Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

628. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, November 14, 1966.

WWR:

SUBJECT

• Meeting with South African Ambassador and Minister-Counsellor Botha

This is one of a series of soundings which the South Africans are taking around town. Their concern is our position on South West Africa. Their line is that there is no real difference between U.S. and South African interests, values, and aspirations in southern Africa, but that the United States is making a serious error in encouraging black Africans to “disrupt” the “peace and harmony” of the “only stable part” of the continent.

Current Situation

As you know, the General Assembly—with our outspoken support—revoked South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa and directed the Secretary General to form a 14-nation commission to develop practical ways to implement the revocation.² Negotiations are now underway on the membership of the Commission. There is still some doubt, but it looks as though we will agree to join. The Commission must report in April, probably to a special session of the GA.

Predictably, the South Africans refuse to recognize the U.N. action. (You will recall that their legal position is that the U.N. is not the successor of the League of Nations and has no jurisdiction over the mandate.) They have said that they will continue to administer South West Africa and meet with force any attempt to forcibly divest them of the territory. They have not, however, quite—or even threatened to quit—the U.N., which had been widely predicted. They seem to be making a real effort to play the situation as coolly as their domestic politics will allow.

They will probably say:

• —South Africa is also committed to self-determination for African peoples. Apartheid is built on the concept of gradual Bantu independence in their “tribal homelands.” (This is a farce—there is no real Bantustan territory left in South Africa, and “gradual” in their lexicon means several decades at least.)
• —South Africa has done and is doing a great deal for the black majorities in its own territory and in South West Africa—roads, schools, etc. (There is truth to this, but most of this spending benefits the whites at least as much.)
• —The danger is that the northern black Africans will stir up trouble among the docile and contented southern blacks and force South Africa into more restrictive policies, thereby retarding the progress of the blacks.
• —Thus, it would be helpful all around if the U.S. were to use its influence in the 14-nation commission to steer it away from economic or other sanctions against South Africa which would require South Africa to respond in kind. (The U.K. has about $3 billion invested in South Africa; we have about $600 million.)

You might say:

• —There can be no doubt where we stand on the general question of racial equality. The President made this clear last May before the OAU ambassadors. Goldberg has repeatedly reemphasized it in New York.
• —We cannot and will not accept the notion that white subjugation of black majorities in southern Africa must continue into the indefinite future.
• —We agree that South Africa has done much for the economic condition of the blacks under her jurisdiction, but we cannot agree that it is an adequate substitute for freedom and equality.
• —We do not control the views and actions of the great majority of U.N. nations which supported the SWA resolution, nor will we control the 14-nation commission—if it develops that we are members. We will use whatever influence we have to promote peaceful and reasonable approaches to these problems, but we are as convinced of the necessity to make progress as are the black Africans.
• —We strongly believe that the interests of South Africa would be best served by cooperation with the U.N. Commission. There is room in the SWA resolution for reinstatement of South Africa as administrator if she shows signs (which, in the present situation, means any signs) of accepting the thrust of world opinion and reversing the trend toward full apartheid in South West Africa. (Indeed, if the South Africans would take one minor step in this direction, the pressure on the Europeans—particularly the British—to relax would probably be intolerable.)

If Pretoria is—as it appears—testing to see how committed we are, this line should get across to them that we cannot and will not save their bacon in a crunch. Goldberg, the Secretary, and others to whom the South Africans have talked have used the same tack. (As you know, there is a large element of bluff—or, at least, of intangible costs and benefits—involved in this pitch. Our economic leverage on South Africa is very small and very dangerous. If she folds, it will be because of an uncharacteristically clear-eyed view of the quality of life as an international pariah.)

Rhodesia

The South Africans may raise the problem of Rhodesia. If so, my suggestions are as follows:

Facts: You will recall that the British committed themselves at the Commonwealth Conference, if a last effort with Smith were unsuccessful, to withdraw all previous offers, adopt a position of no-independence before majority rule, and propose limited mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council. Wilson then wrote the President asking for support. The President assured him that we would back these moves and agreed—without much hope—to have Rountree approach Vorster to try to convince him that it is in South Africa’s interest to cooperate with whatever measures the Security Council imposes. (The President also pointed out that we don’t think it will be possible to keep sanctions from being applied to South Africa.) South Africa has not played ball with the voluntary sanction program against Rhodesia now in effect (although the South Africans claim they have gone to some lengths to avoid open violation).

Vorster listened politely to Rountree and seemed rather more receptive to U.S. influence than Rountree expected, but didn’t give an inch. Since then Smith has been after him several times to reaffirm South Africa’s support. (Smith needs South Africa—particularly for oil—in the event of mandatory sanctions which, if they work, will close off the present oil supply from Mozambique.)

Smith has just delivered to Wilson his “final” answer to the “final” British offer. Both positions are, if anything, less conciliatory than their predecessors. The British have about decided to give it up and go to the U.N; Smith, although hinting that it would be valuable for the Minister of Commonwealth Relations to have another try, seems reconciled to the fact that there will be no settlement.

They will probably say:

• —U.S. should refuse to support mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.
• —In any event, the U.S. should firmly oppose extension of these sanctions to South Africa.
• —The U.S. should work on the British to have another try with Smith.

You might say:

• —We fully support the British commitments. Smith has been given every chance. Goldberg has made it clear that we are against any minority government in Rhodesia.
• —We strongly believe that it is in the interests of South Africa to cooperate in any program of sanctions which emerges. We have grave doubts that it will be possible to keep sanction proposals from being extended to South Africa in the first instance. But if that line is held, it will only hold as long as the South Africans cooperate with the program.

EH

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Confidential.
2. For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on October 27, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 585–586.