Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

420. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)¹

Washington, May 19, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador Anderson’s Views on Portuguese Africa

I am taking the liberty of submitting some comments, for whatever they may be worth, on Ambassador Anderson’s letter of April 18² regarding our policies on Portugal’s African territories.

The Ambassador’s Views

If I understand correctly, the Ambassador considers that our present tactics and policies are unrealistic—until the Portuguese political system changes, there are no prospects of Portugal permitting self-determination and it is useless and counterproductive to try to get them to do so. Instead, we should focus on the possible and try to get the Portuguese to accelerate their present economic, educational and social reforms, which would eventually lead to a liberalization and weakening of Lisbon’s all-out control over Portuguese Africa. Finally, we should explain this new concept to our African friends and endeavor to dissuade the Africans from supporting the Angolan rebellion.

Comments

I can appreciate the Ambassador’s point of view. He is continually charged with the disagreeable task of trying to get some forward political movement out of the Portuguese Government, while still being responsible for maintaining good relations. Moreover, on each approach he runs into a stone wall. Admittedly the prospects for a significant change in Portuguese policies during Salazar’s lifetime do not appear very bright, at least at present.

I might be able to agree with some aspects of the Ambassador’s proposed change of U.S. policies if we were ten years back. Now I think it is too late in the light of the decolonization process that has since taken place in the world, particularly in Africa, and in light of the Angolan rebellion. It is indeed a tragedy that Portugal did not undertake a vast reform program a decade ago. She might thereby have preempted the rebellion.

However, a program of evolutionary economic, educational and social development of the territories, without concomitant political advance, and implemented over an undefined period of time into the future will not serve to solve the issue now. I do not believe that any aspect of the reforms to date has had a sufficient psychological impact in the territories to win over the loyalties of the indigenous populations to Portugal and thus deprive the nationalist movements of their “raison d’etre.” Nor do I think that future Portuguese implementation of the reforms will be able to do this—it is likely to be “too little, too late.” Whether we like it or not, the Angolan nationalist movement, despite its setbacks, cannot be disposed of and forgotten, and a similar rebellion seems likely to break out sooner or later in Mozambique. It is unrealistic to think that the U.S. could discourage African support for these movements, not to mention the adverse repercussions on our interests in Africa if we tried. Self-determination for the territories has become a popular issue in Africa, and irrespective of what may be their private reservations, most of the leaders have no choice but to espouse the cause. We could no more get the Congolese or Tanganyikans to curb the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists than we could have gotten the Tunisians or Moroccans to have curbed the Algerian FLN. Moreover, were the Africans not to support these movements, the latter would then become solely reliant on and thus dominated by the Bloc. Finally, in the theory that African pressures could conceivably be stopped, what would then be the inducement for the Portuguese to modify the status quo at all, even at a snail’s pace?

It may be that our efforts with the Portuguese will be of no avail. If so, it will indeed be a tragedy, because the struggle will inevitably become more violent and racist with few if any chances of an eventual compromise and transitional solution and of a continued Portuguese presence in any form. The final result then could well be chaos. It is precisely in an attempt to prevent such an outcome that I think we have to persist, despite the obstacles and lack of progress to date, in trying to bring about a change in Portuguese policies.

As to the tactics, I agree that Portuguese-African talks under present circumstances are not likely to be successful. But for the lack of any better tactic, they at least serve to establish a channel of communications that may some day have a use; they may constitute pressure on Portugal; they serve to educate the Africans as to just what they (and we) are up against, and they divert African focus on us to produce a settlement overnight. Secondly, regarding the Ambassador’s concern that we are not really clear as to what we expect from the Portuguese after they publicly accept self-determination, I think you spelled out to Salazar and Nogueira last summer the type of transitional program we had in mind. What could be sold to the Africans in general and to the nationalists in particular changes as the struggle goes on. I doubt, even with our support, that the Portuguese could now get a cease-fire and agreement to a settlement entailing more than 3–5 years of successive phases of increasing self-autonomy leading to the final decision of self-determination.

Our tactic with the Africans including setting forth our aims of self-determination are designed not only to take into account domestic opinion, but are also in the way of a holding operation with the Africans. (CA-9360,³ to which the Ambassador refers, carried out the decision of the NSC Standing Group.)⁴ If the Africans, as well as a large part of the rest of the world, came to the conclusion that the U.S. had abandoned its historic principles of self-determination and turned its back on their aspirations in favor of a very long evolutionary process with an uncertain outcome, we would have abdicated our interests and influence in favor of the Soviets and Chicoms, and the Africans would conclude they had to rely on violence and Bloc support.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Secret. Drafted by Looram on May 18. Sent through Harriman. A copy was sent to Jerome K. Holloway in EUR.
2. Not found.
3. Document 416.
4. A record of the NSC Standing Group discussion of Portuguese Africa on February 18, 1964, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XII.