Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

2. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

NORTH AFRICA

The Strategic Importance of North Africa

1. Increasing Soviet naval activity in the Western Mediterranean and substantial arms shipments to Algeria raise new questions for us and for NATO about the significance of the Soviet thrust into the area. North Africa has a southern Mediterranean coastline extending from Portugal to Turkey. With Spain, it commands the Atlantic approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. The United States enjoys military facilities at Wheelus Air Base in Libya and the Kenitra Naval Communications Center in Morocco. The immense oil and gas reserves of Libya and Algeria constitute a strategic as well as an economic asset of considerable importance.

2. Intrusion of the USSR into an area of such vital strategic and economic importance to the United States adds a new dimension to an already difficult set of North African problems. France has so far appeared indifferent to Soviet activities, and the helpfulness of other North Atlantic nations is questionable. It falls largely to the United States to examine the military and political implications of the increased Soviet presence.

The Arms and the Anxieties of King Hassan and President Bourguiba

3. One of our major difficulties involves the Moroccan and Tunisian reaction to the intensive Algerian military buildup with Soviet assistance. Algeria over-reacted to its pummeling by Moroccan forces in 1963 and has acquired the third largest military establishment in Africa. Soviet military assistance, half in grants and half in loans, now totals over $180 million. Greatly concerned by the growing Algerian potential, Hassan and Bourguiba have sought from us additional military assistance, as well as a United States guarantee of their national security. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Both appear to be upset that we have not been more responsive to their requests for arms and protection. King Hassan, who arrives in Washington tomorrow on an official visit, intends to raise the security problem as a prime order of business.

4. Security commitments pose obvious difficulties for us. While in one sense a convenient solution, perhaps, to the pressures from Hassan and Bourguiba, they do not seem to be a practical possibility at the present time. On the other hand, while we are considering limited amounts of arms for Morocco and Tunisia, we are determined to avoid being caught up in a North African arms race. The problem of reassuring such friends as Hassan and Bourguiba is thus a very difficult one.

Polarization

5. Morocco and Tunisia, as their own relations with France have become strained, have turned increasingly to the United States for military and economic assistance, while France and the Soviet Union have clearly opted for Algeria. Strictly regional issues therefore tend to take on overtones of wider international significance, and could, if present trends continue, lead to East-West confrontation.

The Border Problems

6. This polarization is further aggravated by Moroccan territorial claims against a large part of western Algeria and to the whole of Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. There are minor Tunisian claims against Algeria, which would be manageable were it not for the precedent a settlement here would establish for the Moroccan case. Even so, periodic border incidents mar otherwise good relations with Tunisia and have explosive potential with Morocco.

Algeria

7. In an effort to de-fuse the arms race and avoid polarization, we have believed it necessary to find a basis for improved relations with Algeria, without prejudice to the friendly relations we enjoy with Morocco and Tunisia. The course of our relations with Algeria, however, has been far from smooth. The Algerian Government appears sincerely to want good bilateral relations and has accorded warm welcomes to a series of American officials, including Governor Harriman and Senator Edward Kennedy. A hostile press dominated by French-trained left-wing intellectuals and strong GOA criticism of our Viet-Nam policies have marred the relationship which we hoped would improve after the elimination of Ben Bella by Colonel Boumediene.

8. Algeria nevertheless has need of Western assistance, including that of the United States, in developing its tremendous gas, oil and steel potential, and it is reasonable to hope that economic realities will eventually take precedence over the more extreme political inclinations of some of its leadership. We therefore consider it desirable to maintain at least a modicum of U.S. presence in the form of food and other assistance, in the hope of gradually improving relations.

Spanish Sahara

9. Generalissimo Franco’s letter to the President expressing concern that we may be too generous in response to King Hassan’s arms request underlines Spanish concern over Moroccan ambitions to acquire control of Spanish Sahara by force. Spain has committed itself to a solution based on self-determination and has refused to enter into bilateral talks with Morocco on this issue. Morocco has also accepted the principle of self-determination for Spanish Sahara but wants international control of a plebiscite in the belief that a fair vote would be favorable to Morocco. King Hassan’s visit on February 9–10 will provide the occasion to emphasize our interest in the elimination of tensions and the peaceful resolution of the Spanish Sahara and Algerian border problems.

Food Problems

10. North Africa is rapidly becoming one of the major food deficit areas of the world, and the problem will become more acute as population continues to increase at an alarming rate. With a present population of about 30 million, the North African countries have been receiving from us nearly three quarters of a million tons of PL 480 grain annually. Last year, because of a serious drought, the food deficit in the area amounted to over two million tons. Nevertheless, the prospect of increased food production through use of fertilizers and other improved agricultural methods is encouraging, provided these countries devote sufficient resources to the task. Tentative steps toward planned parenthood with the assistance of American private organizations have already been taken and will doubtless increase as education and women’s rights develop.

Economic Development

11. The general prospects for economic development in the area, given in particular the petroleum and gas resources of Libya and Algeria and the phosphates of Morocco, Spanish Sahara and Tunisia, are good. We already have a major assistance program in Morocco and Tunisia, and the latter is an outstanding example of what can be accomplished in the less developed world through a combination of self-help and foreign aid. Libya has passed from the category of aid recipient to aid donor, though on a minor scale, and the IBRD forecasts a potential growth in GNP for Algeria of 7–1/2 percent a year, though the bank considers this growth rate contingent on major U.S. and other foreign assistance. North Africa could become, in the not too distant future, a significant trading partner for the United States.

12. In view of North Africa’s petroleum, phosphates, iron ore and other mineral resources, it is possible to conceive, at least, of a vast regional effort for the integrated development of the area’s impressive industrial, agricultural and commercial (including touristic) potential. Such an effort would require a much greater degree of regional cooperation than presently exists, and major financial and technical assistance from the IBRD, U.S. and other Western sources, public and private, would be indispensable. The Bank would probably have to play a catalytic role.

Regional Cooperation

13. Coexisting uneasily with the arms race is a strong but sluggish current pushing the Maghreb countries towards increased regional cooperation. There are now annual meetings of the Economic Ministers and a Permanent Consultative Committee in Tunis. Seven permanent commissions for specific problems or commodities have been established and are working on such possibilities as a common Maghreb airlines and the elimination of impediments to regional trade. While these constitute small steps toward a big goal, they compare favorably with efforts of other regional groups at similar stages of development.

14. Sheer economic necessity might, in time, dampen down the arms race and spur regional economic cooperation. If national markets for local industries are small, elimination of tariff barriers would open up a market almost the size of Spain’s.

Technical Assistance for Libya

15. Libya typifies that category of country where normal aid activities are no longer justified for economic reasons, but where there is still a requirement for foreign technical help. The Libyans hire foreign technicians but cannot employ Americans because of their higher salary range. In order to maintain our important position in the Libyan economy and to give American firms the opportunity to bid on Libyan development projects, we are trying to devise a formula that would enable the Libyans to acquire the American technical advice they require. We are accordingly attempting to establish some mechanism, preferably within the U.S. Government, but perhaps from private sources, to furnish technical assistance to Libya at a subsidized price.

U.S. Interests and Objectives

16. Our primary interest is in the stability and progress of the area as a whole. As in other parts of the developing world, we support the national integrity and independence of the countries of the region, attempt to help them promote social and economic development in the interests of stability and seek to promote regional cohesion. We seek friendly relations with all four countries of the Maghreb and to deny any part of this strategically important and potentially prosperous region to Soviet domination. We do not ourselves need to dominate any part of it.

17. The United States, in addition to these general interests, does enjoy some useful special facilities. These include Kenitra Naval Communications Center and the VOA relay station in Morocco, substantial private investment in Algerian gas and oil, a close political relationship with Tunisia, and Wheelus Air Force Base and major investments in Libya.

U.S. Strategy and Past Actions

18. We have operated on the assumption that our interests in North Africa could be safeguarded by a relatively modest effort, complementary to that if the French and responsive to the needs of all the countries of the region. We have been aware of the dangers of excessive polarization and possible East-West confrontation and have therefore tried to include Algeria in our assistance programs and to convince its leadership of our good will.

19. In the field of military assistance, we have taken the position that arms expenditures are wasteful and should be subordinated to economic and social development and regional cooperation. Since Algeria’s independence, we have provided only about $65 million in military aid to Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. New programs for these countries involve relatively modest amounts and are presently under discussion.

Future Actions

20. The question to be asked is whether this policy is succeeding. It is a rational policy, provided events beyond our control do not dictate more radical measures. Improvement of our bilateral relations with Algeria appears vital to a solution of the arms race, polarization and regional cooperation. At the same time, it appears necessary to move ahead with modest military assistance programs for Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, keeping the Soviet thrust into the Western Mediterranean under the closest scrutiny. Where opportunities present themselves, we should of course opt for regionally oriented assistance projects.

21. In view, however, of the explosive tensions within the area, our difficulties in finding a basis for cooperation with Algeria, the limited resources available to us for economic and military assistance, uncertainty about French attitudes, and the potential threat to Western interests posed by the Soviet challenge, it is advisable to keep the problems of the Maghreb under continuous review and to re-examine our policies again in another six months.

Background

In assessing the problems outlined in this paper, the following background elements are worth keeping in mind:

a. The four countries of the Maghreb occupy an area one-half the size of the United States on the northwest African littoral. They have considerable religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic cohesion side by side with the greatest political diversity. Islam is the cement and a western dialect of Arabic the common language. Relations among peoples are as close and uncomplicated as those between governments are difficult.

b. We are dealing in the Maghreb with old cultures but new and untried countries and governments. Algeria is five years old and never existed as a country before 1962; it has had to develop institutions and political practices from scratch. Libya is in comparable straits, and Morocco and Tunisia only are somewhat more fortunate.

c. All have emerged from a common colonial past, but only in Algeria was a major and prolonged war required to achieve independence. The war and its aftermath caused half a million Algerian casualties, the relocation of nearly three million people, and the precipitate departure of one million Europeans who had formed the country’s administrative and technical elite. Only in the case of Algeria, furthermore, did the United States side with the colonial power.

d. If the countries are new, so are the people. Fifty percent of the population of the Maghreb is under twenty-one. There is a long-term risk that this generation coming of age in new countries without strong institutions or economies will demand more of their governments than they can possibly provide. In the short run, all the countries of the area must spend inordinate amounts on education and social services.

e. The discovery and development of oil and gas have rapidly made North Africa one of the most significant producing areas in the world. Investments by Western oil companies in Algeria and Libya are in the multi-billion dollar range. Algeria has 10 percent of the world’s gas reserves and some of the largest fields in the world. Libya is producing oil at the rate of 1.5 billion barrels per day and will reach 2–2.5 billion bpd in a few years, putting it in a class with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Over 90 percent of the investment and production in Libya is by American companies. The French are of course the predominant investors in Algeria, but American companies come second with about $100 million invested. The IBRD estimates that there is an additional potential for investment in Algerian oil and gas of over $1 billion, much of which would presumably have to come from the United States.

North African hydrocarbons enjoy a price advantage over those from the Middle East because of the proximity of the European market. The strategic advantage of lying west of Suez could one day make this source of energy even more important to the NATO area.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text is attached as Tab C to a transmittal memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rusk, undated but drafted on February 7. The memorandum notes that Tab C is the discussion paper, which Rusk had already seen, prepared for the NSC meeting on North Africa scheduled for February 8.