131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Your Talk with King Hassan
King Hassan sets especially great store by his meeting with you. When he saw President Kennedy in 1963, they negotiated the terms under which we stayed on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at our naval [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] commo base at Kenitra after closing down our big SAC bases. He has more reason than many of our smaller-country visitors for figuring that the way to do business with the U.S. is to sit down with the President.
[Page 194]From our point of view, there is no such burning issue as the base question this time. The visit is mostly his initiative.
From his point of view, however, the visit will be crucial in determining where his big-power support will come from. He is at odds with De Gaulle, his former mentor. German economic and military help has been disappointing. He disputes Spain’s claim to the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara. He doesn’t trust the USSR, which has sent $180 million in military equipment to Algeria. A closer relationship with the U.S. seems his best remaining bet.
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
He probably won’t expect you to take him up on this, but the offer is a measure of his worry. His main interest in talking with you is to discuss the Algerian threat. He’ll probably settle for an OK on his request for $14 million in military sales, but he may probe pretty hard to see how far we’d go in coming to his aid.
In answering this pitch, you can explain your political problems with such commitments. You can tell him of our willingness to sell military equipment to the amount of $14 million, which he requested. You can say we’d be deeply concerned by any attack on him.
However, it would also help if you could outline our hope for North African regional cooperation. You might describe the spirit of regionalism you found in Manila and elsewhere on your Asian trip. With all of their resources and advanced economic base, it would be tragic if the North African nations let suspicion undercut what they could accomplish together. This is why we are reluctant to see Morocco spend too much on arms. You’ll have to concede that Algeria is a problem, but you may find a way to point out gently that both Algeria and Spain are seriously worried about Morocco’s own territorial claims against them.
Hassan will also want to discuss food, and you can tell him you’ve approved his wheat sale for the second half of the year (167,000 tons). In doing so, you might want to give him your picture of the world food problem and your own political difficulties in continuing food aid. Morocco suffered drought last summer and has launched a crash fertilizer project (which we’re helping with). But population growth is still ahead of food production, and encouragement from you would help. The King wrote you a good letter last fall on what Morocco is doing in agriculture, but he’s still in the stage of talking a better game than he plays.
The same is generally true of his whole developmental effort. He’s done a lot of basic work in the foothills but hasn’t begun to climb yet (see attached charts).2 However, AID has picked Morocco as one of its concentration [Page 195] countries. That doesn’t mean we’ll be spending a lot of money there. It does mean that our aid has dropped sharply from the artificially high level (over $70 million at the peak) [1 line of source text not declassified] and is now seeking a more appropriate level (around $10 million).
In connection with our food aid, you’ll want to note the restrictions Congress has put on the program. The Findley amendment causes us special trouble with Morocco, which barters phosphates for badly needed Cuban sugar. We’ve tried—so far without success—to help the Moroccans find a better deal elsewhere. Nevertheless, Hassan is ready to give you his personal assurance that he will phase this trade down. It’s on the basis of his assurance that you will be signing the Findley waiver.
Leonard Marks would like you to ask for a firmer tenure (now year-to-year) for his Voice of America relay transmitter. If he could nail that down, he might delay building a new $25 million facility in Spain. However, State feels we ought to let sleeping dogs lie. In negotiating our stay at the naval commo station, President Kennedy mentioned five years, which would expire in 1968. Nevertheless, we’re in a better position not raising the subject and making the Moroccans ask us to leave. If the King raises the subject, you could express our appreciation and confirm our desire to stay.
I ought to warn you that these talks are more likely than most to take an unexpected turn. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] He may, for instance, press hard for an answer on the security guarantee and, when you don’t give him one, ask to come back and see you again Friday. (He got an extra meeting with President Kennedy.) You will sense how to handle him, but forewarned is forearmed.
The King may also press for a communique, which we don’t normally include in this simpler visit format. My solution to this would be to ask George Christian at his Thursday afternoon briefing to make a fairly formal statement of subjects discussed which we might check with the King’s party. He could announce the PL 480 deal then and perhaps a couple of smaller loans that are ready to go. He could even invite one of the King’s party to be present.
State’s briefing memo is attached.3 Secretary Rusk’s involvement with Brandt has so far kept him from signing the original. However, this does represent the Department’s recommendation. I believe our discussion at lunch Tuesday gives you most of the background you need so doubt you will need to look at background papers. I’ll have a last-minute talking paper for you in the morning.