Office of the Historian

85. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, March 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Arabian Peninsula

1. Saturday, March 4, I had lunch with Bill Brewer, who has just returned from a tour of the Arabian Peninsula. He found:

(a)
The Sheikdom of Abu Dabi is as reactionary as ever, though senior members of the British Foreign Office have a romantic notion that he is likely to change his spots.
(b)
The situation in Aden is a mess, and substantial disorders are in the wind.
(c)
There is no doubt in Bill’s mind that Nasser is warming up to play a preponderant role in Aden. As you know, over a thousand members of a “liberation” army have returned from training in Cairo and Yemen. All they need is for arms to be given to them and for the British to withdraw. Presumably more trainees will be coming from Cairo.
(d)
Bill found the Saudis deeply concerned by our seeming passivity in the face of Britain’s withdrawal and UAR ambitions. Bill feels we have a serious credibility problem with Faisal.
(e)
Bill does not think we would all take with equanimity an Egyptian move into Aden with the increased Soviet influence in this area such a move would imply. Bill is exploring in State the political implications to us of uncontested UAR control of Aden. He wonders whether it might not be possible to beef up our small naval forces off of Aden to demonstrate to the UAR that we do not favor a movement of UAR or “liberation” forces into Aden. His argument is that if we do not do something like this, Faisal, the Shah, and all the other oil rulers will feel we have abandoned them to the “revolutionary forces”.
(f)
Combining this view with Hal’s report2 leads me to the following tentative propositions:
(i)
we must find ways of asserting more unambiguous U.S. interest in the area promptly;
(ii)
we should proceed with some food to the UAR as a partial way of demonstrating we are not attempting to bring Nasser down; a new Ambassador may help;
(iii)
at the same time, we should increase our naval presence in the Aden area to demonstrate to both Faisal and Nasser that we do not expect an Egyptian take-over in Aden.

Such a two-pronged policy should not be beyond our ability to define and to get accepted. We can explore this and other variations when Hal returns. 2. In the meantime, Rodger Davies is sorting out the “Food for the UAR” issue between Brewer (representing the Saudis) and Don Bergus (representing Cairo). I’ll keep you informed of their recommendations to Nick.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1967. No classification marking.↩
  2. For Saunders’ report on U.S.-U.A.R. relations, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Document 394.↩