Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, February 13, 1967, 5:23 p.m.

136042. 1. King Hassan of Morocco departed for New York this morning after two-day informal visit Washington Feb 9–10 as guest President Johnson. King and party will be private visitors New York until departure for Morocco by plane late evening Feb 17.

2. King Hassan had about hour’s conversation with President on Feb 9 and made brief farewell call on President Feb 10.² King continued substantive discussions with Secretary morning Feb 10. Fuller details of discussions will be provided you in due course, but following are highlights (based uncleared memcon and for your background only) of meeting Feb 9 with President:

a) President told King US attached great importance Moroccan self-help efforts in field of agriculture (King affirmed economic development, particularly in agriculture, his most important concern). Meanwhile, to help Morocco over effects serious drought US prepared to provide Morocco further PL–480 sales of 167,000 tons wheat.³

b) President informed King that in view Morocco’s concern for its security US prepared make $14 million credit sales military equipment for defensive purposes, details to be worked out subsequently. (Deliveries will be spread out over several years.) President said this assistance predicated on use for defense only and on Moroccan dedication to peaceful policies.

c) King emphasized what Morocco hoped to achieve next four years in agricultural development, through extensive irrigation and other improvements. He said he could nevertheless not neglect Morocco’s security and had responsibility as Moroccan monarch take into account disturbing developments in Algeria next door. He dwelt at considerable length on future dangers implicit in Algerian arms buildup and return 2,000 Soviet-trained Algerian military personnel. Morocco had to be able defend itself against attack for at least few days (until Security Council could act).

d) King said of course he had no choice but to turn to friends who thought as Morocco, had necessary resources and could help. (He obviously appreciative offers arms sales and wheat and did not seek further specific commitments.)

e) On Kenitra naval communications center and VOA Tangier, he assured President our use these facilities could continue.⁴

f) President and King of course referred to problems of peace in world generally, with President stressing particularly our efforts achieve peace Vietnam but finding so far no serious response from other side. President expressed appreciation Morocco’s understanding and support this matter.

3. In addition foregoing, U.S.-Moroccan cultural agreement was signed Feb 10 at Moroccan Embassy by Secretary and Moroccan Foreign Minister in King’s presence. (Agreement is standard form for its kind and carries no immediate or explicit obligations.)

4. Comment: Moroccans seemed highly pleased with visit and it went off well from US viewpoint. We are anxious of course to downplay arms question and in answer to press inquiries are giving following background guidance: “There will be limited expansion of our present program of modest arms sales to Morocco for purely defensive purposes. Categories of defensive armaments remain to be worked out. None of this should be construed as sudden infusion of military support for Morocco, but is merely part of our ongoing program”.

5. If you are questioned by officials your capital, you should stick to this formulation regarding arms sales (but mention no figures) and emphasize that President and King talked about security in area solely in terms of Moroccan defense. Any assistance we furnish will be solely for defense, condition which King accepted without question.

6. Two leaders agreed moreover on overriding importance devoting resources in North African area to peaceful pursuits. King said his main interest was in economic development his country and in this connection two leaders agreed on importance regional cooperation.

7. For Embassy Algiers: We appreciate difficulties which newspaper focus on question military assistance may cause you, but trust you will exert best efforts with GOA place matters in true perspective. Any additional military sales to Morocco will be within very low figure (negligible fraction of what Algeria has already received from USSR), remain to be negotiated, will be related strictly to Morocco’s minimum defensive needs and will take several years to deliver. There can thus be no question of contributing to “arms race”. We strongly hope therefore that GOA can be convinced that such a marginal contribution to Morocco’s defensive capabilities would in no way require or justify further Algerian acquisitions. King did not raise border problems with President (El Fassi and Minister Saharan Affairs never appeared in conversations) and there was no sign of bellicose, irredentist attitude. On contrary, Hassan seemed genuinely anxious live on good terms with his North African neighbors. In fact, discussions dealt largely with problems of food, agricultural development and regional economic cooperation.

8. FYI: Prospects for early decision on Title IV sale of 200,000 tons wheat to Algeria seem very good and it would be unfortunate if Algerian press complicates matters in any way at this point. End FYI.

9. For Madrid: Much foregoing guidance applies to your concerns. While King never raised Morocco’s territorial claims with President, he subsequently referred to Spanish Sahara problem with Secretary. His comments were, however, within context peaceful resolution of problem in accordance principle self-determination. Further details on this discussion will follow.

10. For Paris: In addition to foregoing, you may find it useful reassure French officials that, whatever may be exaggerations of press, there was in fact nothing in visit that changed in any way past US policies limited assistance to Morocco and that King has been given no reason to think we have any desire, capability or intent of trying “replace French.” On contrary, Moroccans have every reason to appreciate importance we continue to attach to Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and therefore to avoidance further difficulties in this relationship. Cultural agreement was added fillip during visit but in fact is standard text of its kind and signifies no more than expression of principle which appears on its face.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root on February 11, cleared by Landau in EUR/SPP and Saunders, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Algiers, Madrid, Paris, and Tunis and repeated by pouch to Cairo, London, and Tripoli.
2. President Johnson’s conversation with King Hassan on February 10 was recorded in three memoranda of conversation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67.
3. A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of P.L. 480 wheat sales to Morocco with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid.
4. A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of the U.S. facilities at Tangier and Kenitra with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid.