Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

394. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, March 6, 1967, 1321Z.

CAP 67111. Fresh from his stop in Cairo, Hal Saunders of my staff who is quietly touring the Middle East² has reported the following.

1. Nasser should be told soon one way or the other about wheat. It has come to symbolize our future intent toward him and his regime.

2. Help on the IMF negotiations is nearly as important. Officials argue they’ve cut expenditures, have made real economic achievements. Their self help performance is “relatively positive.”

3. No one in Cairo believes the Soviets and Nasser are working hand in glove. There is parallelism of policy, but Cairo wants to avoid Soviet control.

4. Because the UAR is the chief power in the Middle East, and modernizing rapidly, Saunders believes we should build some kind of new relationship.

5. He doubts this can be done unless you and Nasser meet somewhere to define your areas of common interest and disagreement. He acknowledges the risks, but hopes we will consider this carefully, since Cairo persists in seeing everything we do in the area as directed against him—those not actively with him must be against him. (WWR Comment: Perhaps a letter from you could do the job.)

6. Hal commends a cautious but revitalized policy to rebuild our position in Cairo, avoiding equally the over-enthusiasm of the early 1960’s and the distrust of today.

Comment

We’ve shown this to Nick Katzenbach only. He plans to pursue wheat for the UAR a bit further on the Hill before making a recommendation to you. Probably a small amount as a gift, about matching the Soviet Union’s 250,000 ton gift (which Ellender, among others, seems to prefer over a credit sale!). We have some doubts on the timing, because it may be seen both in Egypt and Arabia as a reward for raising hell. But this will be looked into before the recommendation comes to you.

Hal will be back in ten days, when we can go into the complex of Middle East issues with a fresh look.

Fm Harold Saunders 8693

To the White House eyes only for Walt Rostow and Howard Wriggins

Following impressions my intensive talks in Cairo with Foreign Minister, Treasury and Economy Ministers and others bear on your wheat decision.

• First. We ought to say something to Egyptians about wheat soon one way or the other. Dragging out line that we have food request “under consideration” reaps all disadvantages of negative answer without gaining advantages of keeping door open. Months of ambiguity plus other events Mid East have convinced Egyptians we have cast our lot with other side and for that reason have decided against wheat aid. They say bitterly that even Dulles gave them an answer.
• Second. Wheat decision unfortunately more than ever symbol our future intent because it involves both development and human requirements. We would be a lot better off if we could get off this wicket but for moment it looks as if wheat alone can break stalemate. I think we might get away with dollar sale as long as grace period long enough to cover next three years which Egyptians see as period of real economic pinch. After that, they not euphoric but do seem have reason hope oil and other slowly increasing exports plus improved import substitution will begin pay off.
• Third. To economic insiders, help in new IMF negotiations almost as important as food decision. Main point made to me by Nazi Deif and Hamed El Sayeh whom you met last fall is that they have succeeded in bringing expenditures under control in six months since IMF talks began. Therefore new situation exists here and Gunter Mission must come end March with some give its position.
• Fourth. Despite political symbolism both these issues and contrary conception created by usual intra-USG justification our aid program in UAR. This far from purely political program designed bribe Nasser keep out of our UAR. Washington, especially the press and Congress, badly needs understand that UAR not just proverbial rathole down which we pour our aid. All Washington fully aware foreign exchange bind. Point not widely appreciated is degree to which this a place of real achievement and sound planning. I now understand why World Bank relatively optimistic despite gaps in execution. I well know weakness this argument in offsetting Nasser’s polemics, but it important President know that self-help case relatively positive.
• Fifth. I found no one Cairo willing assert that Nasser and Soviets working hand in glove. Soviet-like political model adopted for pragmatic reasons since Western style democracy not suitable Nasser’s style. Hard evidence any firm Moscow-Cairo understanding lacking. Soviet influence and parallelism interests substantial. But Egyptian desire avoid Soviet control is unanimous impression.
• Sixth. Because Egyptians are making honest development effort and do not look like Communist tools, believe it still possible build some kind US–UAR relationship if we consider it worthwhile. After seeing energy with which Egypt modernizing, I do not see how we can do otherwise, though I recognize domestic pressures may tip judgment other way. Common argument for relationship is that Nasser can cause us so much trouble elsewhere. This true but in my view misses simpler main point that Egypt clearly chief power modern Middle East.
• Seventh. If we do want to sustain long-term US position Cairo, only sound foundation I can see is eventual meeting between Nasser and President. Because our contradictory interests in Near East will always feed Egyptian suspicion we working against them, only way establish accurate picture limits our objectives is for two Presidents reach understanding each other’s purposes and agree on inevitable areas disagreement. I could see this working out much as President’s understanding with Ayub. I realize hard thought needed weigh risks for President against disadvantages, but I am convinced as never before that wide gulf misunderstanding unlikely be bridged any other way. Ambassador Battle essentially agrees, though he wisely cautious we should not try this unless we willing sustain followup.

My main reason for arguing this case is that our biggest problem in Cairo today is that no amount of logic sufficient persuade Egyptians that everything we do in Near East not directed at them. It amazing what shreds of evidence they have woven together to prove this to themselves. These not just debating points. Every official I talked to from Foreign Minister on down obviously sincerely believes this. Main thread this fabric of illogic seems be philosophy those not helping them must be against them.

Unfortunately, there just enough truth their evidence to make it difficult refute. For instance, editorial and Congressional statements that get most play made by people who have in fact chosen sides here. Even more damaging, McNamara statement that tensions in Middle East “sparked by UAR” considered coup de grace in argument that we view Cairo as the enemy.

Therefore, if we wish stop drifting this part of world one major pillar revitalized policy must be some effort rebuild in Cairo. Last five years have taught us not go too far too fast or expect too much. Fortunately international tools at hand in IMF and World Bank study and not impossible try moving gradually to position we shooting for in 1961–62.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. The message is dated March 4; it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:21 a.m. on March 6. A handwritten “L” on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President.
2. Saunders visited the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. He reported his conclusions in a May 16 memorandum to Rostow, which Rostow forwarded to the President on May 17. (Ibid., Name File, Saunders Memos)