345. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Letter from Crown Prince Faisal to the President on Renunciation of Disengagement Agreement
In the enclosed letter to the President2 and in discussion with Ambassador Hart at the time of its presentation on August 17, Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia expressed his belief in a U.A.R.-sponsored plot to divide Saudi Arabia among Jordan, Iraq and Yemen. Referring to U.A.R. overflights of Saudi Arabia on August 13 and 15, he voiced his fear that a current U.A.R. military operation in Yemen would lead to an attack against Saudi territory. He stated that as a result he was sending troops and weapons to the Yemen border to defend his country and that he considered the disengagement agreement to be ended after September 4. He would then feel himself free to help the royalist dissidents in Yemen as he saw fit. However, he still intends to go to [Page 654] the Arab Summit Conference at Alexandria on September 5 where he will talk to Nasser concerning the Yemen if the latter raises the subject. He has not set a date for resumption of aid to the royalists.
We have no information concerning the highly improbable alleged Arab plot against Faisal. There are also no indications that Egyptian military activity in Yemen is directed against Saudi Arabia. The Egyptians, aware of continued Saudi assistance to the royalists, appear to have overflown Saudi territory only in connection with their present major offensive in Yemen, aimed at finally eliminating royalist opposition. Faisal may be seizing the overflights as an excuse to prop up the royalists in Yemen and thus strengthen his own position prior to discussions with Nasser. Of major concern is possible U.A.R. reaction to the movement of Saudi arms to the border. Should the Egyptians believe that this equipment is destined for the royalists, bombing raids on munition dumps across the frontier could occur in the pattern followed by the U.A.R. in late 1962.
Faisal asked specifically where we would stand in case of fighting between U.A.R. and Saudi troops. In restating our 1963 position of support for Faisal against unprovoked attack, Ambassador Hart noted that we would consider further aid to the royalists as a provocation. We intend to instruct him to repeat this stand to Faisal, to inform the Crown Prince of our intelligence estimates that no military threat to Saudi Arabia currently exists and to urge that Saudi Arabia not become reinvolved in the Yemen. We will press Cairo not to continue overflights and not to react unnecessarily against the movement of Saudi troops within their own territory. We will inform U Thant of Faisal’s concern and ask if he has received an up-to-date assessment of the situation from the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission which could be passed to Faisal. We are considering the desirability of a subsequent United States Air Force fighter squadron training exercise in Saudi Arabia as a reassurance of our continued interest to Faisal, provided he clearly forswears provoking the situation by increased aid to the royalists.
Pending the results of the foregoing approaches, we do not recommend that the President reply to Faisal at this moment.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret.↩
- Document 344.↩
- Deputy Executive Secretary Grant G. Hilliker signed for Read.↩