Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

89. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 16, 1967, 1150Z.

5379. Ref: Aden 1168² and State 155272.³

1. As seen from here there is little possibility that SAFG with limited British support now planned will either be able maintain order after independence and withdrawal British forces or become viable government.

2. It seems increasingly clear that UAR is committed to establishment of progressive revolutionary regime in South Arabia and is prepared use force to this end. This intent was most recently confirmed by President Nasser during his final conversation with Ambassador Battle on March 4 and is evident in UARG public statements, reports of creation nationalist “liberation army” and rising pace of terrorism and extremism in Aden.

3. We believe our ability thwart UARG designs in South Arabia is extremely limited and virtual chaos which likely result from actively pursued insurgency against regime created and supported by British can only be avoided by adequate UN military and political presence during several year interim period. We do not see direct British-FLOSY talks as having much chance producing anything unless British willing sacrifice SAFG and begin working with nationalists in effort find combination acceptable to FLOSY and NLF leadership and to UAR.

4. Alternatively, all concerned including British and ourselves can let nature take its course, which we see as messy rearguard British withdrawal, period of civil war perhaps followed by de facto split of South Arabia with revolutionary pro-UAR Aden either independent or absorbed by Yemen on one hand and fragmented tribes of protectorate falling under whatever protection Saudi Arabia can afford them on the other.

5. Question we cannot answer here is whether such a situation would in truth be harmful to US political and strategic interests in area. We seem to have been able to live quite happily with UAR control of Suez Canal and Red Sea as exercised during past decade and may be able tolerate UAR presence in South Arabia without damage our position in area. In any event believe it essential we determine now what our interests are and what we are prepared to live with.

6. Also we must not forget that South Arabia is essentially an Arab problem. The conflicts in both areas result largely from Arab quarrels and except for our security guarantee and military support for Saudi Arabia and Britain’s colonial role, foreign influences have thus far been minimal. Must be recognized however, that present trends if continued will probably lead to far more active Soviet involvement on side revolutionary progressive forces and Vietnam type situation could result.

Nes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Taiz, Aden, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 88.
3. Document 88.