Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

549. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 4, 1966, 2:55 p.m.

96316. For Ambassador. Following message from Prime Minister Wilson was delivered today to President and is sent to you FYI:

Text:

I write this to you in the plane on my way back from one more of these strangely tantalizing and—yet again—ultimately disappointing meetings with Smith. I say tantalizing because, after two days (and nights) of argument, discussion and very plain speaking, it seemed by yesterday evening that an honourable agreement was at last within our grasp.

I need not trouble you with details. We discussed the three main issues—indissolubly related in our minds: to be dissociated so far as possible in his: the independence constitution: the prior return to legality and the formation of the interim government: and the essential external guarantees of the eventual settlement. By late yesterday we had hammered out a document which gave Smith a better deal in all three respects than he conceivably deserves: and on which my two colleagues and I had to reflect very carefully before we decided that this was something we could with honour recommend to Parliament. On the text itself, argued over line by line, paragraph by paragraph, there seemed in the end to be agreement between us.

Why then have we had to make the indecisive short statement today which will have been shown to you? The answer I am afraid, is that we are dealing with a very devious and schizophrenic personality. Smith agreed to meet us on the absolutely clear understanding, to which he specifically assented that each of us came with full powers from our respective colleagues to settle. But on Friday² he recanted on this and insisted that he could not go further than agree with us a text which he would recommend to his colleagues as acceptable. By Saturday evening we had such a text. But then he recanted again: he would go no further than take it back and think over whether or not to recommend its acceptance.

This was intolerable. But we were so resolved that the chance of a settlement should not slip through our fingers through any fault of ours that we have, as you see, given till noon tomorrow to give us a plain yes or no to the document, without any modification whatever. I think there is still an outside chance that he, or some of his colleagues will come to their senses. Before he left late last night, I spoke to him in rougher and more brutal terms than ever before of the appalling dangers for himself, for Rhodesia and for the whole of Southern Africa which were bound to be the consequence of a refusal. I may have shaken him (I certainly shook his colleagues). But what still sticks in his gullet as he put it, is the idea that he must return to legality before there can be the test of Rhodesian opinion in the new constitution.

If he could not remove this bone on board the Tiger, I doubt if he will in Salisbury. At all events, by noon tomorrow the die will be cast, one way or the other. If, by then, he has not said yes to our text, we shall go straight ahead with the programme of action we promised to the Commonwealth in September. Garner has reported on the extremely helpful and thorough talks which he had with your people last week. I am sure that we must continue to act in the closest concert as we go forward to this next stage, fraught as it is with so many difficulties and I am glad to know that there is such close understanding between us.

It is clear to us from our exchange with the South African Government that they have been leaning pretty heavily on Smith to reach a settlement. We have informed them of the content of the text we worked out with Smith, in the hope that even at this eleventh hour they may be able to exert some further pressure. I hope you may be willing to consider most urgently whether, by saying anything to them today, you too might help persuade them to try their hand again in Salisbury before noon tomorrow.

End Text.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, and approved by Larry C. Williamson of S/S. Repeated to Pretoria.
2. December 2.
3. On December 6, Prime Minister Wilson announced to the House of Commons that the Rhodesians had rejected the working document signed by Smith on December 3, leaving the United Kingdom no option but to appeal in the United Nations for the invocation of selective mandatory sanctions against the illegal Smith regime.