369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria1
82010. 1. USG seeks maintain Nigerian unity because it realizes East’s defection would cause grave problems for rest of country as well as for East and because prospects for further fragmentation would be high. Obviously our continuing efforts must depend upon full appreciation by influential Nigerian elements.
2. Department has been giving much thought to US policy in event East should secede. US cannot be expected to serve with UK as guardian of Nigerian territorial integrity if, after long and arduous effort in this direction, a powerful and cohesive section of country should prove determined to disavow its association with rest. Subject has been discussed at IRG meeting in preliminary way. More intensive discussion scheduled for November 17 and will revolve around following general contingency situations and their variants:
- a.
- Eastern Nigeria proclaims UDI. FMG declares East in state of rebellion and attempts invasion of East, in conjunction with blockade, to restore its authority. This contingency presents US with its most difficult decisions and poses most serious threat to US citizens resident in Nigeria.
- b.
- East intensifies its drift into de facto independence without UDI and is coupled with disturbances and breakdowns in law and order in various sections of country. Lack of adequate military capabilities prevents FMG from invading East, but it mounts general effective political and economic blockade.
- c.
- There is prolonged period of continuing drift and uncertainty during which negotiations between East and other regions take place but without any definitive solution being reached.
3. Current approach here to problem may be summarized in these terms. If unity no longer possible despite US–UK efforts, in such environment US must move to protect its own interests, strive for as much stability in area as possible, and seek to maintain its presence in all regions of Nigeria to prevent vacuum which others could enter and exploit.
4. It should be emphasized that outlined contingency approach and brief resume above are tentative pending serious examination. Prior [Page 626] to this on November 17 it would be most helpful if you could give us your views within such a context.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London.↩
- Telegram 3675 from Lagos, November 16, reported the Embassy’s view of Nigeria’s problems. It concluded that the Embassy considered that the Nigerian situation was “not yet hopeless” and that the most urgent problem was to try to help avert the “worst of all contingencies,” namely the fragmentation of Nigeria. (Ibid.)↩