Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, August 22, 1964, 10:51 a.m.

104. Jidda tels 133, 134 and 143.² Faisal open reinvolvement Yemen clearly counter US interests of damping down struggle. It would seem equally counter Faisal’s own interest of maintaining stability and forward thrust of development and reform program within Saudi Arabia.

Faisal understandably disturbed by UAR overflights which themselves provocative. At same time must be realized that UAR is aware of continued Saudi assistance to royalists and that overflights appear to have been observational, connected with major military operation in Yemen rather than hostilities directed against SAG. We have no indication that UAR proposing any military move against Saudi Arabia, either from Yemen in context current campaign or through tripartite deal. However UAR seems particularly intent in current operation on crushing royalists prior Arab Summit Two, with initial successes reported. Faisal strong reaction recent overflights indicates he may be seizing on them as pretext for final attempt bolster fading royalist cause and strengthen his own position before discussion with Nasser.

USG continues support integrity Saudi Arabia, but would consider resumption open aid to royalists, particularly at time present concentrated military operation, as provocatory. While we willing consider visible “re-statement” our concern for Saudi Arabia in form USAF squadron visit, such action would be difficult in face unprovoked SAG aid to royalists.

We gratified that Faisal does not appear intent on rushing aid to royalists. If this the case, major immediate concern becomes potential UAR reaction to movement Saudi arms and troops to border. If Egyptians interpret this as opening move to concentrate troops and establish munition dumps in preparation for massive assistance al-Badr, they may react with cross-border bomb attacks within military operational framework in pattern 1962-63. Thus urgent need exists dissuade UAR from further overflights and from over-reacting to Saudi defensive move to frontiers.

Action Requested

For Jidda. You should re-emphasize to Faisal (or Saqqaf for Faisal) that our concern for and interest in Saudi Arabia remains same as it has in past, that in all sincerity we maintain our policy of support for SAG against unprovoked aggression. At same time, exacerbation by SAG of Yemen situation by provoking military confrontation with UAR, would make it difficult for us come to Saudi support. While expressing understanding for legitimate defensive posture, you should strongly urge Saudis avoid any appearance of becoming reinvolved in Yemen problem and suggest they may wish make very clear to UAR purpose, extent and limits their present mobilization on frontier in order avoid any mistaken hasty UAR reaction. Affirm that we have absolutely no indications that UAR troops Yemen intend transgress Saudi soil; nor do we have any report from any other source concerning alleged tripartite plot. (FYI. Department considering what further action may be desirable in light recommendations this subject contained your 146.)³

For Cairo. At highest possible level you should express our concern that UAR overflights Saudi Arabia serve needlessly to inflame UAR-Saudi relations and threaten confrontation which clearly would not be in UAR, Saudi or YAR interests in area. Urge strongly that UAR not react unnecessarily to Saudi frontier mobilization which SAG has fully assured us is entirely of defensive nature. You should stress our view that greater UAR-Saudi rapprochement, especially concerning Yemen, much to be desired; we hope this will be outcome Nasser-Faisal meeting in September.

For Taiz. In your discussions with YARG and UARG officials you should emphasize need for not allowing short range military requirements of present operation to obscure greater importance of avoiding actions which would arouse Saudi fears and be apt provoke sharp Saudi reaction to detriment possible easing of Yemen situation.

For USUN. You should inform UNSYG or Bunche of Faisal’s concern that UAR military action against Saudi Arabia contemplated and of Saudi remilitarization border area (Jidda tel 133) and ask if he has up-to-date assessment of situation from UNYOM. You authorized tell him of our demarches in Cairo and Jidda, above.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore on August 21; cleared by Symmes, Campbell, and Stoddard (DOD/ISA); and approved by Grant. Also sent to Cairo, Taiz, and USUN and repeated to Amman, London, Baghdad, Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey.
2. Telegram 133 from Jidda, August 19; telegram 134 from Jidda, August 19; and telegram 143 from Jidda, August 20; none printed. (All ibid.)
3. In telegram 146 from Jidda, August 21, Hart recommended a warm Presidential letter to Faisal, and consultation with London on strengthening U.S.-U.K. cooperation in the Arabian peninsula. (Ibid.) In telegram 156 from Jidda, August 23, the Ambassador stated that it was in the U.S. interest for him to see Faisal with the message in telegram 104 and that he would talk it over with Saqqaf first. He noted that it now seemed clear that Faisal’s action in reinforcing the south, although multiple in purpose, was weighted by his desire to show Nasser that he could react quickly and strongly. Hart did not think that Faisal would send forces over the frontier or renew aid to the royalists before the summit. (Ibid.) Telegram 106 to Jidda, August 24, advised Hart that he could delay the demarche at his discretion, and that a proposed draft letter was being sent by separate telegram. (Ibid.)