Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

3. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY NSC MEETING ON NORTH AFRICA

February 8, 1967

1. Number of upcoming Presidential decisions make discussion timely. These include: PL 480 for Morocco and Algeria, both of which require waivers under Findley Amendment because of trade with Cuba, Morocco’s being of major proportions; MAP for Tunisia, and military sales packages for Morocco and Libya; Tunisian and Moroccan requests for security guarantees; possible US participation in regional economic projects; and reply to Franco’s letter on Spanish Sahara. There are visits by Chiefs of State of Morocco and Tunisia, Hassan tomorrow and Bourguiba in June.

2. All these decisions are inter-related and may well shape political context in the Maghreb for years to come.

3. Underlying problems we face are: growing polarization, with Morocco and Tunisia supported by US, and Algeria underwritten by France and Soviet Union; unresolved claims on Algerian territory by Morocco and to much smaller degree, Tunisia, and claims by Morocco to Spanish Sahara; and economic development.

4. Although problems not as immediate as in some other parts of the world, we could have our strategic interests threatened, either by implantation of Soviet military power or by loss of our own military facilities.

5. We have substantial elements of strength, including a sound relationship with three of the four countries. Libya, where we feared fragmentation and Egyptian influence several years ago, now appears firmly cemented together by economic prosperity. Tunisia is making sound economic progress, and Bourguiba’s control is firm, although succession problem is causing some concern. In Algeria, alongside major problems, we possess potentially important assets. The Moroccan internal political situation has disturbing elements of weakness, but Hassan’s popularity in the countryside and proven political shrewdness provide assurances for the stability of his regime.

6. Arms problem is difficult. French refused to take problem seriously until recently, but are now trying to expand their influence in the Algerian military field. We have discussed situation in NATO. Would it be useful to discuss problem directly with Soviets? Would it be possible to enlist the help of the UN in devising a solution to the arms race and other problems of the area? Assuming that a US bilateral guarantee is out of the question, is there any other form of reassurance that could be given Morocco and Tunisia with respect to our interest in their security and well-being?

7. Underlying cause of arms race is suspicion between Morocco and Algeria based on major border difficulties. We subscribe to OAU principles on need to solve African border problems by peaceful means.

8. A long-term solution to the arms race and mutual suspicion is the creation of close economic ties between the four Maghreb countries in general and Morocco and Algeria in particular. Morocco and Tunisia are countries of aid concentration, however, and we have no aid programs of any consequence in Algeria and none in Libya. Does this harden economic nationalism rather than sponsor regional cooperation? Could we sponsor a program of increased food production based on advanced agricultural techniques and fertilizer production, on a regional basis? Morocco is particularly rich in phosphates and Algeria has ten percent of the world’s natural gas.

9. To what extent should we be prepared to “co-exist” with the Soviets in the area? Should we be prepared to make parallel investments, as in the Algerian steel complex, or in meeting food needs of the area.

10. Essentially, we see no alternative to pursuing the broad general policy outlined in our paper. The assistance that we feel would keep the door open to passably friendly relations with Algeria is modest, while to withhold all assistance from Algeria and to concentrate our efforts exclusively on Morocco and Tunisia would be costly in terms of increased political tensions in the area. Moreover, such an extreme position is not yet warranted by the degree of deterioration of our relations with Algeria or by our understanding of Soviet intentions.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. Attached to a February 6 memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, and both are Tab B to Read’s February 7 memorandum (see footnote 1, Document 2). No drafting information appears on the source text, but Read’s memorandum indicates that the paper was drafted by Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs Rene Tron and cleared by Palmer, J. Stapleton Roy in EUR/SOV, Francis R. Campbell in EUR/SPP, and Richard W. Aherne in EUR/FBX.