471. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

102181. State 92898.2 Yemen Situation.

1.
Recent weeks appear have been characterized by sharp but inconclusive fighting. Air attacks and ground action by Republicans have held off but not stopped Royalists. Both sides employing tribesmen. [Page 866] Reports indicate skirmishes, attacks and battles as widely spread as Rada west of Dhamar, Maswar and Hajjah west of Sanaa, Maabar south of Sanaa and Khamr to north of it. While some of these locations as far as 80-100 miles from Sanaa, we also note reported shelling city itself. This connection, only Embassy believed still Sanaa is Chinese, others either moved to Hudayda or Taiz. Royalists claim two airports Sanaa now under their control. Republican air access Sanaa said be limited DC-3 type planes using small dirt strip northern suburbs city. Roads from Sanaa to Taiz and Hudayda apparently still cut. Second MIG aircraft reported downed by Royalists but confirmation lacking.
2.
Soviets remain visibly less involved than early December. Syrian pilots as well as Yemenis reportedly flying combat missions. USSR undoubtedly backing YAR but Pravda has shown sensitivity over public references to its involvement by disclaiming reports re participation Soviet citizens in combat and by drawing attention instead to mercenaries in Royalists’ employ. Notwithstanding radical Arab propaganda, according British observer with one Royalist group only handful 13 foreign mercenaries, mainly French, in important Eastern sector commanded by leading Hamid al-Din Prince Muhammad Hussain.
3.
Arab Tripartite Committee’s efforts organize Yemeni session Beirut to prepare for wider popular Yemeni conference, so far have failed. Republicans refused sit with Hamid al-Din representative and Royalists refused meet until Soviets and Syrians ceased aid to YAR. Tripartite Committee has now called for Nasser and Faisal intercede to try eliminate obstacles to a conference. On January 19 Tass commented that Tripartite Commission failed yield results “primarily because of uncamouflaged subversive activities Saudi Arabia.”
4.
Meanwhile YARG UN representative Jaghman has confirmed to Dept YARG willing allow American (or, presumably, third country national) pilot to remove US mission aircraft from Yemen. Jaghman indicated YARG might also be willing consider USG’s claims against damage sustained US property in Yemen. Jaghman also sought unsuccessfully persuade us assign officer to Italian Embassy in Yemen. (FYI. Plans now underway remove plane and compensation claim will be submitted, but we avoiding any action (e.g. assignment USG personnel to Yemen) which might at this juncture be seen as favoring either side. End FYI.)
5.
USG position regarding developments in Yemen has consistently been to encourage indigenous peaceful solution. Department made statement along these lines available to press January 16 reiterating [Page 867] no Americans in Yemen serving either side.3 USG position has been made clear to King Faisal.4
6.
Comment: Apparent failure Tripartite Committee’s most recent effort bring Yemenis to conference table are disappointing and suggest that neither Republicans nor Royalists believe they likely be defeated. Outlook thus for further bloodshed, at least until military situation less inconclusive than at present.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore on January 10, cleared by Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin, and approved by Brewer. Sent to Ankara, Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tunis.
  2. Document 470.
  3. For text of the Department’s statement on January 16, see circular telegram 99676, January 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
  4. Telegram 94464 to Jidda, January 6, instructed the Embassy to urge the Saudi Government to exert its influence to persuade the royalists to cooperate more fully with the present Arab conciliation effort. (Ibid.) In telegram 2315 from Jidda, January 7, Eilts reported that he had conveyed the Department’s concerns to Mas’ud that day. (Ibid.)