Office of the Historian

548. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 1, 1966, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Rhodesian Situation

PARTICIPANTS

  • Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office
  • Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
  • Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Under Secretary
  • Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary, AF
  • Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO
  • J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
  • Donald R. Morris, Special Assistant, Under Secretary’s Office
  • Edward W. Holmes, Alternate Country Director, AFSE

Sir Saville Garner stated that broad agreement had been reached by the two sides in yesterday’s talks on Rhodesia.2 There had been a difference regarding the tactics to be employed with respect to oil sanctions, but no differences on the broad objectives to be achieved. Both sides wished to avoid escalation of the matter toward economic warfare with South Africa. The British now had to ponder two questions: (1) Should HMG support an amendment to their resolution calling for broad oil sanctions? (2) Should the UK make a statement regarding its strong desire to avoid confrontation with South Africa at the time the amendment was discussed in the Security Council? It is clear that South Africa is worried; presumably we should do nothing to relieve this worry. South Africa is the key to the Rhodesian problem.

The Under Secretary said that probably no outcome would be totally satisfactory. We must all play our cards carefully to bring about the best possible solution.

In reply to the Under Secretary’s question, Sir Saville stated that the next Commonwealth meeting would probably be held in March or April of next year. He recalled the communique’s provisions for another meeting. If, however, a settlement were to be reached with Smith, pressures for a meeting would undoubtedly rise and it would presumably be held fairly soon.

Sir Saville emphasized that he could not comment on the chance of a settlement. He recalled that the Prime Minister carefully refrained from [Page 926] committing himself on this aspect in his message to the President.3 It is clear there has been some recent shift in Smith’s position. Smith has now agreed at least to consider a return to the 1961 Constitution and to give up independence. Nevertheless, he had by no means agreed to go nearly as far as the UK had wanted. The Rhodesian Prime Minister would still be responsible to the present parliament whereas the British had wanted the parliament to be dissolved. It is likely that the effect of sanctions and the influence of business and financial circles in Rhodesia had prompted Smith to move somewhat.

The Under Secretary remarked that Smith would likely have moved in due course even without sanctions. His policy was so completely against the world trend of events that he could not have maintained it indefinitely.

In discussing the general situation, Sir Saville remarked on the striking lack of public opposition to the Smith regime by Africans in Rhodesia. They had been amazingly quiescent. The Under Secretary remarked that perhaps the Africans had been hoping the situation would be resolved in other ways. If no solution were to be reached, they might in time be driven to take action themselves. He wondered how Africans in Rhodesia must feel at seeing their fate decided by white Rhodesians and white Britons in consultation with white Americans.

Mr. Fredericks pointed to the efficient Rhodesian security force and its willingness to operate in ways unlike those employed by the British in the colonies in the past. Mr. Palmer remarked that the history of the Mashonas gave no particular expectation of strong action by them.

Sir Saville declared that if a settlement with Smith were to be announced in the next few days, it would jolt most Africans. He would expect an extremely critical reaction. Much would depend on how a settlement were explained and handled. In view of the very complicated nature of likely constitutional arrangements, it would be extremely difficult to explain them to the ordinary man.

The Under Secretary agreed that it would be very difficult to sell a settlement, even if the agreement to be obtained were better than now seems likely. In his view it would be better to emphasize the conclusions of a settlement rather than the specific details. Mr. Fredericks pointed out that in view of South Africa’s history with entrenched clauses in a constitution, it would be very difficult to obtain favorable African reaction to a settlement with Smith.

Sir Saville agreed, stating that once independence is granted to a country, there is really nothing outsiders could do to control its subsequent [Page 927] actions. That is why the UK had wanted a British force in Rhodesia following any settlement. Any paper guarantees could be changed.

In reply to a question, Sir Saville stated his belief that if Smith and Governor Gibbs made a joint appeal they would get the backing both of the Rhodesian armed services and the majority of the people. He believed that the vast bulk of Rhodesians would breathe a sigh of relief if an agreement with the UK were to be achieved.

In conclusion, the Under Secretary and Sir Saville agreed that we must all wait to see what would happen with regard to the Rhodesian problem in the next few days.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Holmes, cleared by Fredericks and Sisco, and approved in U on December 5. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.↩
  2. U.S.-British talks on Rhodesia were held in Washington November 30–December 1.↩
  3. Document 547.↩