Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

531. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks with the British

The Problem

The purpose of this paper is to obtain the approval by the Senior Interdepartmental Group of “a set of instructions for a frank talk with the British Government shortly after the British elections which would set forth the limits of U.S. involvement in the Rhodesian problem.”

There are listed below (a) a statement of the basic objectives the U.S. seeks to achieve in its relations with the U.K. on the Rhodesian problem (at this stage strictly for internal USG use) and (b) talking points for use by an American spokesman designed to elicit from the British their current assessment and future plans. Information elicited from the British would be used to define U.S. objectives more precisely before we inform the British of the limits of our involvement.

Basic U.S. Objectives in Relations with British

1. The U.S. should encourage the U.K. to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem that would be compatible with the spirit and intent of (a) Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965, and (b) Prime Minister Wilson’s six principles. (It is understood that such a settlement can be negotiated only when HMG can deal from a position of greater strength than at present, which would probably have to be based on a tightening of the present economic sanctions and/or some troop deployment carrying a credible threat of force.)

2. We should endeavor to avoid a situation in which effective African pressures could be mounted to invoke mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. We should therefore encourage the British to take courses of action which would minimize this possibility.

3. In consideration of our relations with Zambia and other African governments and quite apart from our relations with the British, it is in the U.S. interest to continue to help mitigate the effects of UDI upon Zambia. However, HMG should understand that Congressional attitudes could prevent the use of appropriated funds for this purpose or other purposes connected with the Rhodesian problem unless positive steps are taken soon by the U.K. to end traffic with North Viet Nam by British-lag (Hong Kong-registered) shipping.

4. The U.S. should make clear to the British that it cannot commit itself to direct military involvement in Rhodesia.

5. The U.S. should keep the burden of responsibility clearly on the British to find an acceptable solution to the problem. We should therefore confine ourselves initially to endeavoring to obtain a clearer indication of British intentions and should refrain from encouraging or discouraging them with respect to any particular course of action at least until after this has been accomplished.

Talking Points

1. The policy of the U.S. is to continue to support the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and, to the extent possible, to support British efforts to reach an early settlement of the Rhodesian problem.

2. On the basis of recent intelligence do the British now believe that the Smith regime can be brought down through economic sanctions alone within the time limits that appear politically tolerable?

3. Do the British believe that it is wise to encourage Zambia to sever completely its economic relations with Southern Rhodesia unless or until it is clear that by so doing Zambia would be contributing to the early downfall of the Smith regime? HMG’s estimate as to when this cut-off might take place is desired.

4. In view of the leakages in the oil embargo, does the U.K. believe that further approaches should be made to Portugal and South Africa to reiterate earlier warnings of dangers inherent in the Southern Rhodesian situation for those countries helping the illegal regime?

5. How do the British assess the prospects of rising African pressures for mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and how could we best coordinate our positions to deal with these pressures?

6. What does HMG consider are the prospects for success in negotiations with Rhodesian elements on a basis compatible with the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and with Prime Minister Wilson’s six principles?

7. With whom might the British be willing to negotiate a settlement: With the Smith regime? With the Rhodesian Front without Smith? With a coalition of white elements after the downfall of Smith? With a coalition of anti-Smith whites and moderate Africans? With a coalition of Africans and moderate whites? With the African nationalists?

8. In the event that the sanctions program does not appear to be achieving the U.K.’s objective within the time frame which HMG considers tolerable, what alternative or supplementary measures does HMG believe it could take in order to strengthen its negotiating position or otherwise terminate the rebellion?

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 236, SIG/DOC: 3—4/14/66— Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks With the British. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text which is filed with a covering note of April 4 from Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) Harry H. Schwartz transmitting the paper for consideration at the fifth SIG meeting scheduled for April 5. The meeting was subsequently rescheduled and held on April 12.