Office of the Historian

338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen1

Washington, May 26, 1964, 4:23 p.m.

720. Embtel 674.2 You should continue press YARG agree talk with UK under UN aegis. We have not given up hope UK will relent and [Page 642] believe possible YARG approval will favorably influence UK. Meanwhile, we continuing press HMG both here and in London.3 FYI. Fact that al-Aini and Dean held private, exploratory discussion New York prior al-Aini departure for Yemen should be closely held and not revealed by you. End FYI.

For London: You should inform Foreign Office al-Aini now in Yemen and that Embassy Taiz being instructed capitalize on his presence to press YARG agree to border talks. Unless you perceive objection, request you again express strong hope HMG will see way clear to agreeing series of meetings with Yemenis under UN aegis, noting that unilateral UK refusal—eliminating best immediate prospect for abatement Yemeni-Adeni tensions—would be extremely regrettable.4

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Judd, and Dorrance; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to London and repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Aden, and USUN.↩
  2. Telegram 674 from Taiz, May 26, asked whether, in view of the reluctance of the United Kingdom to enter into direct talks with Yemen, the Embassy should continue to press the Yemeni Government for talks with the United Kingdom under the aegis of the United Nations. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 695 from Taiz, May 31, reported that Foreign Minister Sirri had stated definitely on May 30 in the presence of Ambassador al-Aini that Yemeni representatives were authorized to talk with the United Kingdom, but added that Yemen would not continue such talks unless British representatives were willing to discuss specifics. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram 5906 from London, May 27, Bruce reported that he had conveyed the substance of the Department’s telegram to the Head of the Arabian Department at the Foreign Office, Frank Brenchley, who expressed his personal view that if al-Aini returned to New York, the Arabian Department would be disposed to recommend to Butler that Dean have another talk with him. He assumed that Butler’s reaction would depend in large part on whether Yemeni deeds were consonant with its oral protestations of friendship, and noted the great sensitivity of such talks; even Sandys did not know about Dean’s first meeting with al-Aini. (Ibid.)↩