Office of the Historian

132. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 9, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Morocco’s Security Problem

PARTICIPANTS

  • Morocco:
    • King Hassan II
    • Mr. Balafrej, the King’s Personal Representative
    • Mr. Cherkaoui, Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Ambassador Laraki
  • United States:
    • The President
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Tasca
    • Ambassador Symington
    • Mr. Rostow, The White House
    • Assistant Secretary Palmer
    • Mr. Root, AFN
    • Mr. Saunders, The White House
    • Mr. Glenn, Language Services
    • Mr. Nowfel, Language Services

The King stressed that while he would prefer to be concerned only with problems of economic development, he must worry about the security of his nation. One reason for concern, for example, is the effect which will be produced by the return to Algeria of 2,000 young officers who are being trained in the Soviet Union. It has been shown that sometimes two hundred well organized officers can carry out a political takeover. This is a disquieting factor, whatever may be the relative moderation of the Algerian leaders. Another point of concern is the progressive erosion of Algerian independence. The enormous armaments which Algeria has received have decreased Algerian freedom of action in the diplomatic field. They have tied the Algerian economy to Soviet production plans.

The King said that he had to worry about the security of his nation. In addition to a military danger, Algeria is a source of subversion. If the armaments being brought into Algeria were of a type which would be used purely for internal purposes he would not worry, but Algeria’s tanks and missiles are not appropriate for a mountainous country and can be used only for aggression. Algeria has assembled armaments [Page 197] beyond the Moroccan border which include a number of supersonic jet bombers, 40 MIG 21s, 800 artillery pieces (against the 80 in the hands of Moroccans), 450 tanks (against the less than 120 in Morocco) and an army of 60,000 men (against 35,000 in Morocco).

Algeria can be encouraged to use its armaments for aggressive purposes if it knows there is no counterforce capable of opposing it beyond the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Morocco does not wish to enter into an arms race with Algeria; all it needs is enough weapons to hold for three days, enough time for the Security Council to gather and demand cessation of military action. During its long history Morocco has always been able to defend its borders and its honor. It has never sought to conquer alien territory. Morocco would fight with empty bottles if necessary but empty bottles would be useless against the Algerian arsenal.

The King said he was told by Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow that the latter would not like Morocco to become entangled with such friends of the USSR as the UAR, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Tanzania, Syria and Yemen. Under the circumstances, Morocco must turn towards friendly, like-minded, richer countries to ask for help.

The President said that the United States recognizes Morocco’s concern for its security, and for this reason the President has approved the sale of $14 million of military equipment, subject to the usual proviso in American policy that the materiel in question be used exclusively for defensive purposes. A further proviso is that the purchase of this equipment would not hurt the Moroccan economy. It would also be wise to play down the already over-publicized question of military aid.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” The conversation was held at the White House. Memoranda of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of other topics with King Hassan on February 9 are ibid.↩