Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

419. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of 4 May 1964 re U.S. Policy toward the Portuguese Possessions in Africa

PRESENT

• Secretary of State Rusk
• Secretary of Defense McNamara
• Attorney General Kennedy
• Director of Central Intelligence McCone
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy
• Mr. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by stating that he thought it was time to have an overall look at United States policy toward the Portuguese possessions in Africa. He made three essential points:

[1 paragraph (4–1/2 lines) of source text not declassified]

Second, this would be counter to the African tradition of relatively peaceful solutions to self-determination. Granting that Algeria and Indonesia were exceptions, Mr. Rusk stated that 90% of the new nations, including those in Africa, had attained their independence through non-violent means.

Mr. Rusk then stated that as Secretary of State he had serious responsibilities vis-a-vis Portugal as an ally and specifically for retaining our position on the Azores base.

He said he felt the United States support should be directed toward a political program which allowed for a number of choices. For example, the Lusitanian Commonwealth concept for the Portuguese African territories with Brazil as an influential partner might be acceptable. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Rusk elaborated on his concept of a more mature approach by the Angolan movement which would have wider appeal throughout the rest of the non-African world. He emphasized that the current violent trend of the Angolan movement was producing minimal results for them. Adoula was nervous over the trend of Roberto’s movement. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that the present course could well lead to Portuguese punitive incursions into the Congo. Mr. Rusk felt that if Adoula [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could be interested in the moderate approach they might exert influence on Roberto and his colleagues.

There ensued a discussion of how the United States could emerge from the impasse, whether any control factors existed over the Angolan movement after extension of financial aid and to what extent violence could be discouraged. No one present was particularly sanguine about the prospects of averting terrorism. The question of whether the present Angolan movement had any true national base was also explored. Mr. McCone expressed his doubts about Holden Roberto’s long-term stayability as a leader. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Bundy restated the problem by saying that it was in the United States’ interest not to abandon this movement in the face of Soviet and Chicom competition. He cited the pressure of continent-wide African support and the folly of a stubborn adherence to an antique Portuguese policy.

The Attorney General felt strongly that we could not abandon the movement and felt that contacts throughout the movement should be developed and maintained.

[1 paragraph (4 lines) of source text not declassified]

Mr. Rusk commented that Portugal had been on notice that the United States was officially sympathetic to principles of self-determination.

In response to a question by Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara stated that it was “possible to live” without the Azores base. He felt this base problem should not dictate our foreign policy and that keeping the USSR out of Africa was more important than holding Azores base rights. He felt that stronger ties with Spain could obviate the losses of Moroccan transit bases and the possible losses of Wheelus and the Azores.

Mr. Bundy said he agreed with the thrust of the African paper and asked for Mr. McCone’s opinion. Mr. McCone said the [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Rusk conceded that Roberto might be totally unable to make the shift to non-violence.

Mr. Rusk cited certain other factors which did not make the situation inflexible. He noted that Salazar policies were not entirely popular in either Lisbon or the colonies. He referred to conversations between Nogueira and the Committee of Nine in regard to an eventual solution. He felt perhaps the Africans were a bit shortsighted when they promptly rejected any outward association with Portugal in a possible settlement. He then noted that African prime ministers, in his experience, were more moderate in private talks than they could afford to be for domestic consumption.

Mr. Bundy returned to the thesis that we should buy a larger share in the movement and retain full tactical flexibility.

The Attorney General advocated funneling monies for non-violent activities such as refugees and students until the situation can be re-examined next January. This was approved in principle subject to passing specific proposals through the Special Group mechanism.

The exchange of views continued and resulted in a general agreement to proceed with an approach to Adoula [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with the idea of sounding them out and persuading them that a non-violent, multi-faceted political program would be the best path toward self-determination for the Portuguese territories. It was decided that a letter of instruction in considerable detail would be issued to Ambassadors [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Godley in the Congo for initial approaches to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Adoula, respectively. Depending on their responses, additional steps for covert discussions and support could be initiated.

Mr. Rusk suggested that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the idea of the OAU making a public statement against the intrusion of the Soviets and Chinese in African self-determination matters could be explored.

Lastly, the Attorney General noted that Stanislaus Radziwill had mentioned that, in a conversation with Salazar, the Portuguese President had indicated a slight flexibility toward the principle of self-determination for the territories in question. Messrs. Rusk, Johnson, and Bundy thought that this was worth verifying promptly and if, in effect, Salazar had indicated a relaxation, Ambassador Anderson might be advised to re-explore this avenue. Mr. Rusk also indicated that the attitudes of the new Brazilian government should be explored as an auxiliary weapon. He noted finally that the Spanish Foreign Minister had been talking with the Portuguese for some time to suggest a more realistic approach to their collision with African nationalism, albeit with no discernible effect.

Peter Jessup

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 5. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson.