Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

417. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, March 17, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Proposal Regarding Holden Roberto

I wish to register an emphatic dissent to the proposal to provide [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to Holden Roberto [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Angolan Provisional Government (GRAE).²

In filing this dissent, let me make it clear that I do not admire the methods or policies of the Portuguese Government in Angola. Their stewardship of this area is obsolete, brutal—and probably has no long-term future. In fact, I told Dr. Salazar that I did not think that, without a drastic change of methods, Portugal could retain its influence in Angola beyond a limited span of years.³

I should perhaps point out, however, that I would estimate a longer span than would many of my colleagues since I think the Portuguese are dug in and determined to stay. The French stuck it out in Algeria during seven years of fighting. While Portugal is not France, neither are the Bakongo Algerians.

The core of my position is that, in developing an Angolan policy we should not be over-persuaded either by sympathy for the underdog or abstract libertarian principles. We should look at this question hard-headedly in terms of the United States national interest. In those terms, I should like to set out my objections to the current proposal.

• First, I object to this proposal as a destructive moral precedent for the American Government.

  The doling out of this money will constitute double-dealing on the part of the United States Government. You have on at least two occasions (in Lisbon and Athens in 1962) assured the Portuguese Foreign Minister that we engaged in no activities with Holden Roberto that we could not disclose to the Portuguese. You did tell the Foreign Minister that we had had for some time an intelligence arrangement for Holden Roberto [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Pursuant to my instructions, I categorically assured Dr. Salazar that we were not providing assistance to Holden Roberto—and, by implication, that we did not intend to do so.

  To embark on a covert program of aid to Holden Roberto at this point would be a direct violation of confidence. I cannot believe that it is either good morals or good policy to put the United States Government in that position.

  We all recognized at the time of the Cuban missile crisis that the United States could not act out of character without losing something of its own self-respect. If it was true then, it is true now. And there are practical considerations as well. The question of good faith cannot be considered solely in the framework of United States-Portuguese relations. If we break confidence with Portugal—an acknowledged ally—we shall contribute to a general mistrust of our government that can cause us irreparable damage in the whole area of our international relations.

• Second, I do not believe that the United States should undertake a joint venture with the Communists to undermine a Western ally.

  The Agency presentation states: “In January, 1964, Roberto announced his willingness to receive military aid from the Bloc but insisted that such aid be given without commitments”. In arguing for the proposal, the presentation states: “Nationalist leaders intend to seek Bloc arms in order to satisfy the military wing of the movement, upon which their ability to retain leadership ultimately depends. As long as Bloc military support can be controlled by a friendly Congo move, and Bloc personnel excluded, this presents no immediate danger to United States objectives.”

  The United States role under the proposal would be to provide “constructive” assistance, including the “administrative expenses incurred by the” Provisional Government, “travel and representational costs”, etc.

  From this I take it that the proposal assumes that the Communists would provide the military weapons while we—as the junior partner—would provide the costs of administration of the Provisional Government. With our combined help Roberto and his colleagues would set about trying to undermine our ally.

  I do not find this an attractive posture for my country.

• Third, I believe it wrong to assume that we can exercise “leverage over the direction of the Angolan nationalist movement and … strengthen our relationship with its leadership,”⁴ by providing money for administrative support on a covert basis.

  The proposal assumes that United States involvement would not become known except to Roberto and his immediate associates. If this be the case, then the bulk of the Angolan nationalists would be fighting with arms known to be provided by Bloc sources, while only Roberto and one or two of his colleagues would know that the United States had helped at all. How would this give us effective leverage?

  I doubt that the United States can build much influence in this manner. At the moment, I understand that Roberto’s hold on the movement is precarious. He is, I am told, a poor administrator and a rather indifferent leader. According to a report received today, he may be ousted by his colleagues on the grounds he is an “American tool”.

  One accusation against Roberto is that he has been unable to raise adequate funds. What would be the result if he suddenly appeared with substantial funds? Against the background of accusations already made wouldn’t it be evident that he was getting money from the United States? If so, wouldn’t this become promptly known to the Portuguese?

  If, on the other hand, his followers assumed that he was getting money from the Bloc, wouldn’t this strengthen the Communists?

• Fourth, I do not believe it in the United States interest to encourage a state of terror in northern Angola.

  At the moment, the military situation in northern Angola is at a stand-off, and the Portuguese are feeling increasingly confident. The Agency presentation states: “The Portuguese military over the past year has succeeded in containing the nationalist forces, but it has been unable to put down the rebellion or put an end to rebel activities.”

  Our administrative funds will not significantly alter the military balance. Portugal has 40,000 troops in Angola. I think it is prepared to fight to the finish (although it may withdraw from Mozambique and concentrate in Angola). Under these circumstances, it is almost certain that—without regard to whether or not we give him financial help—Roberto will in time be driven to terrorist methods. This happened in 1961. It will surely happen again as the struggle grows more bitter—and, with increased bitterness, becomes more racist in character.

  I put, therefore, what I regard as a relevant question: All sentiment aside, is it in the interest of the United States to become an accessory to terrorizing Portuguese settlers in Angola? Isn’t it rather in our interest to discourage such a state of affairs in the heart of Africa? Or, if we cannot discourage it, shouldn’t we at least avoid associating ourselves with it?

  To put the question in larger terms, is there any hurry about Angola? Left by themselves, the Portuguese will probably be able to sustain a military stalemate for several years. While this may be a continuing source of frustration to the other African states, I don’t see why it need concern us except in the United Nations.

• Fifth, is it in our interest to stimulate a Portuguese invasion of the Congo?

  The Portuguese are known to have mobilized a substantial cadre of Katanganese gendarmes. If nationalist activities grow more intense, I think they will almost certainly move to destroy the nationalist camps in the Congo—particularly if they feel we are helping the nationalists. This can create major problems for us and the Adoula Government.

• Sixth, I do not think that a payment to Roberto is either necessary or useful.

  I do not think we have to run and get ahead of each nationalist movement in order to keep it out of Communist hands. Genuine nationalist movements have shown themselves resistant to Communist domination, and the test as to the direction of a regime is much more likely to occur when the revolution is completed and the new nation is being established.

  For this reason, I question the thesis that underlies the present proposal—that we must give covert financial aid to the Angolan Nationalists if they are to be friendly with us after independence.

  We have regularly supported the principle of self-determination in the United Nations and in our continuing dialogue with the Portuguese. I think we should persist in that course, which is in our great historic tradition. It is because of our open adherence to this tradition that we have won the leadership of the newly-emerging nations.

  To assume, however, that there is any direct and inevitable relation between financial help to revolutionaries and our relations with a post-revolutionary regime is not borne out by the historical facts. During the Second World War we helped Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and he is no friend today. We have, for the most part, established useful working rela tions with the new governments of Asia and Africa, yet we did not supply them covert support during their revolutionary days. What we have done is to help the new nations that have emerged from revolutionary struggles, and our continuing help is to a considerable extent the basis of our relationship.

  One lesson can be clearly read in our recent experience: If the question, “What have you done for me lately?” reflects political reality, it also reflects the reality of our relations with the less-developed countries.

Finally, I think it unrealistic to assume that, over a period of time, Portugal will remain unaware of our financial assistance to Roberto.

The dossier prepared for you by the Portuguese Foreign Minister describing the Angolan camps would indicate that their intelligence is competent. Once the Portuguese are morally certain that we are providing financial help—even if they cannot prove it—our credibility will be wholly destroyed. The question of credibility again is not limited to US-Portuguese relations, since the Portuguese will make it known throughout NATO circles that we have been treating them dishonestly.

My conclusion from all this, therefore, is quite clear. I see no objection to looking after Angolan refugees or even providing them with scholarship grants—provided we tell the Portuguese. But I am against furtive aid directed at undermining the interests of our ally.

While the observations in this memorandum have been addressed to the proposal to provide funds to Holden Roberto, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

George W. Ball ⁵

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 2, Document 415.
3. As President Kennedy’s Personal Representative, Under Secretary Ball visited Lisbon and met with Prime Minister Antonio De Oliveira Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira August 29–30 and September 6–7, 1963. For a record of Ball’s meeting with Kennedy to debrief him on these discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, p. 571. Records of Ball’s mission are in the Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2301; ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL, POL 19 PORT, POL AFR–US, and POL AFR–PORT; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal Subjects, Ball Mission. Ball’s own account of his mission to Portugal is in The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 276–279.
4. The omitted word in the quotation is “to.” The quotation is from the March 6 proposal cited in footnote 2 above.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.