Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State¹

Lagos, November 11, 1966, 1510Z.

3562. Ref: State 81686² and Enugu 146.³

1. I spoke to Gowon by telephone morning Nov 10, said Ojukwu had told Barnard Nov 4 they not then in touch and asked whether communications reestablished. Gowon said he talked with Ojukwu by telephone Nov 9 and was sending him letter Nov 10. I asked about prospects Eastern attendance resumed Constitutional Conference. Gowon replied he making suggestions to Ojukwu which he hoped would solve attendance problem.

2. Of thoughtful suggestions Enugu 146, I have incorporated substance of much of paragraph 4 in revised message. Re paragraphs 5 and 6, however, I am reluctant at this stage to extend discussion into difficult area of terms of constitutional settlement. If we did, it would be hard to avoid expressing view, which unlikely please Ojukwu, that way to settlement not eased by region designating elements its position as not negotiable.

3. For Barnard: Following is my message to Ojukwu, revised in light of reftels, to be conveyed orally soonest. I leave it to your discretion whether you paraphrase it in third person or dead it. Also, feel free to amend or delete specific words or phrases which you judge would be unhelpful:

A. I have been giving prolonged and troubled thought to your conversation with Mr. Barnard on Nov. 4.⁴ The general tenor of your remarks and particularly your questions about military aid and recognition led me to believe that you and your associates had moved very far in the direction of unilateral secession since our talk on Oct 17. Barnard assures me that I read too much into your remarks and attach too much importance to the strongly secessionist line of the news media in the East. I hope he is right.

B. In any case, it is only with the greatest reluctance that I address myself to questions which presuppose a complete breakdown of negotiations between the East and the rest of the country. There are many remaining avenues of negotiations, both procedural and substantive, which should be explored before any of us resigns himself to the tragedy of secession. Gowon told me on Nov 10 that he was making new proposals to you resumed constitutional conference.

C. Your query to Barnard about military aid was in the context of an invasion of the East by northern troops before eastern secession. This is indeed an hypothetical question. I still think, as I did on Oct 17, that such an invasion is only a remote possibility. The folly and danger of any attempt to solve Nigeria’s problems by resort to force have repeatedly been pointed out to Gowon and other military and civilian leaders. Despite all the recent rumors of troop movements, imminent new attacks on tribal groups, etc., we have been unable thus far to find confirming evidence and to the extent that the rumors forecast specific events, these have not yet occurred.

D. Apropos of rumors, one other aspect of your talk with Barnard that dismayed me was that you should have believed on Nov 4 that Commodore Wey was not in Lagos and that Gowon might have left Lagos. Wey’s return to Lagos on Nov 2 from his travels to Accra and Conakry in connection with the Ghana-Guinea dispute was well publicized. During the several days preceding Nov 4, Gowon received various foreign and local visitors, and these public activities were thoroughly reported by press, radio and television. Your Lagos informants should be able to give you reliable information on such simple matters as the whereabouts of Gowon and Wey.

E. Since you have raised the question of recognition in the event of unilateral secession, the candor of our past exchanges requires me to tell you what I think is likely to happen, despite widespread sympathy for the sufferings of Easterners, if the East does unilaterally secede. Most if not all African governments would deplore the act, would refuse to recognize the East as a sovereign state and would refuse give political support to the Federal Military Government. Non-African governments could be expected to follow the African lead, as very few, in my opinion, would consider that they could afford to recognize or otherwise support Eastern Nigeria at the expense of relations with the rest of Africa.

F. I once again urge you and your associates to give continued careful consideration to the consequences for yourselves, the rest of Nigeria and Africa as a whole if you take the path of unilateral secession. The prevailing emotional tensions and uncertainties leave all of us apprehensive of the future, but I earnestly hope none of us will be led into rash actions by rumors however persistent and alarming. Developments here and abroad since our talk on Oct 17 have only strengthened my conviction that dissolution of the Nigerian union would perpetuate and even intensify the problems and animosities that now plague Nigeria.⁵

4. For Barnard: Neither Department nor Embassy has previously dealt with question of emissaries to Washington. I suggest you not reopen subject but should Ojukwu do so take position that new emissaries could add nothing to Onyerjula’s effective presentation Eastern views. FYI: Acting UK HICOM told me Nov 10 London not eager receive Eastern emissaries and proposing take stand that it could do so officially only if FMG concurred. If emissaries appeared in London without FMG concurrence, officials would talk with them informally but only after informing Nigerian HICOM. Acting UK HICOM has agreed that Ojukwu be told FMG concurrence required but has suggested that if emissaries arrive without FMG blessing, they should either not be received or received secretly. Acting UK HICOM also said London not planning respond to Ojukwu’s questions on military aid and recognition. End FYI.

5. For Department: I fully agree that it would be useful if UK emissary, preferably Malcolm MacDonald,⁶ could soon be sent to undertake quiet talks in Lagos and all regions to determine whether CW mission could play useful role.

Mathews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Also sent to Enugu, and repeated to London, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
2. Telegram 81686 to Lagos, November 9, advised that a message that Mathews proposed to send to Ojukwu should be delivered orally by Consul Robert J. Barnard, suggested that Mathews telephone Gowon and convey Ojukwu’s concern at the recent 3-day silence in communications, and requested his views on the possible effectiveness of a visit to Nigeria by a British emissary. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 146 from Enugu, November 11, reported Barnard’s view that while U.S. representatives should make U.S. opposition to secession clear to Ojukwu, they should also assure him that they were trying to dissuade the Nigerian Government from attempting a solution by force. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 133 from Enugu to Lagos, November 4, reported that Ojukwu had requested U.S. consideration of military aid if the East was attacked by northern troops and had asked Barnard whether the U.S. Government would recognize Eastern sovereignty if the East declared independence. (Ibid.)
5. Telegram 160 from Enugu, November 17, reported that Barnard formally presented the Ambassador’s message to Ojukwu on that day, and that afterwards they discussed key elements of the problem. Ojukwu said that he interpreted the Ambassador’s reply to his questions to mean that if the East seceded as a result of an attack by the FMG or the North, the U.S. Government would not give military aid to or recognize the East. Barnard responded that “this interpretation was not correct; we simply were answering a hypothetical question.” He added that “no honest government would promise recognition in advance of secession unless it favored such a move, which we clearly did not.” (Ibid.)
6. Malcolm MacDonald was the British High Commissioner for Kenya.