393. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
5030. 1. I made farewell call which lasted one hour and ten minutes on President Nasser March 4. After exchange pleasantries during which he expressed regret my departure, I said I wished reflect on some of my final conclusions and impressions as I left this country where I had made many friends and in which I had had a very rewarding tour of duty.
2. I said I was more convinced than when I came of the rightness of US goals in the area. Seeking peace and stability as we do, we must attempt maintain as friendly relations as possible with as many countries as possible. This not an easy course. In large measure changes in relations Arab countries to each other frequently resulted in suspicions re US motives and aims. For example, I mentioned sales arms Jordan stemming from UAC assessment defense needs that country, an arrangement which Egyptians now appeared in some strange way view with suspicion. On Yemen, Saudis suspected we more tolerant Egyptian attitudes than of their own and Egyptians considered we supported Saudis. In truth we have no material interest in Yemen and wish only see peaceful resolution that problem, which is danger to relations between our friends the Saudis and our friends the Egyptians. In accordance his instructions, Hassan Sabry el Khouly and others his government have kept me fully informed re UAR efforts at various times resolve situation. I still hoped way could be found bring about peaceful resolution this difficult area problem. At various times Egyptians had indicated to me that if US wanted solution Yemen problem, we should play more active role that direction. I wanted to ask him today whether on my return Washington to assume broader responsibilities for area relations I should urge my government offer join in one of several offers mediate or take initiative on our own in that direction.
3. President then launched into lengthy discussion Yemen, saying he had gone to Jidda to conclude agreement Feisal against advice his colleagues and had entered agreement “on my own responsibility”. As he landed for Jidda meetings, he felt nervous and uncertain, but felt he must make effort resolve conflict. Since that time many actions had entered into situation, including Islamic Pact, Aden problem and other difficulties. He could not at present be hopeful solution. Yemen operation not now costly to UAR although has been in past. UAR can remain indefinitely and will do so if necessary. He was always interested offers [Page 769] solution but not hopeful in view Feisal’s arrangements Jordan and in view their determination to view his earlier efforts as sign weakness, which Jidda agreement had not in fact reflected.
4. I said I took it from his remarks that he would not oppose any efforts by US if we thought we could be helpful but he did not appear hold out much hope chance success any US efforts. He replied this was his attitude although he appeared pause and be somewhat reflective in his response.
5. Nasser then launched into thirty minute tirade of most emotional character yet displayed in my meetings with him. He said UAR proud, independent country with its own dignity. He had decided in thinking over my call on him to be very frank and he hoped I would not take offense at anything he said, but he must deal lucidly and frankly with issues. UAR would not respond US pressure. It did not want American wheat. During time we had provided wheat he had gone to bed each night disturbed that UAR dependent on US for food and had resented each item in American or world press reminding UAR that five out of each eight loaves of its bread were provided by US. UAR would not accept interference by other countries. It was not influenced by Russia and would not be. Whether he remained or not, attitudes UAR re its own independence would be consistent and those lieutenants he trained would take same position as he took. UAR had no designs other countries contrary our impression and our press but wanted, for example, Aden to be ruled by revolutionary forces and not British stooges. Re Israel, his views are well known. He hoped Arabs could return.
6. He then switched to IMF, asking why he should pay IMF 104 million dollar debt when it would not give him seventy million dollars to which he felt entitled. In meeting in that room a few days ago, when some of his colleagues voiced concern re UAR relations IMF, he had stated UAR must stand on own feet and if IMF and all Western Interests refused do business with UAR, UAR would still survive and make progress. UAR would have been better off if it had not in developing its economic plans based those plans upon continued supply wheat which had distorted development efforts by permitting broader program than justified. If any country attempted hurt UAR, UAR would respond and no doubt could do damage US and other countries.
7. I replied by asking his permission be as frank with him as he had been with me, saying I would not under any circumstances wish offend him in my last meeting but I must answer as frankly as he had on statements he had made.
8. The US had entered into food arrangement, which admittedly had become issue of its own between us, in hope providing help which would accelerate development and be of help to Egyptian people. Based on his speeches, it appeared he had given up hope continuing these arrangements [Page 770] before I had and before Executive Branch had completed deliberations on matter. During recent days, for example, consultations had been under way with Congressional leaders, that consultation had not been helped by his own statements and those of Heikal with respect our relations and motives. (I mentioned specifically latest Heikal article.)
9. He interrupted, saying he had given up hope of wheat several months ago and reminded me that he had never before brought up wheat in conversation with me and that I had always raised matter first. He could not approve efforts his Ambassador Washington to obtain wheat in manner that appeared be begging on knees.
10. I went on to say US Government and I personally respected need for UAR be independent, dignified country and we wanted see it develop viable economy and we still hoped for success in those goals and in his achievements and aims for his people.
11. He referred to fact that he owned several newspapers in Beirut and that Saudis and Jordanians also had newspaper spokesman in area. Indicated he had been restrained in his response many of their attacks on UAR but could only accept so much and had had to respond to them.
12. I said that I wished remind him as I had in past that he was world figure and that each utterance coming from him was read and interpreted throughout world and that his remarks more important than newspaper stories one kind or another. While this great compliment to his influence in world, it was also responsibility to bear as I well recognized. I said there was no doubt ability many countries hurt each other, including ourselves, but we must find way to build lasting friendship which I was convinced both sides really wanted. I hoped he could find satisfactory relationships IMF and with West. He replied, “If we cannot, we will go on with other countries.”
13. In closing I repeated that US policy in area had not changed and that we sought continued friendship UAR and that while I had not succeeded in removing suspicions and doubts and problems from agenda, I had every intention in new assignment continue my efforts and I hoped he would view future as long time indeed in which we would try overcome various problems between US in relations often marked by such ups and downs.
14. Nasser was more emotional than I have ever seen him and at moments developed glaze over eyes typical of that we have seen when he makes speeches. He was at all times extremely cordial to me, very friendly and warm and at various moments of tirade against US said not to take it personally. In view his attitudes re US mediation Yemen, I cannot be hopeful. Suggest we wait few days, however, to see whether idea picked up by lower level officials.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Amman.↩