Office of the Historian

532. Record of Agreements and Decisions at the Fifth Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group1

Washington, April 12, 1966.

PRESENT

  • The Under Secretary of State (Chairman)
  • The Deputy Secretary of Defense
  • The Administrator, AID
  • The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • The Deputy Director, USIA
  • The Deputy Director, CIA
  • The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow
  • The Staff Director
  • Mr. Dean Acheson
  • The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
[Page 901]

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.]

2. Rhodesia: It was decided that American officials should, as a matter of urgency, talk to the British on this subject not only to attempt to determine the nature of British thinking, but also to inform them of our thinking:

a.
The United States will not in any way permit itself to be involved militarily in Rhodesia.
b.
We think that economic sanctions have reached a level beyond which further escalation would not be profitable.

The Group also discussed the broad choices open to the British—the use of force or negotiations which could lead to a reasonably acceptable political settlement. If the British choose to use force they must understand that it will be done without us. Consideration was also given to the more positive role the U.S. might play in trying to create conditions which, hopefully, could lead to a speedy political settlement of the Rhodesia problem.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.]

Harry H. Schwartz
Staff Director, SIG
  1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA: #5—May 3, 66—Discussion on France, NATO, and Rhodesia. Secret; Exdis.↩