Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria¹

Washington, February 14, 1967, 8:09 p.m.

137143. Ref: Lagos 6143.²

1. Department appreciates timely analysis in reftel and agrees with Embassy’s outline of major features (para. 1) and assessment (para. 2) of current crisis.

2. Re paras. 3 and 4, Dept. shares doubts on what either Wey or Adebo might accomplish as intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu. Yet there could be merit in utilizing every potential Nigerian for such role before calling on AF heads of state. In this connection does Wey still plan to visit Enugu?

3. Sufficient time should be available to (1) await results, if any, of Wey’s trip; (2) bring in Adebo, who has just returned Lagos, if Wey fails; and (3) then possibly proceed along lines para. 4 reftel. Dept. recognizes, of course, Embassy may have new info which militates against use of either Wey or Adebo. However, in light widespread agreement that Nigerian crisis must in last analysis be solved by Nigerians themselves, would welcome your views on exploring use of Wey and Adebo³ more fully before turning to other AF states.

4. Agree encouragement of Gowon to continue oppose use of force is of prime importance. While equally important to impress on Ojukwu that he could not expect immediate foreign support for unilateral independence, Dept. believes some AF commonwealth states would boggle at bald statement suggested para. 4C. Perhaps rephrasing to eliminate recognition aspect but to include thought that FMG will continue to enjoy full support of international community would be more palatable. In light Shell-BP’s exposed position, it possible HMG itself might prefer less exact language.

5. Dept. concurs in thought expressed para 6a. It believes 6b could be modified to say that if there prospect of resort to force, US would be gravely concerned over safety its nationals. Their removal to places of safety would be imperative. Para would continue with your phrasing “as we do not believe, etc.” Re 6C phrasing similar to that in para 4 above might be more suitable.

6. Para 7 requires further study and, at appropriate point, discussion with UK.

7. Would appreciate your additional thoughts on above before Dept. authorizes London to explore with HMG.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London.
2. Document 371.
3. Telegram 6190 from Lagos, February 15, reported that no Nigerian would be trusted in East as an intermediary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA)