Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

380. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State¹

Lagos, April 13, 1967, 1723Z.

8088. Ref: Lagos 7981² and 8039.³

1. I talked almost hour with Gowan and PermRep Extaff Ogbu this noon.

2. Re visit to Ojukwu, I reported he reiterated opposition to Decree No. 8, expressed doubt as to utility SMC meeting but did not say would not attend if Ghanaians able to arrange. Seemed to realize and discount that if East seceded prospects for early international recognition would not be good and took generally pessimistic and hard line re prospects for Nigerian unity.

3. I then asked Gowan how he saw future. He responded that in view increasing intransigence of and provocation by Ojukwu he did not believe SMC meeting would be productive. He was however willing make another attempt and would attend meeting arranged by Ghanaians. He thought this would take place in relatively near future and all members SMC would be present. He dismissed participation other African heads of state. I expressed hope that despite gloomy prospects meeting would be successful.

4. Gowan said bitterly that East continuing to import arms and in view population pressure probably planning to expand North and West. He cited China as parallel. I expressed doubt that East had military capability seriously to contemplate such course. He agreed this true now but if permitted Ojukwu would continue military buildup for future effort.

5. I asked Gowan whether he thought Ojukwu would soon issue formal declaration of secession or independence. Gowan talked around this question, but gist of his remarks was he thought it more likely Ojukwu would continue for time being to move toward de facto independence. Gowan reiterated that it was his responsibility to prevent Ojukwu from breaking up Nigeria and that FMG would have curb East. I commented that I assumed he had only economic measures in mind and urged him to avoid measures that would do lasting damage to Nigerian economy. Gowan nodded assent.

6. Gowan went on to say that except for Ojukwu and some other Ibos, all Nigerians wanted to remain together in one country. This definitely included minority tribes in East who “did not want to be left alone with Ibos.” He had therefore been considering various ways of meeting wishes of most Nigerians. He had thought of possible course of action which he might adopt if upcoming SMC meeting proved abortive. He would then offer Ojukwu and Ibos option of seceding and establishing their own “little Switzerland” within Nigeria. From care with which Gowon led up to this and unusual precision of his language, and keen interest with which Ogbu listened and watched me, it was evident that they regarded this as major if not brilliant gambit.

7. I commented that this was new idea to me and asked whether his reference to Switzerland meant that he had in mind landlocked Iboland. He said yes. I wondered whether this move might not lead other Nigerian groups to seek similar independence along tribal lines and thus end in disintegration Nigeria which he wanted prevent. Gowon stoutly rejected this possibility. He said Ojukwu’s intransigence and arrogance had dissipated sympathy which most Nigerians had had for Ibos after events of last year. Other Nigerians now swinging to view there no living with Ibos and if they want to go let them, but without Eastern minorities.

8. I said I strongly hoped it would not be necessary to take such radical step, and urged that every effort be made to find other solution at SMC meeting.

9. Foregoing interview has not caused me to change analysis in Lagos 8039. Only new element is Gowon’s Iboland idea which Ojukwu would reject out of hand. As psychological warfare ploy, however, it could mobilize anti-Ibo sentiments of many Nigerians and increase Ojukwo’s problems in Eastern minority areas.

Mathews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis (Noforn except British). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, NSA, AND CIA.
2. Dated April 11. (Ibid., POL 23–9 NIGERIA) See footnote 2, Document 379.
3. Telegram 8039 from Lagos, April 12, transmitted Mathews’ estimate that Ojukwu would probably seek early independence, but that the East would probably submit quickly if foreign governments complied with FMG economic measures and otherwise continued to support Nigerian unity. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA)