536. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1

379. Subject: Secy Freeman’s Discussion with RGA. Ref: State 11304.2

1.
Details Kabul-Kandahar road openings being submitted by airgram3 and general impact Secy Freeman’s visit by septel.4 This message covers Secy’s meeting July 13 with PriMin Maiwandwal and key Cabinet members which only official discussion with RGA during short visit. Following account based on oral report by Amb Steeves (only Mission official present).
2.
Secy observed privately before meeting that Afghan performance in tackling basic agric problems appeared shockingly inadequate. RGA spokesmen at meeting did nothing overcome this impression. Meeting related solely to Afghanistan’s agric problems and foodgrain situation. Afghans described problems and plans in general but largely failed provide convincing info.
3.
In response, Secy avoided being hypercritical but did not conceal awareness of Afghanistan’s failure take effective measures alleviate agric problems. When Afghan official estimated 200,000 tons as foodgrain import requirement for coming year, Secy observed pointedly that raising ante progressively from original 50,000 ton program suggested Afghanistan going backward rather than making progress in meeting food problem. (As far as we know, specific quantities not otherwise discussed and Secretary emphasized fact of limited stocks of US foodgrains available for export this year.)
4.
Re prospects future US foodgrain assistance, Secy stressed Title II no longer possible. Explaining course of new legislation in Congress, including pressures for cash dollar sales or loans, Secy foresaw more restrictive law probably most closely resembling present Title IV.
5.
This context, PriMin admitted that RGA, in urgently requesting further Title II assistance, hoped beat enactment of new legislation. Secy saw little chance success such tactic. (See also Embtel 274.)5
6.
In discussion of possible domestic effects of future Afghan foodgrain purchases, Secy asked if RGA had considered direct subsidy in reselling to consumers; Afghans did not object this suggestion. Secy also raised possible substitution of coarse grains for wheat; response inconclusive.
7.
Secy emphasized throughout that it squarely up to Afghans to meet own problem by taking effective measures produce more food—e.g. adoption of prices providing adequate incentive to Afghan farmers and importation of more fertilizer.
8.
In subsequent conversation with Amb Steeves, PriMin stated he regarded Secy very sympathetic and understanding man. PriMin added he anxious visit US as best means of communicating Afghan sense of “dependence” on USG for substantial and timely aid, though he believed he had conveyed general idea to Secy.
9.
Understand staffers Brown and Walsh attended discussion, took notes for records of Secy and White House, respectively. Department might obtain more complete account from them if desired.
Blood
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/FREEMAN. Confidential.
  2. In telegram 11304, July 20, the Department requested additional details on the Kabul-Kandahar road opening, including Secretary Freeman’s talks with Afghan Government officials, and the general impact of his visit on U.S.-Afghan relations. (Ibid.)
  3. Airgram 19 from Kabul, July 28, described the July 13 ceremonies opening the Kabul-Kandahar highway, built under an AID development grant. Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman attended as special representative of the President. (Ibid., IT 7–16, AFG)
  4. In telegram 415 from Kabul, July 27, the Embassy reported that Freeman’s visit had dramatized U.S. interest in Afghanistan, and that, although no substantive actions or decisions were taken, the Secretary’s discussions with top Afghan officials helped place the U.S. aid prospects in better perspective. (Ibid., POL 7 US/FREEMAN)
  5. Dated July 18. (Ibid., AID (US)