418. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Portuguese African Territories
Summary
The issue of the Portuguese African territories remains stalemated—the present courses of action followed by the Portuguese Government and the nationalists respectively have led to a blind alley. The threat of the rebel movements, our own efforts with Salazar and the attitudes of some of the NATO members have thus far resulted in only limited movement by the Portuguese. At the same time, rebel activity has not met with notable success. Guerrilla actions continue, but they have been contained to a large degree by the Portuguese military at considerable financial cost.
Eventually Portugal will have to reach an accommodation with the nationalist movements. In the meantime, however, the nationalists are becoming increasingly radical; they have just admitted extremist and pro-Communist elements into the organizations. The most immediate problem in the overall issue is, therefore, to try to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their future to the Communists and from reaching a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one.
United States long-term interests require that a new approach be made to the issue in order to unblock the present stalemate and thus prevent the future situation of the Portuguese African territories—and with them the future of central Africa—from being gravely jeopardized. We should accordingly propose that the nationalists alter their tactics and develop a political action program with the objective of significantly expanding their political organizations and activities within and outside the territories. Broad-based support and participation would be sought among the populations concerned for campaigns in favor of self-deter mination. [Page 730] The United States would be prepared to provide clandestine assistance for this purpose.
Discussion
Current Trends in the Nationalist Movements
The rebel leaderships of both Angola and Mozambique are now passing through a critical phase. Frustrated by Portuguese military containment and Salazar’s refusal to concede any steps toward self-determination, they have also become embittered by the lack of UN, Western and even African support. The various War Games played at the Department and JCS have shown that as the Angolan conflict was prolonged, the more racist, violent and extremist the rebel movement became and the more the chances for an evolutionary settlement were compromised. Thus we are witnessing today the development of internal dissension within the Angolan nationalist leadership, the emergence of strongly anti-Western tendencies, and overtures for Communist help. Adoula recently told Governor Harriman he was very much concerned about the possibility that Holden Roberto might soon be ousted by extremists. It is now reported that Viriato da Cruz, a pro-Chicom leader of a rival nationalist group, has just been admitted into Roberto’s organization.
This is now a critical juncture. If present trends continue unchecked, I fear that the nationalist movements will become more extremist and anti-white, with a possibility of strong Communist influence. Should this occur, there would be little chance for peace and a Portuguese-African compromise solution until and unless Portugal wearies and decides to cut its losses. Under these circumstances the future of Angola and Mozambique would be seriously jeopardized, and with them, the future of central Africa.
At the same time, it is probably unlikely that these nationalist movements would become so blatantly dominated by Communist elements as to alienate African support. Despite the reservations of moderate leaders, their fears of another Congo-like situation developing in Angola, and their often-expressed hope (albeit privately) for a peaceful and gradualistic solution, the nationalist cause has such wide African appeal that the African leaders really have no choice but to back the Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements if they are to survive politically themselves. Thus, almost irrespective of the political coloration and actions of the nationalists, their struggle is likely to remain a burning issue in Africa and a touchstone in our relations with the Africans until the issue is finally resolved.
Portuguese Government Attitudes
The Portuguese leaders give every sign of being convinced that they can ride out the storm and that if the rebellion can be eliminated within [Page 731] the next few years, they will be safe home. There are reports of returning soldiers being fed up with the struggle and feeling it is hopeless. Moreover, military expenditures are taking up a large portion of the budget at the sacrifice of public investments in the domestic economy. I suspect, however, that Salazar is being told mostly what he wants to hear, and Admiral Anderson reports that there is no indication of any give in Salazar’s position.
As in the case of French attitudes toward the Algerian struggle, Portugal will in all probability come around eventually to seeing the hopelessness of trying to maintain the status quo and will make an accommodation with the nationalists. There are those who contend that it is futile to try and move Salazar, at least at present, and that we should wait until the moment is ripe for us to exert pressures. The flaw in this theory is that if we stand by and do nothing until rebel violence finally forces the Portuguese to face realities, by that time the nationalists will probably have reached a point of no return and no longer be disposed to working out with Portugal a compromise settlement.
U.S. Objectives
Our objective is to bring about an evolutionary settlement of the issue, which will ultimately provide stability for the territories and for the adjacent areas. This requires meeting the nationalist aspirations and at the same time permitting the maintenance of Portuguese presence in some form. Thus the settlement requires African-Portuguese cooperation. In order to make such an objective realizable, some progress has to be made in the meantime, namely before the African and Portuguese positions become wholly unreconcilable and before the orientation of the nationalists becomes such as to preclude a moderate and transitional settlement.
A New Approach—Political Action Program
In order to avoid a further deterioration and bring about some progress toward settlement, we believe that the nationalists should alter their present tactics and concentrate their energies, with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This organization should be based on non-racial principles and obtain the adherence of as many elements as possible of the populations concerned—the various tribes, as well as the white and mulatto segments of the population. Once set up, the organization should endeavor to set in motion forces favorable to the cause of self-determination and capable of bringing pressures to bear on Portugal to change its policies. Inside the territories, this would consist of political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination. If the nationalists could thus succeed in showing that they did in fact reflect the will of the [Page 732] majority, their cause would evoke significant international sympathy and impress on world public opinion the urgent need for a solution. Under such circumstances, the American public would be prepared to back the nationalists, and our NATO allies might be more disposed than they are now to help cope with the issue. Even the Portuguese might feel obliged to face up to realities, and the nationalists’ emphasis on non-violence might make it more palatable for the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the rebel leadership.
Admittedly there is no guarantee that the nationalists, particularly the Angolans, would accept the concept of non-violence when their whole strategy is based on guerrilla warfare. Even if they were to accept it, they might not be able to carry it out. The Angolans and Mozambicans do not have a tradition of passive resistance or, more importantly, a British colonial police to contend with. The nationalists would have to be extremely adept in building up an effective and extensive underground organization that could successfully elude the ubiquitous Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.). Similarly, great courage and enormous sacrifices would be required of the indigenous peoples in carrying out passive resistance in the face of ruthless counter-measures by the police. (In the past P.I.D.E. has dealt brutally with any Africans suspected of being involved in strikes, not to mention the treatment meted out to the ring-leaders.)
It should also be kept in mind that if the nationalists were to engage in political campaigns, it would probably be unrealistic to expect that all violence and guerrilla operations could be stopped. Roberto has a trained force in being of five to seven thousand men, and for him to try to keep them “on ice” for an extended period of time or attempt to adapt all of them to non-violence tactics could easily lead to his overthrow. Extremist elements in the organization are unlikely to accept a complete change to non-violent tactics. Similarly Algerian-trained guerrillas of Mondlane’s FRELIMO have just returned to Dar, thus adding to the pressures for immediate military action. By the same token events have probably gone too far to persuade the nationalists to turn down all offers of Communist support. (Were they to do so might indicate the existence of our own support.) We would, nevertheless, with our assistance, be in a position to limit the extent of nationalist involvement with the Communists, at least for a certain period of time.
Despite these obstacles, the present guerrilla operations have not met with notable success, and an effort should be made to persuade the nationalists to undertake new tactics. Essential of course would be our commitment to provide them with assistance for this purpose. We should, moreover, try to get the support and direct involvement of those African leaders who have an influence over the nationalists.
[7 headings and 17 paragraphs (5–1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63–7/64. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Looram on April 28. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. A May 3 covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Attorney General Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and McGeorge Bundy reads: “Attached is a paper prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs at the request of Secretary Rusk as a basis for the discussion on the foregoing subject at the meeting, 4:30 p.m., May 4. In addition to the considerations with respect to Africa, as set forth in the attached paper, Secretary Rusk suggests that consideration will also need to be given to the effects on our NATO relationships with [sic] and our military interests in Portuguese territory, as well as the place of Portugal in the NATO alliance.”↩