Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State¹

Lagos, April 12, 1967, 1500Z.

8014. Ref: Lagos 7981.²

1. Following brief session with photographers and notetaker present in which Ojukwu and I made standard statements of position, Barnard and I talked privately with Ojukwu over hour.

2. I opened by saying I had instructions convey certain views USG to him and covered points B, C, and D (first two sentences) of paragraph 5 State 161782.³ In doing so I read closely paraphrased versions of paragraph 1 and first two sentences paragraph 5 (D) Deptel. I also said in view prevailing tension and difficulties travel to and from East, USG temporarily suspending travel its personnel and dependents to East⁴ and advising US companies do same. We hoped Nigerian developments would permit early cancellation this temporary measure.

3. I added personal comment with respect post-Aburi disagreements to effect that prominent world statesmen skilled in negotiation sometimes left meetings or conferences thinking they understood each other only to find later that they had widely divergent views as to results of meeting. Was it not therefore possible that meeting at Aburi of military men who not skilled negotiators had resulted in honest misunderstandings.

4. Ojukwu replied there could be no misunderstanding as to what agreed at Aburi. Neither he nor Eastern people would go back from their understanding of Aburi agreements which was only correct understanding. Decree No. 8 does not fulfill Aburi and was therefore not acceptable to East which would not compromise. Ojukwu regretted that USG had “taken sides” by expressing favorable view of Decree No. 8.

5. I asked what specifically was wrong with Decree No. 8. Ojukwu mentioned emergency provisions, composition SMC and timing. Ghanaians, he remarked, had found forty divergences from Aburi agreements in Decree No. 8. Ojukwu said Decree was now only incidental as events had overtaken it and Nigerians had more important issues to resolve. Early resumption of discussions among military leaders was essential to prevent breakup of Nigeria by default.

6. Ojukwu made usual comments to effect he does not recognize Gowon as “leader of Nigeria” and does not consider East in any way subordinate to FMG. He also said Nigeria ceased to exist as federation on July 29. Since then country has in fact been divided in separate parts and now very close to complete split. Only question remaining is how and to what extent parts should work together in future. He reiterated his view that parts could be only loosely associated.

7. I said that it appeared from Ojukwu’s remarks that East was unwilling compromise. If this so, how could there be negotiations with rest of country. Ojukwu replied in effect that there could be no compromise between right and wrong; East was right, and rest of country must see this.

8. I several times raised question of and urged need for another full SMC meeting. Ojukwu carefully avoided saying he would not attend meeting, but consistently responded that he doubted meeting would achieve much, and that each day that passed reduced prospects for and value of meeting. He reviewed reasons why meeting in Nigeria not practicable and mentioned conditions he has recently been attaching to his participation anywhere. He thought Ghanaians getting discouraged and merely going through motions of trying to arrange meeting in Ghana. He had agreed to cooperate with Ankrah’s efforts by withholding major Eastern action until after April 14. He expressed doubt that Gowon really wanted meeting.

9. I asked Ojukwu what he thought African heads of state would do if they participated in SMC meeting. He said he wanted them to mediate. He was confident that even most reactionary heads of state would recognize that East acting in good faith and FMG in bad faith. He also thought they would have restraining effect on “other side.” I asked whether their presence would also have restraining effect on him. Ojukwu replied seriously that he always acted with restraint.

10. Ojukwu reverted to temporary suspension travel US citizens to East and said with emphasis he considered this “discriminatory and another evidence USG ‘taking sides.’” I said our action consequence of special circumstances now affecting East only and we had taken similar action in other parts of Nigeria in past. I re-emphasized temporary nature of action. I took occasion to point out that in present atmosphere of preparedness East was not pleasant place for foreigners, and US citizens in region were showing increasing concern about situation. Their concern was not eased by speeches such as that Ojukwu had recently given at ABA which identified unspecified foreign governments as potential “enemies of the East.”

11. Ojukwu said it evident to him that USG and other Western governments would comply with FMG actions such as blockade of East. Eastern people would regard governments so complying as enemies. He foresaw possibility that most foreigners might leave region. He would regret this but East would have to get along without these foreign friends and would look forward to their eventual return.

12. Ojukwu laid great stress on financial aspects and growing economic warfare. He accused FMG of stalling on payments to East and of refusing enter into serious discussions or negotiations on financial problems. He said Ghanaians had tried unsuccessfully to persuade FMG pay statutory debt to East. Ojukwu reiterated that blockade would force East to “strike out alone.” He claimed Lagos progressively tightening screws and situation would soon reach point of no return.

13. In view Ojukwu’s hard line and apparent expectation of early confrontation leading to Eastern secession, I said I greatly depressed by grim prospect he offering and wondered whether he had weighed consequences of Eastern withdrawal from Nigeria. If one could foresee peaceful separation East from rest of country, it might be deplored but accepted. We all, however, knew manifold tribal frictions within Nigeria. I thought Eastern withdrawal would set off process of dissolution throughout Nigeria that was hardly likely to remain peaceful and could disintegrate into situation worse than Congo. East obviously would not be unaffected by such development.

14. Ojukwu made obvious response that Nigeria not Congo, implied tribal situation not so dangerous in Nigeria and went on to say Nigerian problems could not be solved by foreign formulas. While he recognized economic advantages of one Nigeria with large land, resources and population, political considerations were much more important than economic. As far as East and Easterners were concerned, they now motivated by Eastern nationalism and wanted to build Eastern nation. Moreover, federated Nigeria had been block to Pan-Africanism as many other countries feared such large nation. Some African countries think it might not be bad thing if Nigeria broke up into smaller nations and might be willing enter into closer relations with successor states.

15. I pointed out that I had not offered any formula for solution and noted that some propagandists writing for “Outlook” who presumably Nigerian appeared share my view of potential tribal trouble throughout Nigeria as their output seemed directed toward stirring up such trouble. Ojukwu did not attempt deny this. I also said according our information it was not just Western nations who wanted Nigeria to remain one country; this was also view of African countries. I expressed view it would be some time before other African countries would be inclined enter into close relation with states emerging from Nigerian dissolution, in light conditions that would probably prevail here. I dwelt also upon likely reaction of US public and Congress which would be inclined draw back from aid and other involvement in Africa. Ojukwu commented that USG could not withdraw from involvement in Africa no matter how distasteful it found Nigerian dissolution. I responded that I agreed with him in long run, but for medium term popular US reaction would inhibit USG.

16. I remarked that related matter was prospect of international recognition should East secede. I had asked Department for available information in this regard. I concluded from this information that recognition would come very slowly. Ojukwu responded that he assumed US recognition would be slow although in time US national interest would counsel recognition. I rejoined that I was thinking more of recognition by other African countries which would be slow. USG would of course be greatly influenced by what African governments did.

17. Ojukwu suggested twice that USG and other Western governments were more tolerant of North than of East and perhaps thought North more amenable to their interests. I said emphatically this unfounded, USG was impartial as between Nigerian regions and obviously had no special interests in North.

18. As variant of foregoing theme, Ojukwu also remarked he beginning believe Western Nigeria not averse to Eastern secession on assumption it then easier for Yorubas to exploit North in rump federation.

19. At one point in conversation Ojukwu had casually thrown out comment that he might have to order his troops to take Lagos. I later took occasion to observe that I thought it unlikely either Ojukwu or Gowon would order their respective forces to undertake offensive action. I had impression both of them and their senior military advisers were aware of limitations their forces for such action. Ojukwu did not argue point.

20. Discussion ended on note of mutual unhappiness and pessimism.

Mathews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Accra, London, Monrovia, Yaounde, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA.
2. Telegram 7981 from Lagos, April 11, reported that the Ambassador was en route to talk to Ojukwu, and that Ojukwu and the East were losing support in the West and Midwest. (Ibid.)
3. Document 378.
4. Telegram 171192 to Lagos, April 7, concurred in the recommendation to temporarily suspend travel to the East. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA)