Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

1. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 60–66

Washington, May 5, 1966.

THE MAGHREB (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA)

The Problem

To examine and assess trends and problems of the individual Maghrebian states and of the area as a whole over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

A. The three Maghreb states share a certain sense of identity, but this tends to be overshadowed by the differences between them. Some modest forms of economic cooperation are developing, but over the next few years nothing approaching economic integration or political unity is in sight. (Paras. 1–6, 43–46)

B. Tunisia is likely to enjoy continued political stability under President Bourguiba and his entrenched Destourian Socialist Party. Bourguiba’s departure would probably not bring on a serious succession crisis or major policy changes, at least in the short term. Long range economic prospects are fairly good, but Tunisia will suffer from some painful economic problems, particularly a balance of payments deficit, over the next few years. (Paras. 17–25)

C. Morocco is also likely to enjoy relative political stability for the next few years. King Hassan II, facing minimal domestic opposition and supported by the security forces, will probably continue to dominate the political scene. In time, however, the combination of rapid population growth and continued economic stagnation is likely to pose a major threat to the nation’s social and political order. (Paras. 7–16)

D. In Algeria, Boumediene will probably continue to seek a broad consensus in support of his government, but the army will remain the dominant political force. Considerable political infighting within the regime is likely, probably involving occasional charges within the leadership. There is considerable potential for economic growth, but political confusion and the leaders’ demonstrated difficulty in reaching policy decisions will hamper the task of dealing with Algeria’s monumental economic problems. However, high levels of petroleum revenues and French economic assistance will keep the economy going, though at a slow pace. (Paras. 26–32)

E. France will continue to be the single most important foreign influence in the Maghreb. The cultural link is likely to persist for some time, and France is the principal trading partner of each of the three countries. Algeria will continue to be the most favored by French subsidies and other economic aid, though throughout the area these will decrease over the longer term. (Paras. 38–42)

F. Algeria’s relations with the US will be less suspicious, and with the USSR more reserved, than in Ben Bella’s day. Algerian dependence on the Soviets as a source of arms aid, and Algerian distrust of US policy—notably in Vietnam but also in the Maghreb itself—will be limiting factors on any basic change. Tunisian and Moroccan relations with the West, particularly the US and West Germany, are likely to remain close. None of the Maghreb countries is likely to become closely involved in the affairs of the Eastern Arab or sub-Saharan African states. (Paras. 47–51)

G. Both Morocco and Tunisia have border disputes with Algeria, and both fear that Algeria may try to dominate North Africa. Algeria, on the other hand, fears that Morocco and Tunisia, backed by Western powers, might attempt to encircle it. These attitudes have contributed to a North African arms race, with Algeria receiving large amounts of Soviet arms, and Morocco and Tunisia pressing for extensive military aid from Western powers, particularly the US. Algeria’s military capabilities are now greater than those of Morocco and Tunisia combined, and we believe Algeria would seek additional Soviet arms if a major build-up of Moroccan or Tunisian forces occurred. (Paras. 33–36; Annex, Paras. 1–10)

H. Despite the tensions among the Maghreb states, none is likely to mount a deliberate major armed attack against a neighbor during the period of this estimate. Limited border conflicts may occur, but they would probably be localized and of short duration. (Paras. 36–38)

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed.