Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State¹

Lagos, February 14, 1967, 1230Z.

6143. 1. Distinguishing characteristics of current developing Nigerian crisis are:

A. FMG Military and Eastern Military apparently believe that their respective armies are equipped and ready to fight, and acceptance of inevitability of conflict is growing in both Lagos and Enugu.

B. Ojukwu’s recent public pronouncements, whether or not by design, have been of nature to goad FMG northerners to force. It is possible that Ojukwu wishes to precipitate crisis, fearing that time may not be on his side.

C. Gowon’s personal inclination against resort to force is being eroded, and he may in any case be unable to prevent initiation hostilities by FMG forces.

D. Some FMG military and top civil servants are concerned that time is against FMG and unless drastic action is taken soon East will achieve de facto independence. They tend to believe removal of Ojukwu as Eastern Military Governor will end Eastern intransigence.

E. Ojukwu and some of his advisers are convinced that FMG is generally unpopular and administratively and militarily ineffective.

F. Military Governors of West and Mid-West are increasingly attracted to Ojukwu concept of greater autonomy for regions.

G. FMG and Eastern Government are both becoming increasingly aware of critical importance of control of public revenues.

H. Confidence and trust between Gowon and Ojukwu at lowest ebb yet and not likely improve significantly.

2. As against attitudes, beliefs and convictions Nigerian contenders, my assessment is that:

A. Time is in fact on side of FMG as long as it avoids resort to force and retains control of bulk of public revenues, and general international acceptance as legitimate GON.

B. Resort to force, regardless of which army—FMG or East—won battles, would set off tribal violence in many parts of Nigeria, but particularly in Lagos area which still harbours mixture tribal people.

C. Consequence of this tribal violence rather than clash between armies would almost certainly lead to breakup of Nigeria into at least three new countries.

D. If resort to force can be averted, breakup of Nigeria is unlikely.

E. Practicable constitutional settlement will have to fall between retention same degree of federalism as provided in 1963 Constitution being urged upon Gowon by FMG top civil servants, and de facto independence within nominal confederation being sought by Ojukwu.

3. In current circumstances, I reluctantly concluded that intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu would not be able to accomplish much whether individual involved is General Ankrah, Commodore Wey, Chief Adebo, Ambassador Martins or Malcolm MacDonald. I believe that what is now needed to prevent crisis coming to climax in next six weeks is expression of concern at Nigerian situation and support of FMG by foreign governments. Objective would be to encourage Gowon to continue opposing resort to force and to impress on Ojukwu that he can expect no foreign support for unilateral independence.

4. I propose therefore as matter of urgency that UK with our full support give other African Commonwealth members estimate of current Nigerian situation and urge heads of state to send messages to Gowon (A) Expressing concern at growing tension in Nigeria, (B) Calling upon all Nigerians to abide by Aburi renunciation use of force and to seek peaceful solution their problems, (C) Stating that sender’s government would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria, and (D) Asking that all members SMC be informed of message. Ankrah, Kuanda and Kenyatta would be most effective voices.

5. Consideration should also be given to proposing to Emperor and Tubman that they send similar messages to Gowon.

6. In context these African approaches which would certainly become public, UK HICOM and I should be authorized separately to explain positions our governments to Gowon and other members SMC privately along following lines:

A. We consider use of force could only result in breakup of Nigeria, regardless of “military victory” by FMG or Eastern forces.

B. If there is to be resort to force, we require advance notice so that our nationals can be removed to places of safety as we do not believe that law and order could be maintained in many parts of Nigeria if FMG and Eastern forces clash. (We would tell Gowon that one of main concerns is safety of our nationals in Lagos itself.)

C. We would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria.

D. We believe constitutional settlement should be sought in practical accommodation of interests rather than in rigid adherence to doctrinaire “confederal” or “federal” positions.

7. We and British should be prepared to give substance to foregoing position by:

A. Advising our companies operating in eastern Nigeria not to acquiesce in demands for payment of federal revenues to Eastern Government. Effect of refusal to pay federal revenues obviously stands or falls on position Shell-BP as largest single source federal revenue in East.

B. Complying with FMG decrees closing seaports and airports in East and otherwise seeking restrict international contacts of eastern regions.

C. Urge that Department authorize Embassy London to explore this proposal with HMG.

Mathews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:17 a.m. on February 15.