inform him that the $4.6 million loan for equipment for the Helmand Valley was nearly ready for a signature. Rusk suggested that Maiwandwal also be told that a decision was expected in 30 days on his request for a $13 million AID loan for hydroelectric power at the Kajakai Dam site in the Helmand Valley, and that Afghanistan’s application for an Export-Import Bank loan of $7.5 million was still under consideration. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Afghanistan, Visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 3/28/67)
  5. Tabs A, B, and C are not printed.