Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

533. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, April 18, 1966.

The following is a brief situation report on the Rhodesian crisis bringing the events of the past two weeks up to date.

I. UN Activity—At the UK’s request, a UNSC meeting was finally held on April 11, at which the UK’s resolution on Rhodesia was passed in spite of African and Communist Bloc efforts to broaden and strengthen it. As passed, the resolution called the breach of the voluntary oil embargo “a threat to the peace” and authorized the UK to use force to stop tankers carrying oil for Rhodesia from docking at the port of Beira in (Portuguese) Mozambique.²

II. Consequences—On the strength of the UN resolution, the UK has prevented two tankers with oil for Rhodesia from being unloaded. Both tankers are Greek-owned and their cargo was purchased for Rhodesia by a South African firm The Portuguese are angry with the UK for making them the scapegoat for an “oil leak” into Rhodesia which originates solely in South Africa.

Because of the UN resolution, the Smith regime has withdrawn its skeleton representation from London and ordered the UK to close down its residual mission in Salisbury.

The UK has recalled its Ambassador to South Africa for consultations and instructions. He will probably return to South Africa with instructions to make the following pitch to Prime Minister Verwoerd: (a) South Africa should cooperate in the oil embargo in its own interest and perhaps (b) request Verwoerd to intercede with Smith to end the Rhodesian crisis.

Dissatisfaction with the UN resolution has led the Africans and Communist Bloc to re-group in the UN’s Committee of 24 to press for a stronger UNSC resolution calling for (a) total economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and (b) the UK to use force to put down the Rhodesian rebellion.

III. At Stake—The longer the Rhodesian crisis continues, the harder it becomes to solve and the greater the risks for UK and US prestige and influence in Africa. Some obvious considerations are:

(a) Prolongation will result in the Rhodesian crisis being tied into the crisis of South Africa’s compliance with the International Court’s decision in the South West Africa case in June or July;

(b) Wilson’s failure to put down the Rhodesian rebellion prior to the July Commonwealth PM’s meeting could precipitate African members’ leaving the Commonwealth;

(c) Prolongation is having a serious adverse economic and psychological impact on Zambia and could topple the government of the moderate President Kaunda;

(d) US Civil Rights groups are beginning to focus on the problem;

(e) If economic sanctions cause the disintegration of the Rhodesian economy, the cost of reconstruction to the UK will be prohibitive;

(f) Prolongation encourages the determination to resist of the Smith regime and its supporters.

IV. Our Moves—State is currently taking quiet and discreet soundings in London and with the Australians and New Zealanders to explore possible approaches based on mediation leading ultimately to negotiations by the principals.³

Rick

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Confidential.
2. For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 221 (1966), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 597.
3. A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads: “Stewart coming. Mann in charge. We want a negotiation approach—Wilson is reported leaning that way.”